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ABSTRACT
Largely due to colonial experiences and the nature
of the country's geography and population, Costa Rica had
a fairly high level of social cohesiveness in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries . There was a
degree of consensus on fundamental questions which was
unusual in Latin America and, partly for this reason,
modern political parties, repz'esenting the interests of
identifiable social groups and fostering partisan politica
goals, did not emerge<> Thus, Costa Rica, paradoxically had
a more personalistic political tradition than Latin
countries whose political systems were, in other ways,
less mature.
Allowing for the many defects in the country's
political system, Costa Rica nevertheless was one of the
more democratic countries in Latin America or anywhere in
the tropics*

The political system was one of representa

tive, rather than direct, democracy, and it emphasized
civil liberties and formal participation in the political
process while tending to restrict actual decision-making
to a small group.

The system v/as maintained intact both

by the cohesive nature of society and by a considerable
level of legitimacy resting on a view of national history
to which many, probably a majority, of Costa Ricans
subscribed.

According to this view— which was part

fiction and part reality— Costa Rica was a tranquil
democracy, superior to its neighbors in political develop
ment and in general social well-being.
This traditional system was challenged in the
1940's by two separate groups, each representing a view of
society and government different from that of the tradi
tional system.

The first group, headed by President

Calderon, was dedicated to social reform and, in order to
further it, resorted to some undemocratic practices.

In

1948 a calderonista-dominated congress nullified the
presidential election of Otilio Ulate, an influential
journalist who was the leader of the traditional forces.
Forced to choose, as he saw it, between two of Costa Rica's
basic values— peaceful stability and democracy— Ulate
hesitated and allowed the momentum to pass to -Jos§ Figueres
who launched a revolution.

Ulate acquiesced in the ouster

of Calder5n but then discovered that Figueres, who set up
an extra-legal government and enacted his own reform
program by decree, was also a challenge to the traditional
order.
In November, 1949 Ulate finally assumed the
presidency along with a congress controlled by members of
his party, and Costa Rica's traditional forces appeared
to have a chance of reasserting themselves. Ulate,
however, tended to work with, rather than against,
iv

existing legislation when he came to office and thus
declined the opportunity to undermine the reform movement.
Little additional progress was made in the field of social
legislation but Ulate restored a faltering economy and
began programs designed to spread the new prosperity„
The watchwords of his administration were pragmatism,
conciliation and democracy, and he worked effectively to
close social schisms opened in the 19^0's and to rebuild
confidence in the government.
Despite a generally successful administration,
however, Ulate and the traditional system he headed were
unable to meet the challenge presented by Figueres who,
by the end of Ulate's administration in 1953» had created
a modern effective political party and used it to change
the workings of the political system in Costa Rica.

Since

1953 this new party has been the dominant force in national
politics and traditional leaders seeking office have had to
rely on the support of widely divergent groups lacking the
consensus on which the traditional system rested.

Repre

senting the last real chance to restore the old order,
Ulate1s administration offers an opportunity to study the
dilemma of a conservative in a period of great change.

v

INTRODUCTION
i
The role of conservatives in recent Costa Rican
history first interested me in 196? when I spent three
months in Costa Rica doing research for an M.A. thesis
on the Junta de Gobierno formed after the revolution of
1948.

In the course of my research, I came to realise

how significantly both the Junta and the CalderSn-Picado
administration it replaced differed from the political
pattern of the past.

Costa Rica's traditional political

system placed greater emphasis on social harmony than on
progress and assumed that the government would maintain
a low profile in the lives of the people.

Sy contrast,

both CalderSn and Jose Figueres, leader of the Junta,
were determined men, advocating activist roles for the
government in support of controversial reform programs.
I wondered how Costa Rican traditional political
forces, led at that time by Otilio Ulate, had reacted to
these back-to-back challenges to the established order,
but no writer, Costa Rican or foreign, had given more
than passing_attention to the question.

In fact, there

seems to be little scholarly work on the general subject
of true Burkean conservatives in Latin America.

The word

"conservative" is often used to refer to strongmen 1
who in reality are reactionaries or, as used in John
Mander's The Unrevolutionary Society, to describe members
vi

of a wealthy elite lacking in social consciousness and
interested only in perpetuating static, materialistic
societies.

In neither case, it seems to me, is the

term "conservative" properly employed.
For these reasons, I was interested in studying th
response of Costa Rican traditionalists to the modernizing
political and social changes occurring in that country
during the turbulent 19^0's, centering the study on the
19^9-1953 Ulate administration, which immediately
followed the Junta period and attempted to restore the
traditional order before new political forces could
consolidate their hold on the country.
Research for this topic thus grew out of my
original research in Costa Rica.

During that initial

visit I interviewed Ulate and most members of the Junta
and had access to the private collections of certain membe
of the National Liberation Party,

A second visit to

Costa Rica *n 19?^ enabled me to make use of the papers in
Ulate’s private collection and to talk with a number of
his political associates and family members.
In this country I have done research in the Latin
American collections at Louisiana State University and at
Tulane University's Middle American Research Institute.
Since moving to Washington in 197^r I have done research
at the Library of Congress and have had convenient access
to a number of U.S. government sources, such as the

annual economic reports from the U.S. embassy in San
Jos§, as well as other materials available in the
libraries of the Department of State and other U.S.
government agencies.
Among the many people who have helped with this
study, a few deserve special mention.

I would like to

thank all those Costa Ricans who gave their time for
interviews and assisted me in gaining access to useful
materials.

Lie. Daniel Oauber, currently President of

Costa Rica, was particularly forthcoming and was also
kind enough to make available to me the unpublished
transcript of the minutes of the meetings of the Junta*
My discussions with Lie. Alberto Martin, a prominent
Costa Rican who has maintained the rare position of
separation from politics since he resigned from the
Junta in 19^9, were especially thought-provoking.

Srta.

Olga Marta Ulate rendered most valuable assistance by
granting access to her father's papers and by sharing
her own reminiscenses.
I am also grateful to the Graduate Council of
Louisiana State University for providing a Field Research
Fellowship which financed my first stay in Costa Rica.
Thanks are also due to my adviser Professor Jane DeGrummond,
whose interest in the topic, patience and sense of humor
greatly contributed to the study.
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CHAPTER I
DEVELOPMENT OP THE NATION

The Geographic Setting
Costa Rica* a country of about 19,600 square
miles and some two million people, lies between Nicaragua
and Panama.

Since Panama was a part of Colombia until

1903* Costa Rica has historically been regarded as the
southeastern tip of Central America.^

Costa Rica was

thus placed in one of the most remote corners of the
Spanish empire, a fact which significantly influenced its
developmento
Costa Rican isolation was further encouraged by
the topography and climate of the country which favored

1 Since the early sixteenth century, Panama’s
function as a bridge between the two oceans has given it a
special role in history, quite separate from that of
Central America. During the colonial period, the narrow
land of Panama was the chief transit route for goods
going to and from the Pacific coast of South America.
Hence, Spain logically placed Panama in the southern half
of her New World empire— the Viceroyalty of Peru. Costa
Rica and the four other m o d e m Central American states
were part of Spain's northern viceroyalty, with head
quarters in Mexico.
Panama's separation from Central America continued
in the national period. While Central America broke away
from Spain, experimented with a federation and split into
five separate republics by mid-nineteenth century, Panama
remained a part of Colombia until 1903. Only in the
twentieth century have limited attempts been made to
involve Panama in regional affairs, but Panama has
3hown little interest and continues to follow a course
largely separate from that of Central America.
1

,the early concentration of the population In an
inaccessible region,

Behind Costa Rica's Caribbean

coastline is a large, flat alluvial plain with the heat,
dense forest and heavy year-round rainfall typical of
much of the lowland tropics.

The Pacific coast is more

varied and has a coastline broken by gulfs and hilly
peninsulas.

The Pacific side also has a more pleasant

climate, including a dry season in the winter, 'cut the
region still suffers from the heat of the lowland tropics.
Between these two lowlands are mountains with
highland plateaus.

The most important is the Meseta

Central, a basin about forty miles long and fifteen miles
wide, with a cool springtime climate.

Since early

Spanish settlers considered the lowlands boo hot and
disease-ridden, they concentrated in the Meseta,*^

Thus,

the Meseta has been the heartland of Costa Rica and has
exerted an overwhelming influence on national development.

2 The Meseta Central is actually composed of two
basins divided by low hills which form the Continental
Divide, The eastern basin, the Meseta Central Oriental,
drains to the Caribbean by the Reventazfin River* The
western Meseta Central Occidental drains to the Pacific
through the Tarcoles River valley, Leo Waibel, "White
Settlement in Costa Rica," Geographical Review. XXIX,
No, ij- (Oct. 1939). 531 and 51

3 There was also some settlement fairly early in
Guanacaste, a cattle-raising region in Costa Rica's Pacific
Northwest, But Guanacaste was a part of Nicaragua until
1820 and has had little influence on Costa Rican cultural
development. Ibid.. 5^7*

3
Robert West described the Meseta Central as "truly the
political, social and economic core— and historically the
cultural hearth— of Costa Rica*

Demographic History
Settlement in this highland basin did not begin
immediately after discovery in 1502.

During his fourth

voyage tc the New World, Columbus touched on Costa Rica's
Caribbean coast and saw Indians wearing gold ornaments.^
His descriptions gave rise to the rumor that the "Rich
Coast,M as it later came to be called, was a land of
£
wealths
Thereafter, Spanish colonists tried to
penetrate the lowland forests and establish settlements
on the Caribbean and Pacific sides of the country.

k Robert C. West and John P„ Augelli, Middle
America: Its Lands and Peonies (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentic e-Hall, 1 9 6 6 ), 4 3 9 ,
Leo Waibel agrees, noting that "in the history of
colonization, we have many examples of the development of
a whole state from a coastal town; but nowhere else has a
town lying in the interior highlands, difficult of access
on every side, exerted such an influence. Costa Rica was
from the very beginning a 'central' land." "White
Settlement," 5^2#
5 FernSndez Gudrdia, Cartilla histfirica de Costa
Rica (San JosSi Imprenta Lehmann, 196 7 ), 2 0 „
6 In a rather-superficial, book, Thorsten
Kalijarvi provides the interesting information that
"Costa Rica" was originally used to describe the whole
southwestern coast of the Caribbean, while present-day
Costa Rica was known as "Nuevo Cartago." The current
names were given about 15^0* Thorsten Kalijarvi, Central
America: Land of Lords and Lizards (Princeton: Van
Nostrand, 1962), 74.

However, no Spanish settlement was permanently
successful until Cartago, Costa Rica's colonial capital,
was founded on the Meseta Central in 156^«

One writer's

theory is that those of European blood were unsuited for
permanent settlement in the tierra caliente. or "hot
lands," of the lower altitudes.

Writing in 1939* he

noted that the lower limits of European settlement on
both the Pacific and Caribbean slopes corresponded
closely to the dividing line between the climatic zones
of the tierra temolada (temperate zone) and the tierra
caliente.^
Some fifty Spanish families settled around
Cartago.

They found that Costa Rica was not rich in

minerals and the Indians were not of the sedentary sort
easily adapted for worfc on large haciendas.

Probably for

this reason, very few other Spaniards came to settle in
these highlands.

Thus, many writers say that most Costa

7 Waibel, "White Settlement," especially 535*
Jorge LeGn noted a similar pattern in 1952i he found
that two-thirds of the total population still lived in
the highlands and that "the people of these zones have a
very high percentage of white blood," Lefin, Nueva
geografia de Costa Rica {San JosS« Librerla La Espaftola,
1 9 5 2 ), 23 and chart o n 2^,
However, with disease-control efforts since World
War II, a significant number of highlanders have begun to
settle in the tierra caliente. a development similar to
that followed in other parts of the Caribbean lowlands.

5
Ricans are descendants of this small group of original
settlers.®
Population grew very slowly at first.

It was

more rapid in the eighteenth century\ hut Costa Rica still
had "scarcely 6 6 ,0 0 0 souls'*— the smallest number in
o
Central America— at the time of independence.
Despite
this low figure, population density was high in the
settled areaso

Settlers filled most of the.Meseta

Central by the end of the colonial period, giving the
central portion of it one of the highest rural densities

8 John and Mavis Biesanz, Costa Rican Life (New
Yorki Columbia University Press, 19^4), 6 . Oscar
Schmieder also noted that "the population of Costa Rica
grew from a nucleus of some 300 square kilometers"— the
original Cartago settlement area. Schmieder, Geografla de
America Latina (Mgxico* Fondo de Cultura Economica, 1965),

5951

Schmieder noted that blacks and Indians were also
attached to the original settlement area but, from all
accounts, their numbers declined dramatically during the
colonial period, leaving a population largely composed of
descendants of the Spanish settlers. The 192? census, for
example, listed over 80$ of the population as pure white,
with some 1^$ mestizo,
black and 1$ Indian. The next
full-scale census, taken in 1 9 5 0 , listed "whites and
mestizos" together and thus provided no further infor
mation on the number of people of unmixed white blood.
Schmieder, however, estimated in 196 5 that 75% of the
people were of white blood. See Costa Rica, DirecciSn.
General de Estadistica de Costa Rica, Censo de poblaciSn.
11 de mayo de 1927 (San JosS* Ministerio de Economia y
Kac1 enda, 1960 ), 90-92; and Schmieder, Geografia. ^98.
9 Ricardo Femdndez Guardia, Costa Rica en el
siglo XIX (San JosSi Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1970), 581. Of these 66,000, the great
majority lived in the highlands. Some 5,000 lived in
Guanacaste and several hundred near the Pacific port of
Puntarenas.

in Latin America— 260 persons per square mile. 10

The

settlement pattern indicated that these were true
pioneers.

The spread of settlement did not take place in

waves which left "behind empty areas.

It was not directed

by the Crown— there was little of value to the Crown in
Costa Rica.

Instead, settlement spread spontaneously into

contiguous land.

This pattern of outward movement without

a decrease in the population of the original settlement
area was unique in the Middle American region of Mexico,
Central America and the Caribbean, 11
Preston James says that "in all colonial Latin
America there were not many settlers like these” in the
Costa Rican highlands.

12

With neither significant

immigration nor commerce, they lived in isolation and
poverty throughout the colonial period.

It is said that
l*i
Costa Rica was the poorest of the Spanish colonies. J

Land was plentiful but most of the Spaniards did not have
Indian servants and had to work their own land.

For this

reason, they tended to develop small-sized farms.

They

were farther from Mexico than any other mainland colony

10

Waibel, “White Settlement," 5^5<>

11

West and Augelli, Middle America. 440.

12 Preston James, Latin America (New York*
Odyssey, 1959)1 709.
13 Abelardo Bonilla, "El costarricense y su
actitud polltica," Revista de la Universidad de Costa
Rica, X (Nov, 195^), 3Sj Jorge LeOn, "Land Utilization in
Costa Rica," Geographical Review. XXXVIII, No. 3 (19^8), ^44,

?

in the viceroyalty and they received little help or
attention from the government,^

They shared, instead,

a long period of the sort of "benign neglect” which is
thought to have contributed to democratic traditions and
self-reliance in the United States,
This combination of experiences was important in
shaping the national character.

Costa Rica's colonial

life fostered a degree of individualism unusual in Latin
America.

While Costa Rican writers probably exaggerate in

claiming that colonial society was c l a s s l e s s i t does
seem probable that this sort of environment produced a
more egalitarian, less rigid class structure than was the
norm in Latin America.
Costa Rica's insularity continued, to a large
extent, even after independence.

Despite some increase

in movement to the lowlands, the colonial pattern of
concentrated settlement in the central highlands was
maintained.

Xn 19^8 two-fifths of the entire population

of the country lived in the Coffee Belt, a 150-square-raile
area of the Meseta Central.

Throughout the Coffee Belt,

rural population density was almost 1 ,0 0 0 persons per

1^

Fero&ndez Guardia, Cartilla histSrica. 30-35®

15 Bonilla, "El c o s t a r r i c e n s e 39} Eugenio
Rodriguez, Anuntes para una socioloala costarricense (San
Jos6 * EditoriajT^Iniversitaria, 1953), 99-101.

8
square mile.

T6

For a small country there have been

considerable advantages to such a settlement pattern.
It facilitated the building of roads to link the people
and made public services more feasible, and rural
children were brought together in sufficient numbers to
justify the costs of schools, which are lacking in parts
\rj

of rural Latin America even today. '

Costa Rica's

literacy rate, one of the highest in Latin America, may
thus be related to the settlement pattern.

T _ 3

Land Distribution and Social Patterns

The nature of Costa Rican colonial society, like
the settlement pattern, was intricately linked to the

16

LeSn, "Land Utilization," 444,

17 Joseph F. Thorning, "Costa Rica: A Rural
Democracy," World Affairs. CVIII, No, 3 (Sept. 1945), 177,
18 In 1950 > 78 .767s of all Costa Ricans over ten
years of age were literate; the literacy rate varied from
a high of 8Sfo in the Central Highlands to 687$ in the
southern region of the Pacific lowlands. Costa Rica,
Direccidn General de Estadlstica y Censos, Areas
demogrgJicas de Costa Rica (San JosS: Ministerio de
Economla y Hacienda, 1959)* 16. 46,
One writer has said that Costa Rica's illiteracy
was the lowest in the Caribbean area. He speculated that
it was lower than that of any other tropical country in
the world. Harry B, Murkland, "Costa Rica: Fortunate
Society," Current History. XXII (March 1952)> 142,

9
landholding system.

Reliable statistics for this early

period are not available but commentators have agreed
that from the mid-sixteenth to about the mid-nineteenth
19
century Costa Rican land was widely distributed.
The landholding pattern was said to be the most
egalitarian in Central America, if not in all of Latin
America.

It is logical that this should have been the

case, given the small size of the population and the
availability of land, as well as the absence of any
reason to carve out large plantations when Indian
servants were few and commerce negligible.

One of Costa

Rica’s leading historians explained!
The cultivation of the soil grew into the
development of the small property. This
matter of each one having his owns of not
submitting to feudal exploitation by powerful
rulers of the land; and of each one earning
what he could through his own efforts, explains
the feeling of equality which developed
very early. Thus, Costa Rica was a land of
tillers, of proprietors of small pieces
of land.20
The distribution of the land during this long
period left its mark on Costa Rica.

Just as eighteenth

19 Among the scholars who have given such a
description of early landholding in Costa Rica are Waibel,
"White Settlement," 5 ^ s FernSndez Guardia, Cartilla
histSrica. 31-35; Biesanz, Costa Rican Life.T22FT James
L. Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy. University of
Colorado Series in Political Science No. 2 (Boulder, 1962 .),
53» Carlos Monge Alfaro, Historia de Costa Rica (San Jos§:
Imprenta Trejos, 1959) • 1 2 9 . No writer is., known to have
contradicted this characterization of Costa Rican landholding during the early period.
20

Monge Alfaro, Historia, 129,

10
and early nineteenth Century land patterns in the United
States probaoly counted for more than present-day
patterns in determining the nature of American society
today, by the same token Costa Rica's early landholding
pattern seems to have left a cultural impression which
outlived subsequent changes in the landholding pattern
itselfo
While modern land distribution is thus of less
concern than thax of the earlier period for our purposes,
it is of some interest.

Despite the concentration of

land during the nineteenth century as a result of the
rise of coffee and banana plantations, it is popularly
thought that land in Costa Rica remained widely
distributed*.

Costa Rica has been called "a democracy of

small farmers, each working his own acres,"

21

Other

writers described the country as "an agrarian demo- ■
22

cracy,"

Remarking on his country's landholding system

in 1935i Costa Rica's education minister said that "it is
the policy of the government that every Costa Rican
21
should have some land of his own," J As if in support of
that statement, one observer about that time said that

21

Thoming, "Rural Democracy," 172-73*

22 Lawrence and Sylvia Martin, "Four Strong Men
and a President," Harper *s . CLXXXV (Sept, 19^2), ^25.
23 Teodoro Picado Michalsky, "The School and
Democracy in Costa Rica," Bulletin of the Pan American
Union (1933)> 3^6,

11

Costa Rica had the highest percentage of landowners of
Oh
any Latin American country.
Another even claimed that
eighty percent of the people owned land, a figure he
believed was unequaled anywhere else in the world
Leading students of Costa Rica and Central America have
made more moderate claims , A number of twentieth century
26
scholars, however, also found land widespread
and Costa
Rica with "a much higher percentage of landowners" than
elsewhere in Central America,

27

Typifying these views,

Chester Lloyd Jones said that Costa Rica had a "highly
democratic system of landholding which has contributed
greatly to the stability of the political and economic

24 John Gunther, "Costa Rica, a True Democracy,"
Current History. LII (Dec, 1940), 12,
25

Murkland, "Fortunate Society," 142.

26 Dana Munro, The Five Republics of Central
America!;(New York: Oxford University Press, 1918), 14243? and James Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy.
University of Colorado Series in Political Science No, 2
(Boulder, 1962), 62-72,
27

Parker, Central American Republics, 2 9 0 ,

12
life.” 28
Some observers, however, have held that Costa
Rica's egalitarian reputation was exaggerated.

A leading

social critic of Costa Rica during the 1930's said that
poor economic conditions were forcing small coffee
growers in the Meseta Central to sell their land.
Acknowledging indirectly that land was once widely
distributed, he predicted that if the trend then current
continued, "the small properties and village proprietors
which once formed the basis of our economy will have
disappeared forever into the mass of day laborers. " - 7
Other observers a few years later listed "wide land
distribution,ras an important factor in forming Costa
Rican society; but they, too, felt that the land was no
longer so well distributed.-^0

28

Jones, Costa Rica. 12^.

Jones felt that the

1 9 2 ? census indicated wide distribution of land ownership

but believed that ownership was actually even more
widespread than indicated by the census. He said that a
number of peasant owners had refused to answer census
questions out of fear the information was to be used for
tax purposes.
The 1927 census itself expressed a similar view.
It reported that incomplete instructions to census takers
had led to misapprehensions about the purpose of the
poll. Costa Rica, Censo de poblacion de Costa Rica, 11
de mayo de 1927 (San Jo'sS: Ministerio de Economfa y
Hacienda, DirecciSn General de Estad-fstica y Censos,
I 9 6 0 ), 86-87.
29 Mario Sancho, Costa Ricat Suiza Centroamericaha •(San Jos'S j- Imprenta Tri-buna, 1935) * 35*
30 Biesans, Costa Rican Life. ^0, 22^,

Even writers who claim that landholding is
widespread in the Meseta have acknowledged that land is
more concentrated in other regions.

For example, one

observer said that: “the striking social feature" of the
Coffee Belt is the division of the land into small farmsj
.but on the Pacific slope he found large farms with
absenteeism common, and in Guanacaste he found that "the
cattle ranches, still holding to the pattern of colonial
days, are disproportionately large.
Census figures fail to provide the definitive
answer to the question as to whether Costa Rica is a
nation- .of small farmers or one of concentrated landholding.

Table 1, taken from the 195° census, shows that

small farms were the rule during the mid-twentieth
century period under consideration here.

Of ^3,086

fineas (farms or estates) listed in the census, seventy
percent were between one and fifty manzanas in size.

■50

At the same time, it can be;seen that about one-fourth0
of the land was held in huge fincas of over 3 , 5 0 0
manzanas, and much of the remainder was in other large

31

Le§n, "Land Utilization,"

^50-51.

32 Small farms were, in fact, probably much more
numerous than the census figures indicate because Costa
Rica does not include in the census fincas smaller than
than one manzana. In 1963 there were some
such
tiny fincas out cf a total of 1 1 5 ,0 0 0 fincas of all sizes
in the country. See Howard I. Blutstein, et. al„, Area
Handbook for Costa Rica (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1970), 2 2 7 .

farmsa Census figures thus are cited both by those who
point to the large number of Costa Ricans who own land
and those who note the existence of large farms in which
33

much of the land is concentratedo-^

Table I
Distribution of' Costa Rican fincas according to size,
1950
Size of
finca in
manzanas

Number of
fincas
thi3 size

Percentage
of fincas
this size

all fincas
1-4
5-9
10-19
20-49
50-99

43,086*
12,004
6,972
6*572
9 ,004
4,703
3,258
524
49

100.00

1 0 0 -5 0 0

500-3499
3500 or more

2 7 .8

16.2
15.3
20.9
10.9
7.6
1,2
0,1

Manzanas
in fincas
this size
2 ,5 9 2 ,2 2 0

291,273
46,524
88,074
230,391
309,390
6 0 5 ,8 0 3

543 *687
688,578

Sourcest Costa Rica", Direcci.on General de Estadlstica
y Censos. Areas demoarSficas de Costa Rica (San Jos£i
Costa Rica, Direcci§n General de Estadlstica y Censos,
Qenso agro’oecuario de 1950 (San Josl: Ministerio de
EconomSa y Hacienda, 1953), 9, 122.
&
Costa Rican census figures do not include fincas
smaller than one manzana (approximately 1.7 acres),.
Another way of examining Costa Rican landholding
is to consider the tenancy pattern— often a factor in

33 For example, the Costa Rican census itself
glossed over the fairly high percentage of the land held
in large farms and made much of the fact that most of
the farms were small, noting that "in all the countryonly 49 fincas larger than 3. 5QQ manzanas existed." £reas
demogrSf icas. 17-
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determining both the extent of agrarian unrest and the
credit facilities available to farmers 0 Figures listed
in the Tercer

compendio estadolstico centroamericano

show that Costa Rica has a higher percentage of owneroperated farms— and a higher percentage of ownercultivated farmland as well— than other countries in
Central America.J

Yet the significance of these

figures is also open to disputes

Costa Rican landowners,

like those elsewhere, may hire any number of workers to
assist them.

Such owner-operated farms thus may be huge

enterprises, employing large numbers of landless
peasants, rather than family-sized farms.

34 The Tercer compendio listed these percentages
for owner-operated farms:
Costa
Rica

HI
Guatemala
Salvador

Honduras

Percentage of
proprietoroperated farms

75 .5

3 9 -3

54.9

2 1 .3

Percentage of
proprietorcultivated land.

8 8 .9

81.5

46.7

46.3

Secretarla Permanente del Tratado General de IntegraciSn
Centroamericana, Tercer compendio estadlstico centro
americano . 1 9 6 3 . Nicaraguan figures were not given.

16
The tenancy figures* however, seem to have some
significance when considered in conjunction with James
Busey's examination of worker-farm ratios in Central
America.

By studying the average number of workers per

economically producing farm— defined as a farm of at
least thirty manzanas— Busey found that Costa Rica had
an average of 10,9 workers .on each such farm, as compared
to 38<>2 for El Salvador, 48.2 for Guatemala and 26.4
for Honduras. ^

With significantly fewer workers per

viable farm than other countries in Central America,
Costa Rica presumably has fewer landless peons and a
higher percentage of landowners.
In light of these facts, what conclusions can be
drawn about the landholding system which is believed to
have played such an important role in Costa Rican
history?

First, there seems little doxibt that Costa

Rican land was fairly widely distributed during the
colonial and early national period, and thus whatever
impact the landholding system may have had on society
was greatest during the country's formative period.
Concentration of land within Costa Rica’s heartland, the
Meseta Central, became more pronounced with the advent
of coffee plantations in the nineteenth century because,

35 Busey, Notes, Table II, 68.
figures were not given.

Nicaraguan

1?
for the first time, land on the Meseta was
really valuable.

A more concentrated landholding

pattern was also the norm in the regions beyond the
Meseta, which were slowly developed and brought into the
national economy during the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.

Even considering the lowlands

and the greater concentration of the nineteenth century,
however, Costa Rica appears to have retained its position
as the Central American country with the most equitably
distributed land, a fact which probably contributed both
to Costa Rica's more stable political history and to the
more satisfactory state of social well-being at mid
twentieth century, as indicated in Table 2.

Economic Development

The changes in Costa Rica's landholding pattern
beginning about the middle of the nineteenth century
were primarily due to the development of the country's

3 6 Guanacaste, as we have seen, was somewhat
developed from early colonial days but was not really
tied into the national economy until at least the
nineteenth century. (Until Ulate's administration there
was not even an all-weather road connecting Guanacaste*s
capital of Liberia with the Meseta Central. See Chapter
5). Much of the rest of the Atlantic and Pacific coastal
regions developed as banana lands, and large plantations
were the norm, especially during the first decades of
the banana industry's growth.

Table 2
Central America at mid-twentieth century? Socioeconomic indicators
Population Percentage Life expect1950
of urban
ancy at birth
housing
1949-1951
with
electrical
lighting,

No. of
Percentage of .
inhabitants illiteracy in
per doctor, population over
1 9 5 7 -1 9 6 0
ten years of
age, 1 9 5 °

Percentage^of children
aged 7-14 )
attending
school,
1950

2 ,7 0 0

2 1 .2

6 1 .7

5 ,8 0 0

57.8

41.1

6,400

70.3

24.4

a

6 6 .3

24.7
25.5

1949-1953
Costa Rica

800,875

8 1 .6

El Salvador

1,855,917

39,2

Guatemala

2 ,7 9 0 ,8 6 8

3 8 .8

Honduras
Nicaragua

1 ,3 6 8 ,6 0 5

23.7
*

1,057,023

Male-54,6 5'=
female-57•°5
male-49,94
female-5 2 .4 0
male-43.82
female-43»52
*
*

2,800 ,

62.6

Sources? Organisation of American States, Inter-American Statistical Institute*
America en cifras, IV, (Washington? OAS, 1964), 26, 85s United Nations, Economic
Commission for Latin America. Los recursos humanos de Centroamdrica, PanamS y Mexico
en 1950-1980 (New York, I960), 20, 2 3 , 35
* informaiion"not”provided.
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two chief economic activities— the production of coffee
and bananas.

Neither of these crops had any importance

in the colonial period, however,

Most of the people at

that time were subsistence farmers and engaged in very
little commercial exchange with the outside world.
Coffee was introduced into Central America only at the
very end of the colonial period.

Costa Ricans soon

found that the soil and climate of the Meseta Central
were almost ideal for producing a high-quality product,
and Costa Rica was the first country in Central America
to establish coffee as an export crop, sending its first
abroad in 1925•

Coffee almost immediately became the

country's chief export, a position it has held in most
years since that date.-^

The government encouraged

coffee by building a cart road to the Pacific port of

37 Indicative of the state of economic develop
ment of the Meseta Central during the colonial period is
the fact that cacao, grown only in a small area along
the Atlantic coast, may have been the colony's chief
crop. Cacao was an important preconquest crop in much of
Central America and it continued to be grown after the
arrival of the Spaniards. However, the industry declined
rapidly after the mid-eighteenth century and cacao was not
grown again along Costa Rica's Caribbean coast until the'
United Fruit Company began planting there in the early
twentieth century. Leon, "Land Utilization," ^5^*
38 For example, coffee averaged .almost sixty
percent of the total value of the country’s exports during
the decade of the 1930's. Manuel Jimenez, "Coffee in
Costa Rica,“ Bulletin of the Pan American Union. LXXXIX,
No. 3 .(Feb, 1?^5), 8 b.
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Puntarenas, which was then the outlet for coffee, and by
offering free land to anyone who would put out coffee
39
trees.
These measures paid off in the rapid growth of
coffee cultivation.

Visiting Costa Rica in 1 8 3 9 , John

Lloyd Stephens described the coffee growing:
On the top of the ravine we came upon
a large table of land covered with the rich
coffee-plantations of San Jose. It was
laid out into squares of two hundred feet,
enclosed by living fences of trees bearing
flowers, with roads sixty feet wide...seven
years before the whole plain was an open
waste.1+0
Coffee gave the country its first significant
source of foreign exchange and, for the first time, a
chance to escape from the poverty and isolation of
colonial days.

Some of its social effects, however,

were less desirable.

Land values rose and land became

concentrated in the hands of a “coffee aristocracy" which
became a powerful social and political, as well as economic,
force.

Costa Ricans write about the formation of a

"coffee class:"
The men with money were becoming a
plutocracy. They believed in good
faith that their interests were the same
. as those of the country. They truly
felt that they were the ones who gave
39

James, Latin America, 712.

b0 John Lloyd Stephens, Incidents of Travel in
Central America. Chiapas and Yucatdn. I. (New York: Dover,
1969), 352-53.
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life to the country and not vice versa,
They were being converted into a class.
Some say Costa Rica had no real upper class until
42
the coffee boom.
Although that seems doubtful, society
certainly became more stratified as a result of the
development of coffee plantations.

Together v/ith a

limited number of leading merchants and professional men,
the large coffee growers remain today the social elite
of the country.
The need for an east coast exit route for the
coffee led Costa Rica to undertake the most ambitious
railroad project in Central America at that time--the
building of a rail line between the Meseta Central and

41 Hugo Navarro Bolandi, La generacifin del 48:
.iuicio historico-polftico sobre la democracia costarricense
(MSxico: Sdiciones Humanismo, 1957), 21-22.
42 Rodriguez Vega, Apuntes, 99-101. In
Rodriguez' opinion, even the coffee rich were not a rigid
upper class. He says they were more accurately described
as "middle class men with money."
Other writers, however, described a more definite
new class. See, for example, Navarro Bolandi, La
generacjon del 48, 20-22; and^Alberto P. Canas, Los 8 ^nos
Xsan Jose; Editorial Liberacion Nacional, 1955)» 9-10-

i

22
Costa Rica's Caribbean port of LimSn.^

Among the great

difficulties involved— the huge expense, the problems
of building through the tropical forest and down the es
carpment^- probably the greatest was the shortage of
labor* Since Costa Ricans still had their aversion to the
hot lowlands, thousands of West Indian blacks had to be
brought in.
While the railroad for the coffee trade was under
construction, Costa Rica developed its second leading
source of foreign exchange— bananas.

Minor C. Keith, the

builder of the railroad, first introduced bananas
commercially into Costa Rica's Caribbean lowlands.

It

is said that Keith wanted to insure freight income
sufficient to warrant continued construction on the rail

if-3 Costa Rica's first railroad line had been a
nine-mile stretch along the Pacific coast which was opened
in 1857 * The railroad was immediately dubbed "El
Burrocarril" because of its two-mile-per-hour speed.
Although the "Burro" could hardly be called a successful
venture, there was a cart road connecting the Meseta
Central with the Pacific coast port of Puntarenas. But
traffic between the highlands and the Caribbean port of
limSn— the logical exit route for Costa Rican coffee—
was possible only by' mule train until Keith's railroad
was completed in 1890. Watt Stewart, Keith and Costa Rica;
A 'Siographical Study of Minor Cooper Keith (Albuquerque!
University of New Mexico, 1964), k~5»
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line-- an unpopular project in much of Ccsta Rica due to
the expense.

Costa Rica's first banana exports were sent

to New Orleans in I 878 and eleven years later, Keith
and another banana exporter founded the United Fruit
h.h.
Company.
The arrival of the railroad and banana plantations
brought the first significant settlement and development
to Costa Rica's Atlantic lowlands.

United Fruit developed

large plantations back of Limon, and the West Indians who
had come to work on the railroad stayed on to work for
the banana company.

Their descendants still form the

majority of the population around Limona
Bananas soon rivaled coffee for the leading place
in the country’s economy, but the "banana boom" on the
Caribbean ccast was short-lived.

Panama disease, which

affects the plants' roots, spread through much of the
Caribbean lowlands of the isthmus in the early part of
the century.^

By 19^2 United Fruit had abandoned all

its operations around lim&n and moved to the Pacific coast
of the country where it has played a major role in
developing the Pacific lowlandso

Stagnant economic

Clarence F. Jones and Paul C. Morrison,
"Evolution of the Banana Industry in Costa Rica,"
Economic Geography, XXVIII, No. 1 (Jan. 1952), 2-3•
^5

Ibid., 5 -8 .
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conditions around Limon as the banana company began its
shutdown in the 1 9 3 0 's are considered one of the reasons
the Costa Rican Communist Party had its initial success in
this area.^
The history of Costa Rica's relationship with the
controversial banana company has been something of a
success story.

Costa Rica has been neither as submissive

nor as truculent in its dealings with United Fruit as have
many neighboring countries.

One possible explanation is

that Costa Rica's considerable internal stability has
given her a freer hand in dealing with United Fruit than
governments in many other Latin American countries have
had.

Another explanation is that Costa Rica is less

dependent on bananas because of the well-established,
native-owned coffee industry.

Political Development-, before 1940

Costa Rica's political history, like her social
development, was a product of colonial experiences.
During the colonial period, Costa Rica was a part of the

46 While the economic decline of the area during
the 1920's and 1930's thus may have aided the Communist
movement, United Fruit's final pullout hurt the movement,
because it dispersed the banana workers and broke up
Communist-dominated unions.

Captaincy General of Guatemala, a subdivision of the
Viceroyalty of New Spain.

As the least-populated, most

distant and poorest of the five colonies in the Captaincy
General, Costa Rica was ranked only as a gobierno at the
end of the colonial period, while the other four provinces—
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua— all held
a higher status.^

However, Costa Rica's isolation from

viceregal affairs proved to be a great benefit to the
country in the national period, because it had given the
colony a tradition of independence and greater freedom of
action than that found in the other colonies of Central
America.
Probably because the central government had never
had much importance for the people, the independence move
ment was not strong in Costa Rica.

In 1521, Costa Rica

learned that Guatemala had declared independence from
Spain, and after some hesitation, Costa Rica adhered to
48
the declaration. The country was then briefly a part of
Lq
the Central American federation. 7 However, this attempt
^7
48

Parker, Central American Republics, 259*
Biesanzry Costa'-gi'can-life'; 9 .

49 Costa Ricans had to choose between the empire
created by Mexico's AgustSn Iturbide or the Central American
federation. Most people from the colonial capital of
Cartago favored the Mexican connection. Those from San
Jos4— by then, the largest city— preferred to join the
federation. The question was decided on the battlefield
where the .josefinos carried the day. As a result, Costa
Rica not only joined the federation but also it was decided
that the capital would be moved to San Jos£ where it has
remained. Accounts of this episode are given^in Canas,
Los 8 3-nos, 7-8,* and Navarro Bolandi, Generacion del 48 . 16.
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at uniting all the former provinces of the Captaincy
General of Guatemala failed, as have numerous later attempts
to create a single Central Amerioan nation.
Costa Ricans have shown little interest in such
unions.

Perhaps they fear a repeat of the colonial

experience when Costa Rica was the remote edge of the
<0
viceroyalty,
or they may remember the early federation
when Costa Rica was dragged into the quarrels of other
Central American states.

In any event, the desire for

independence from Central America seems to have been
stronger than the desire for independence from Spain had
been.

Talking with Costa Rican strongman Braulio Carrillo

in 1339, John Lloyd Stephens noted this sentiments

50 Thomas Karnes calculates that Costa Rica has
sent delegates to less than one-third of the approximately
two dozen conferences called since 184-2 to discuss the
formation of a Central American federation. While the
other four countries could form a union without Costa
Rica, Karnes notes that this is seldom considered and
thus Costa Rican isolationism has been a major.cause for
the repeated failure to form a single Central American
nation. Karnes, The Failure of Union; Central America,
1824-1960 (Chanel Hills University of North Carolina, 1961),

243-49.

Costa Rica also was reluctant to join the Central
American Common Market formed in 1961 because of her fear
of again being caught on the periphery of Central American
trade routes and because of a fear of competition from
countries with cheap labor. Costa Rica agreed to join
only if Panama were invited to join— but Panama never
accepted full membership. See Ralph Lee Woodward, Central
Americai A Nation Divided (New York: Oxford University,
1976), 251-52j and. C. Harvey Gardiner, "Costa Rica: Mighty
Midget," Current History (Jan. 1 9 6 6 ), 11-12,
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He was uncompromising in his hostility
to General Moras-Sn and the Federal Govern
ment [the Central American federation].
and, in fact, it seemed to me that he was
against any general government, and
strongly impressed with the idea that
Costa Rica could stand alone.-5
After achieving full independence in 184-8, Costa
Rica spent several years struggling against the filibuster
William Walker who played havoc with much of Central
America in those

years.

The Walker episode was one of

Costa Rica's few experiences with significant foreign
invasion.

It may be that the absence of a tradition of

insecurity and invasion explains Costa Rica’s low incidence
of military dictatorship, in comparison with her neighbors
Throughout the nineteenth century, Costa Ricans political
history was more stable than her neighbors'.

51

There were

Stephens* Incidents of ...Travels I, JoO.

52 James Busey believed that, in the absence of
a history of invasion, Costa Rica had had less reason
than Nicaragua to develop a strong, army. Busey,
"Foundations of Political Contrast: Costa Rica and Nicaragua,"
Western Political Quarterly, XI, No, 3 (Sept. 1958), 64-9.
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electoral irregularities and attempts against the
government, ^ but Costa Rica had fewer turnovers of
governments and her periods of strongman rule were
shorter and less frequent than was the case anywhere else
in Central America.
One of the country's few military presidents,
General Tom&s Guardia, controlled Costa Rica from I870
until his death in 1882.

Although more stable than other

Central American countries, Costa Rica was not a
constitutional democracy in that period and Guardia's
dictatorship was thus unusual only because of its length.
General Guardia was typical of strongmen in other parts
of Middle America during the late nineteenth century,
such as Porfirio D£as of Mexico (1 8 7 6 -1 9 1 1 } and Juste
Rufino Barrios of Guatemala (I8 7 3 -I8 8 5 ).

Such

autocrats often considerably advanced their countries'

53 In 1961 James Busey calculated that between
75 and 100 attempts had been made against the government
of Costa Rica, of which twelve had been successful. Most
of the others were minor affairs, often in the comic-opera
level.
Busey figured that Costa Rica had had from 46 to
50 different presidential administrations with only two
presidents holding power for an extended length of time.
During the same period El Salvador, the Central American
country usually considered second to Costa Rica in terms
of social and political development, had had 122 different
administrations* Busey, T?he Presidents of Costa Rica,"
The Americas. XVIII (July 1961), 60-61.
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material well-being by lessening the power of the landed
aristocracy over the national economy and encouraging
the growth of industry and commerce.94
Basing his actions on the writings of positivism,
TomSs Guardia seems to have had a considerable commitment
to his country's economic development, if somewhat less
to its political e v o l u t i o n * P r o o f of this commitment
can be found in his continual efforts to raise money and
arouse support for the San JosS.-LimSn railroad project
which he began soon after taking power.

At one point, for

example, Guardia took some of the country's leaders on a
horseback excursion down the eastern escarpment to point
out some of the difficulties in the construction and to
dramatize the benefits to be expected from the rail line.

96

Guardia's efforts are of interest, not only because of their
importance to the rail line, but also because they indicate

54 For a brief discussion of the role of these
late nineteenth century ■-liberals in Central America, see
Woodward, Central America, 151-56*
55 Despite his dictatorial tendencies, however,
Guardia promulgated the Constitution of 1871 which had a
strong chapter on basic human rights. This document, the
longest-lived of any of Costa Rica's constitutions, was in
force until 1948 and used as the basis of discussion during
the preparation of the current 1.9-49 constitution. RubSn
Hern&ndez Poveda, Desde la barra: como se .discutio v emiti5
la constituci-6n polltica de 1949 (San JosSt Editorial
Borase, 1953), 116-17 *
56

Stewart, Keith and Costa Rica, 39*
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that he felt the need, to gain support of influential
sectors of the population«

Apparently Guardia's control

was not so complete that he could ignore the opinions of
leading opponents.
Many writers date the beginning of Costa Rica's
political maturity from the election of 1 8 8 9 ."^

The

election has been called "the birth of Costa Rica's
civic consciusness’’^® ana "the first fully free election
in all Latin A m e r i c a . I n that year President Bernardo
Soto guaranteed that freedom of the press would be
respected, and the election was preceded by an active
campaign.

After some hesitation, Soto then yielded power
60
to the victor, although he had backed another man,
The election of 1889 was important in Ccsta Rican

political history because it roughly marked the beginning
of popular interest in politics and signaled an increasing
role for public opinion in the political process.

The

significance of the date should not be exaggerated.

Costa

57 Claudio Gutierrez Carranza, irEnsayo sobre las
Seneraciones costarricenses 1823-1953,’* Revista de la
Universidad de Costa Rica, X Nov. 195*0, 57*
58

Bonilla, "El costarricense,"

59

James, Latin America, 72h.

60 A show of force in support of the winning
candidate helped the president decide to accept the
election results. Canas., Los S anos, 10-11,
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Rica, like most other countries, remained in the hands
61
of "los de arriba,”
hut a large step had "been taken
toward participatory democracy and peaceful transition
of governments.
Some Costa Ricans have called the years from I889
to about 19^0 the "Age of Gold” in their country's
political history.

82

It was during this period that the

country gained the reputation for being democratic and
tranquil— the "Central American Switzerland" described in
Like many popular nations, this view

had some basis in fact.

The country was more peaceful and

forward-looking than most Latin countries.

Basic human

rights established in the 1371 constitution were generall
respected.

**;2

Costa Rican songs.

Literacy increased rapidly as a result of

late nineteenth century laws which provided for free,
compulsory education.

A sizeable middle class developed

in urban areas.
This was also a period of considerable stability.
The number of violent attempts against the government

6l Three quarters of a century after 1889, Daniel
Goldrich pegged the children of "los'.de arriba"— the
"upperdogs"— as those still mcst likely to inherit political
power in Costa Rica. Goldrich, Sons of the Establishment;
Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica (Chicago-! Rand
McNally, 1.9&&), 2,
62

Canas, Los S anos, 11.
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declined after 1889■

62

Popular interest in political

affairs was high: It has been estimated that about fourfifths of the registered voters cast ballots in an
average presidential election during this period.
most elections were non-competitive in nature.

n ii-

Yet

Without

having to resort to violence, the "coffee elite" could
generally determine presidential candidates.

The

6 *5
president played a large role in selecting his successor, J
and with his support, a candidate could usually line up
wealthy men who would sign bank notes for campaign
expenses.

Once the president and the country's leaders

cast their lot with a candidate, his victory was virtually
assured, although he usually faced one or two minor

63
In 1 9 6 1 Busey calculated that only two of the
21 administrations since I88 9 had secured power clearly
by force, (There have been no successful attempts against
the government since 3usey wrote.) Prior to 1889, he
figured that seven of 25 administrations had taken power
by force. Busey, "Presidents,” 60.

6k El Diario de Costa Rica, July 2k, 1953- B1
Diario thought that about”one-fifth of Costa Rica's total
population was registered for an average election between
I 889 and 1953 and that around eighty percent of those
registered voted.
65 Burt English says that "as a general rule,
each outgoing president ’willed* the political and
economic support that had kept him in office to a
successor who then used that support to win a controlled
or influenced election.” English, LiberaciSn Nacional
in Costa Rica (Gainesville, University of Florida, 1969)
7-

opponents at the polls.
The system thus tended to restrict political
leadership positions to men who were members of, or had
the support of, the wealthy class.

The determining

factors in politics, one writer said, were "money and
66

the more or less frank sympathy of the Government."

In a bitter critique of his country's politics, Mario
Sancho observed in 1935:
Anyone today who aspires to run for congress
and doesn't have eight or ■sen thousand col ones
with which to fatten the purse of the party,
or, failing that, the protection of^a rich
man, is dreaming of the impossible. {
Once in office the president had few institutional
checks on his power.

The constitution tended to

concentrate power in the executive.

Local government

was weak; congress was not completely subservient, tut
the president could usually make his writ run.

One

Costa Rican observer, looking back on the system in effect
under the 1871 constitution, characterized it as "republican

66

Sancho, Suiza Centroamericana, Jj-9-50*

67

Ibid., 5 6 .

currency.

The coldn is the Costa Rican

3k

Louis XlVism."

68

Yet none of the presidents of these

years— except during one authoritarian interlude in 1 9 1 7 1 9 1 9 — overstepped the bounds of custom to rule by fiat.

The country's conservative traditions and cautious approach
toward political and social problems may have acted as an
unwritten check on the president.

Another check was the

free press which was increasingly influential as literacy
rates and newspaper circulation figures rose.

The

opposition papers took their watchdog role seriously and
were often outspoken in their criticism of the government.
Still another factor discouraging strongman rule was the
influence of the country's other political leaders for
whom the president was no more than primus inter pares.
In a small, isolated country where everyone seemed to
know the president, social and political pressures could

68 Rodrigo Facio, "La constituciSn polltica de
1 9 /4-9 y la tendencia institucional," Revista de la Univer-

sidad de Costa Rica, XIII (July, 1956 )> 100,
Fitzgibbon, however, noted in 19^1 that:

Russell

Most Costa Rican presidents have been able
to exercise a considerable influence over
their government; but in that country,
government falls far short of approximating
the one-man institution which exists for all
practical purposes in the other four states
[of Central America.
Russell H. Fitzgibbon, "Executive Power in Central America,"
The Journal of Politics, III, No. 3 (Aug. 19^1). reprinted
in Asher N. Christensen, (ed,), The Evolution of Latin
American Government (New York: Henry Holt," 1951)> 413*
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be very real. It was expected that the president would
move forward only along lines on which there was general
agreement.
The penalty for failure to play the game by the
rules was illustrated in 1917 when President Alfredo
GonzSles Flores was ousted by his Minister of War
Federico Tinoco— one of only two occasions since I889
in which a Costa Rican administration has seised power
clearly by force a697 Gonz&les had violated several
traditions#

He had tried to impose a direct income tax

opposed by most of the country's elite and he had
alienated public opinion by restricting freedom of speech
70
and the press.
Tinoco, however, also violated tradition
by setting up what one writer calls "the only true
71
dictatorship that Costa Rica has known.”
Unable to

69

The other was the Junta de Gobierno which came
to power in 19^3• Busey, "Presidents," 60,
70 Canas blames Gonz&lez1 downfall on the elite,
noting that "for the aristocracy of San Jos£, he was a
vulgar provincial who, to top all evils, had decided to
levy a tax on them." Canas,■T j o s 8 Anos, 1 2 .
Navarro
Bolandi is even more adamant; "The dictatorship of the
Tinoco brothers [Federico Tinoco's brother was his chief
adviser] was a direct consequence of the power and affairs
of the oligarchy: the only cause for the coup d'etat was
the direct tax." Navarro Bolandi, Generaci-on deT™4-8, 55*
Jones, however, considers popular resentment of
GonzSlez' undemocratic ways the major reason for his
ouster. Jones, Costa Rica, 26-27.
71

Canas, Los 8 Anos. 13 .
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secure recognition from President Woodrow Wilson and
faced with internal opposition, Tinoco was forced to resign
in 1919> ending an unusual and unpleasant episode.
In contrast to Tinoco, most of the leaders of this
period at least aspired to the ideals which the election
of 1889 represented for the country— free speech, orderly
72
government and indirect democracy.
A number of the
presidents in this so-called "Generation'of 1389" were men
of great ability, including two popularly known as the
"Olympians" because they were- sc highly regarded in Costa
Rica.

These were Cleto Gonzalez Viques, who served as

president from 1906 to 1910 and 1928 to 1932, and Ricardo
JimSnez, who served three terms— 1910-191^1 192^-1928,
and 1932-1936.

Under the leadership of such men, the

political system was able to adjust to considerable
change in the environment and during the 1920's and 1 9 3 0 's
a number of progressive measures, most of them centering
around labor regulations, were enacted
72 Rodrigo Facio described the leaders of the
"Generation of 1889'* as "philosophically liberal,
socially conservative, intellectually brilliant and
constitutionally and temperamentally personalistic.”
Facio, "La constitucion poL£tica," 110.
73 For a listing of early social and labor
legislation, see "La polftica s o c i a l Surco, IV (MayJune, 1944),
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A Reform Party founded in the 19201g urged a much
faster pace of social and economic reform but had only
7 Z1
limited success. '
The level of public support was
still fairly high for the traditional style of government
with its small-steps approach to reform, and while the
Generation of 1389 continued to enjoy this kind of backing,
bold action was unlikely.
As the Reform Party declined in influence, the
issue of social reform was championed by the Communist
Party founded in 1929 by a young law student, Manuel
75
Mora0'
The Communist Party was probably Costa Rica's

74 The Reform Party never won the presidency
but played a significant role in dramatizing social
problems. The movement suffered when its leader Jorge
Volio lost credibility after the election of 1924 which
had to be decided by congress when none cf the three
candidates— Volio, Ricardo Jimenez and Alberto Echandi—
received an absolute majority. In maneuvering reminiscent
of the Adams-Clay-Jackson "corrupt bargaining," Volio
threw his support to JimSnez and thus deprived Echandi,
generally regarded as the rightful winner, of the presidency.
Fernandez Guardia, Cartilla historica, 140; Navarro
Bolandi, Generacion del 48, 64~
It was indicative of the still incomplete develop
ment of Costa Rican democracy that a number of Echandi's
supporters suggested he launch a revolution. He is
supposed to have replied that "the presidency is not worth
one drop of Costa Rican bloodo” A number of Costa Ricans
have commented on the difference between Alberto Echandi's
qudefc acceptance of the congressional verdict and the
more scrappy political style of his son Mario who later
served as president from 1958 to 1962.
75 Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin
America (New Brunswickj Rutgers University, 1957). 38^°

first permanently functioning, ideologically based
76
political party.
Mindful of its tenuous position
within conservative Costa Rica, the party maintained
a moderate line and emphasized economic issues.

Mora

acted as something of a gadfly, trying to arouse popular
sympathy by criticizing the government in terms Costa
Ricans could accept.

For example, ridiculing both, his

country's economic and political systems, Mora once
commented that "we don't have a lot of bread here, but
then we have no shortage of circuses,"^
■The party achieved its first major success in
1933 when Mora was elected to congress. The following
year, the party scored another victory by organizing a

?6 Most parties were ad hoc arrangements rushed
together to support a single presidential candidacy and
then disbanded. Among those commenting on the then
personalistic nature of Costa Rican politics and the
lack of permanent parties is Charles Proctor, "Political
Systems," in Charles P. Loomis (ed.), Turrialbai Social
Systems and the Introduction of Change (Glencoe; Free
Press, 1953) 220-22.
77
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Mora quoted in Sancho, Suiza centroamericana,
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large-scale strike among United Pruit Company workers

rpQ
along the Caribbean coast.

During the strike,

President Jimenez met with Mora, had a frank discussion
with him, and afterwards ordered United Fruit to negotiate
with the banana workers.*7^

78 Costa Rica, with a small internal market and
poor mineral and fuel resources 1 has little industry and
could hardly be said to have a cohesive or conscious
industrial working class— a fact which helps to explain the
historical weakness of the labor movement in Costa Rica,
particularly on the Meseta Central. Costa Ricans on the
Meseta have shown little interest in unions and most of
those formed soon folded because so few people attended
the meetings*■ 3y the 1930's lowlands banana workers came
closest to representing a Costa Rican proletariat and it
was here that the labor movement achieved its first
success and has traditionally been strongest.
The labor movement in the lowlands was dominated
by the Communist-oriented Confederacion de Trabajadores
de Costa Rica formed in 1943• Reform-minded members of
the Costa Rican clergy,disturbed by the Communist
orientation of the confederation, formed a rival
Catholic-oriented labor confederation in 1945* The
Communist labor confederation was dissolved by law in
1948 and, for a time, the Catholic organization was the
largest in the country, but it largely merged its member
ship and organization with that of the National Liberation
Party in the 1950's and, in the opinion of many observers,
labor lost out in the merger. By the 1960’s, Charles
Denton saw a "stark picture" for organized labor, with
only one collective bargaining contract in force anywhere
in the country. For discussions of the Costa Rican
labor movement, see Denton, Latin American Politics; A
Functional Approach {San Francisco: Chandler, 1972),
137-33b ' Alexander, Communism, 383-390. The Catholicoriented labor confederation describes its objectives in
Ccnvencion Rerum Novarum, No, 1 (May 1, 1945), 1-4.
79

Alexander, Communism. 384-85*

JimSnez' response was interesting in that it showed
that the country's conservative leadership, while deploring
the existence of the Communist Party and occasionally
seeking to limit its activities, had made the more or less
conscious decision to permit the Communists to take part
in the life of the country.

The Communist Party's slowly

growing strength, however, was symptomatic of the fact that
segments of the population felt that the country's political
system was no longer providing a satisfactory answer to
"basic problems.

These segments included members of the

middle class who felt the lack of economic opportunities
in a country still largely run by the "coffee elite;" also
holding this view were portions of the working class,
particularly coastal banana workers who had been politicized
by the Communist-dominated labor movement in that region.
Class antipathies were not strong in.the country as
a whole, however, and the government probably would have had
a fairly good rating on a legitimacy scale. Despite pressure
for wider political and economic opportunities, Costa Rica’s
traditional system might therefore have been maintained
intact for some time longer had it not been for a reform
movement directed from above which began during the 19 ^0 's
and proved to be a more serious threat than either the
Reform Party or the Communist Party.

CHAPTER II
ULATE *3 EARLY YEARS

Family and Early Life

Just two years after the watershed election of
1 8 8 9 , Otilio Ulate Blanco1 was "bora in the town of

Alajuela, capital of the Costa Rican province of the
same name, on August 25, 1891,

He was the only son of

Ildefonso Ulate, whose ancestors were from Spain, and

1

Much of the information on Ulate*s early life
comes from interviews with him in San JosS on July 27 and
2 8 , 1967 and from several interviews with his daughter,
Srta. Olga Marta Ulate, in San Jos6 in June, 1974, Also
helpful was "Homenaje a Otilio Ulate,** a tape-recorded
collection of reminiscences prepared by friends and
political associates after his death in 19 ?3 <»
2 El Diario de Costa Rica. Feb„ 6 , 1948 and
Nov, 8 , 19^9; "Homenaje a Otilio Ulate.H A number of
sources have given various incorrect dates for Ulate*s
birth. The Costa Rican embassy in Washington believed it
was 1892, and a U,S 0 government reference source listed
it as I8 9 7 , Other reference works— Who*s Who in Latin
America and Encyclopedia of Latin American History— gave
1&95 and in 19^9 the New 2ork Times gave his age as 54,
also indicating an 1895 date. At the time of Ulate*s
death in 1973• however, the New York Times gave his age
as 8 2 , which would indicate an 1&91 date,
it seems
logical to accept 1891 * the date given by Ulate's El
Diario and the "Homenaje,” as correct.
41

kz
Ermida Blanco, the daughter of a French immigrant who
had settled in Costa Rica and opened a retail shop,^
Although he was known as Otilio from birth, Ulate*s true
baptismal name was Luis Emilio Rafael, a fact later noted
by political opponents who half-seriously charged that
the man could not be trusted because he used a false
name.

As they put it, "His name is not *Otilio® and he

is neither an 'Ulate' nor a 'Blanco.*1* This frivolous
charge was based on Ulate9s use of the nickname "Otilio"
and on spelling changes which his forebears had made in
h,

his paternal and maternal surnames,
Ulate*s birthplace of Alajuela lies about fifteen
miles from the national capital San Jos6 , in the
northwestern c o mer of the Meseta Central.

Although he

was not from San Jos€, Ulate did not grow up in isolation
from the life of the capital,,

The difference between the

cultural level of the national capital and that of the
rest of the Meseta Central was not as great as the gap

3 Orlando Cato, "Un periodista a la presidencia
de Costa Rica," El Diario de Costa Rica. Nov. 8 , 1949.
4 Ulate's paternal great-grandparents had
changed the spelling of the Spanish family name "Eulate"
to "Ulate." Soon after his arrival from France, Ulate's
maternal grandfather had also changed his name from
*Le Blanc" to "Blanco," probably in an effort to pave
the way for his acceptance into nineteenth century Costa
Rica's insular society, ' Olga Marta Ulate interviews.
Those unfamiliar with Spanish surname usage
should note that two surnames are normally used— the
father's last name (here, Ulate) followed by the maiden
name of the mother (Blanco).

h3
between capital and countryside In most Latin American
countries.

Due to the Meseta's small size and the high

population density throughout the region, the major towns
were not isolated communities separated by desnoblado
areas> as is the case, for example, in northern Mexico,
Traffic between the four chief towns of the Meseta (San
JosS, Alajuela, Heredia and Cartago) was regular, and
personal and cultural contacts were frequent during the
years when Ulate was growing up in Alajuela,
In 1 8 9 1 , the year of Ulate*s birth, the railroad
between San JosS and the Caribbean port of Li.mdn was
completed, greatly facilitating the Meseta Central's
coffee trade,

Alajuela was surrounded by coffee

plantations and, just to the west of the town, lay the
country's chief sugar cane planting region ,-7 so that the
town was a convenient market point.

At the turn of the

century, the town had only a few thousand inhabitants,^
but it was one of Costa Rica's more prosperous cities

5 Preston E, James, Latin America (New Yorki
Odyssey Press, 1959), 713-l4,
6 According to the 1927 census, the city of
Alajuela had a population of 6,707, and the total
population of the province of Alajuela was 97,577*
The
last census before 1927 had been taken in 1 8 9 2 , when the
provincial population totaled 57,203* If the city
population is calculated as growing at the same rate as
that of the province as a whole, then the city of
Alajuela had a population of just under if-,0 0 0 around the
time of Ulate*s birth. See Costa Rica, DirecciSft
General de Estadlstica y Censos, Censo de poblacifin de
Costa Rica, 11 de mavo de 1927 (San Jos6 1 Ministeriode
Economia y Hacienda, I9 6 0 ), 36, 6 1 ,

and had a number of wealthy families,
Ulate was born into a middle class family that
was neither wealthy nor especially prominent socially.
This was a somewhat unusual background for a future
president of Costa Rica* a provincial country in which
public life was largely managed by a small group whose
relationships had an almost familial quality about them.
Ildefonso Ulate, Otilio*s father, was a telegraph
operator who briefly served as a lieutenant in the Costa
Rican army.

He made an unsuccessful bid for election as

a deputy to the legislature from Alajuela.(Family lore
has it that the election was handled unfairly and he was
"robbed" of victory).

Shortly after that, Ildefonso
Q
Ulate apparently suffered a mental breakdown.
He died
around 1 9 0 8 , leaving little money for his widow, his son
Otilio, and a young daughter named Lidy, who died
o
several years later.7

7 Charles Denton thinks the pattern is little
changed today. He argues that the country*s public
school system is used to inculcate obedience in lower
class children, while children of the "prestige" class,
who attend private schools, are made to feel they have
a right to share in the political process and to make
demands on the political system, Ulate's family would
have been marginal members of the very small prestige
class, as Denton defines it. Charles Denton, Patterns
of Costa Rican Politics (Boston* Allyn and Bacon, 1971)

90-100.
8

Olga Marta Ulate interviews.

9

"Homenaje a Otilio Ulate."
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Otilio Ulate attended primary school and
secundaria— roughly equivalent to a middle school— at the
Instituto de Alajuela and then enrolled in the Liceo de
San JosS, a high school in the capital*

After his

father*s death, however, Ulate felt he should not
continue in school while his mother, who had a small
clothing shop, took in sewing and sometimes worked all
night,

For this reason, he left the Liceo 'oefore his

last year and never earned a high school degree,

With

little formal, education and no financial hacking when
he hegan his career, Ulate*s later successes proved him
to he, as Costa Rican historian Ricardo Fem&ndez Guardia
said, "a perfect example of what is called in English a
self made mano"^’
Ulate*s family does not seem to have played a
great role in his life, perhaps because his father and
only known sibling died while he was young,

Possibly the

family member with whom he had the closest relationship
was a daughter, Olga Marta Ulate,

Otilio Ulate never

married, but he had a long-term relationship with Olga's
mother and recognized his children,

10

Olga was especially

Cato, wUn periodista,"

11 Ricardo FernSndez Guardia, HE1 nuevo
presidente,* El Diario. Nov, 8 , 1949*

k6
interested in politics, and he involved her in political
matters and sometimes took her on trips abroad.
Olga had a stabilizing influence on Ulate, a man
of mercurial temperament.

He had a great enthusiasm for

whatever he was doing, a .ioie de vivre. and was jovial
and liked parties,

Ulate is remembered with fondness at

his favorite "watering holes" around San JosS, particu
larly the dining room of the Hotel Europa where he often
spent an evening relaxing with friends.

12

Ulate's

personality was very different from that of his onetime
political ally, JosS Figueres, a difference which may
have contributed to the antagonism which eventually
developed between the two m e n . ^
Despite his usually expansive nature, Ulate was
moody and sensitive to slights, of which there was no
shortage during a long political career.

He was capable

of considerable compromise! but where he perceived points
of honor to be involved, Ulate had the Spanish
aristocrat's sense of hidalguez.

He was inclined to put

12 The desk manager of the Hotel Europa, for
example, seemed to take great pride in telling this
writer that "this was Ulate's favorite place in town, and
he was often here,"
13 Although very pleasant in personal dealings,
Figueres is a rather strait-laced man who, for example,
once insisted that ice water rather than champagne be
used to toast his incoming administration. See Judy
Oliver, "Twelve Who Ruled in Costa Rica* The Junta of
19^8" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State
University, 1963), 23 .

k?

principle above financial and other considerations, a
tendency which led to the break-up of several profitable
Ik
business relationships#
In fact, it is doubtful
whether he would have been able to launch a successful
career as a journalist had it not been for his unusual
creativity and his fiery, moving style of 'writing#

Journalism Career
Julio Suflol, Ulate*s young friend and protege in
the newspaper business, says that "Otilio Ulate had the
two great Latin passions— politics and journalism,"1^
both of which had interested him from his early days#
While he was a student, Ulate and a group of classmates
published a weekly school paper.

When he decided to

drop out of the Liceo in order to help his mother, he

1^ Ulate*3 onetime business associate Julio
Suflol relates that Ulate refused President Figueres'
offer of reimbursement by the Junta government for damages
to his finca La Vieja during the 1948‘revolution, saying
that "where there is payment, there is no glory#"
Interview with Julio Suflol, San JosS, June 5» 197^# (The
government did reimburse citizens, including the members
of the Junta, who had suffered financial losses as a
' result of the revolution#)
Olga Marta Ulate corroborates Suflol *s story and
also recalls that in 19^8 a group of cattlemen formed a
cooperative society to help save La Vieja from financial
ruin# The cattlemen, however, supported Mario Echandi in
the 1970 elections and, when Ulate refused to back
Echandi, the society broke up and Ulate was left with ^ 0 0
manzanas of his formerly 1.0 0 0 -manzana farm# It is also
said that Ulate broke up a newspaper partnership over a
disagreement in principle#
15

Suflol interview#
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was drawn to the newspaper business*

He began in

Alajuela where his first job was that of rolling
l6
newspapers by hand,
but he eventually found a position
as a reporter in San JosS*
San Jos6 was an exciting place in which to begin
a journalism career in those days*

Costa Rica had a long

tradition of freedom of the press, and governments
generally honored it, although there were occasional
attempts to exert official pressure on the media*

-6

17

In

SI Diario. Feb* 6 , 1948 and Nov* 1, 1949.

1? Among the many writers who have commented on
the freedom of the press in Costa Rica in this period are
Biesanz, Costa Rican Life. 340s and Jones, Costa Rica. 3 3 .
James Busey somewhat later also found that*
Insofar as press freedom is concerned, there
can be no question that Costa Rican journalists
write as they please— often with a smaller sense
of responsibility than might be desired, but
certainly free of all official control or
influence*
James Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (Boulder 1
University of Colorado Series in Political Science No* 2 ,

1962), 35.

Despite the general pattern of a free press,
however, there have been a number of incidents involving
government pressure on the newspapers* For example,
Marvin Alisky noted that the Inter-American Press
Association stepped in when President Jos6 Figueres
attempted to reduce press criticism during the invasion of
1955* Ulate*s papers La Hora and El Diario were among
those which the government briefly subjected to censorship.
See Marvin Alisky, "The Mass Media in Central America,"
Journalism Quarterly. XXXII (Fall 1955)» 481*

1*9
addition, newspaper writers fcnew They could have a real
impact on public affairs because the country had one of
the highest literacy rates in Latin America*

Costa Rica

also had the highest proportion of newspaper readers in
Central America and, despite having the smallest
population of the five countries, Costa Rica had the
18
largest press circulation*
This led to a proliferation
of newspapers in the capital, although— as is often the
case in Latin America— there were few in the rest of the
country*
Newspapers opened and folded fairly often, but
there were usually several San JosS dailies operating at
any given time, just as there are today*

The different

papers covered a wide range of editorial opinion, but all
devoted a great deal of space to political developments,
often carrying the full text of lengthy speeches,
congressional debates or letters to the editor.
Most papers were closely identified with one
political party or politician, and their coverage was
usually biased.

Their *examinations'* of political issues

often turned on petty points, and sometimes boiled down
to nothing more than personal quarrels or vendetta.

Yet

most of the papers were willing to accept advertisements
from their political enemies and often ran uncut versions
of angry letters to the editor, including an occasional

18

Alisky, "Mass Media," 481.
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letter from the President of the Republic# 7

Thus,

newspapers insured a high public interest in the
questions of the day and offered an entree to influence
for someone like Ulate, who otherwise would have had few
opportunities*
Ulate worked for a number of San JosS papers
during the next few years, moving to positions of greater
responsibility as his writing abilities developed*

Julio

Suflol said of his writing, "He was the best journalist
Costa Rica has had*

His prose was excellent#

It was

20

always polemic, but beautiful*"

Ulate became co-owner and co-editor of La Tribuna,
but he eventually had a disagreement with his co-owner,
Jos^ Maria Pinaud, and bought Pinaud*s share of the
p *l

paper around 1932*

In about 193& Ulate bought Costa

Rica's oldest paper, El Diario de Costa Rica, which had

19 It was the custom in Costa Rica for the
president to respond openly and directly to press
criticism. Presidents most frequently answered through
articles or letters printed in their own favorite papers,
but they sometimes wrote letters to the editor of an
opposition paper. Modern examples of such exchanges were
Ulate's dispute with President Figueres during the 1955
invasion, which Ulate later publicized through his Hacia
donde lleva a Costa Rica el Seflor Presidente Figieres?
(San JosSi Universal, 1955) t and President Mario
Echandi's exchange with La Reoflblica over the question of
presidential meddling in the autonomous institutes#
Echandi also published his remarks in his Los hombres
pdblicos frente a los dineros oflblicos (San JosS*
Imprenta Nacional, 19^2)# "
20

21

Suflol interview*
Cato, "Un periodista!" Olga Ulate interviews#
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been founded in 1919.

Soon after buying El Diario. he

divested himself of his other newspaper interests and
concentrated on building up the Diario.

In 19^0, when

the paper was well launched, he opened an afternoon
paper, La Hora. as a late-news appendix tc the Diario.
While Ulate was publisher of both papers, he was editor
only of El Diario. Another man, Guillermo Calvo Navarro,
edited La Hora but its editorial line followed closely
that of El Diario.

For many years the two papers were

printed on the same presses and their finances were
merged, but it was always El Diario that was Ulate's
great love in journalism.
With Ulate as editor, El Diario de Costa Rica
grew-to be the country's largest and most influential
paper, with an estimated circulation of 3 0 ,0 0 0 at its
apogee, around 19*^6.

Ulate's daughter— admittedly a

partisan source— feels that it "had a monopoly on the
intellectual life and writing of Costa Rica in those
days."

Like most Costa Rican papers, it devoted a great

deal of space to political developments.

However, unlike

most other papers, El Diario avoided political affiliation
and maintained an independent editorial line.

This

22 Olga Marta Ulate gave this estimate of
circulation. The Political Handbook gave an estimated
circulation figure of 19,000 in 1952. Walter H, Mallory
(ed.), Political Handbook of the World* Parliaments.
Parties and Press (New York*: Harper Bros, for Council on
Foreign Relations, 1952), ^5*
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stance reflected Ulate*s sense of independence, as well
as his political ambitions and his desire to avoid tying
the paper to the fortunes of any particular party.

In

19^9 the New York Times noted that "he has always been an
independent as a newspaper man, a rare thing in Latin
America.
In addition to directing his own papers, Ulate
occasionally served as correspondent for other publi
cations during his extensive travels, and in 1 9 ^5 he
spent several months as an AP war correspondent in
2h
Europe.
Ulate was always a hard-hitting writer.

He

critically evaluated each Costa Rican government and
often engaged in running debates with Costa Rica’s
presidents, including those in whose administrations he
2

held an occasional public position. J

He soon earned a

reputation for editorial honesty, which boosted his
papers' circulation and allowed him to have considerable
influence.

Beginnings of his political career
The recognition that Ulate gained as a journalist
helped launch his political career.

He first entered

23

New York Times. Nov. 9» 19^9.

2b

Ibid.

25

Cato, "Un periodista.M
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politics in 1917» when Minister of War Federico Tinoco
overthrew the government of Costa Rica and seized control
of the country,

Tinoco issued a call for elections for a

Constituent Assembly and Ulate, running on an independent
ticket, was elected as a delegate from Alajuela,

26

However, he soon concluded that the country was in the
control of a dictatorship and, after serving only a
month or so, he quit his seat in the assembly.

He then

was briefly arrested for suspected anti-Tinoco activities
27

but was soon released, '
While concentrating chiefly on his newspaper
work for the next 25 years, Ulate continued to have a
role in public affairs.

He served as secretary for

Costa Rica's diplomatic mission to the other Central
American states and later served on a mediating
commission which worked to avoid armed conflict in
Central America,

28

During 1928-29» Ulate seems to have

served briefly with the Costa Rican mission in

26

Otilio Ulate interview, July 27* 1967,.

27

New York Times. Nov, 9, 19^9«

28 Fernandez Guardia, "El nuevo presidentei"
Cato, HUn periodista,"
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Spain. 7

On his return to Costa Rica, he got back into

politics, serving in the national legislature as a
delegate from Alajuela.

Ulate had lived in San Jos€ most

of the time since he left school, but he ran for congress
from his native province, Alajuela, where he owned a
finea and maintained a residence.
Although he served several terms in congress,
both before and after his presidency, Ulate never took an
active interest in the work of the legislature.

He seemed

to regard having a seat in the assembly simply as a means
of keeping his name before the public, not a particularly
responsible attitude.

For example, Lie. Fernando Lara

Bustamente, a leader of the Partido Uni<5n Nacional, says
that Ulate attended only one session of congress during
one four-year congressional term to which he waa
elected after his presidency.

His only reason for

attending that session was to vote for Lie. Lara

29 Ronald Hilton (ed«), 'rfho’s Who in Latin
America. 3rd edition (Stanford* Stanford University
Press, 1945), Part II (Mexico and Central America), 14.
Ulate later briefly served as Costa Rica*s ambassador to
Spain during the early 1970*s when, to the surprise of
his friends, he accepted the position offered by his
political opponent, President Jos§ Figueres. Alberto
MartSn, an independent observer, thought Ulate accepted
the position out of civic duty. Viewing things
differently, Ulate*s longtime political associate
Fernando Lara thought Ulate should not have accepted the
appointment, especially since he had earlier rejected an
identical offer made by Lara who was foreign minister
during the late 1960*s. Interviews with Lie. Alberto
Martin on June 8 , 1974 and with Lie. Fernando Lara on
June 9, 1974.
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as president of the Legislative Assembly.
During his early political career, Ulate seldom
played an active role in party politics.

He preferred to

run for congress on independent tickets and developed no
strong party affiliation until he founded his own
National Union Party around 1 9 ^ * ^

This preference for

independence may have stemmed in part from a disappointing
experience in 1930 when Ulate served on the Central
Committee of the newly-formed National Regeneration Party,
This party, advocating a moderate reform program,
nominated a prominent Costa Rican, Lefin CortSs, for
president.

CortSs accepted the nomination and began h.is

campaign but withdrew a few months later in order to
support his opponent, former president Ricardo JimSnez
Oreamuno.

The rapid rise and fall of political parties

was common in Costa Rica, but Ulate was chagrined by
CortSs* making a deal with Jimgnez and he never hadgood
relations with CortSs after that time,-^2

30

Lara interview.

31 "Homenaje a Otilio UlateiM Busey, Notes. 2 3 .
A forerunner of the National Union Party was the
Democratic Party founded in 19^1 by Lara and another
young lawyer, Eladio Trejos. The Democratic Party was
Le 6n Cortgs* vehicle during his unsuccessful bid for the
presidency in 19^4 and later merged with National Union,
32 Theodore S. Creedman, "The .Political „
„
Development of Costa Rica, 193^-19^" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Maryland, 1971)» 58 - 5 9 .
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Information on Ulate's early life is sketchy.
As he told foreign reporters shortly before his
inauguration in 1 9 ^ 9 » he was "a man without a.
It- S 'S

biography.

The limited nature of his political

activities in the early years gave few indications of the
later rapid rise in his political fortunes.

The nature

of Costa Rican politics during the 19^0's placed a
premium on Ulate's unusual combination of political and
journalistic talents, however, and gave him an
opportunity to catapult himself into the leadership of
the Opposition movement.

33 El Diario. Nov. 1, 19^9*

CHAPTER III
CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM

Calderfln Guardia and Social Reform

The decade of the 19^0's confronted Costa Rica's
traditional political system with its most serious
challenges since the system had assumed its modern form
shortly after the election of 1889.

The first challenge

came during the administration of Dr. Rafael Angel
CalderCn Guardia, a socially prominent physician who
appeared to offer continuity rather than change when he
was elected president in 19 ^0 . He had the backing of
President Le6n CortSs and most of the country's leaders,
and had run on the ticket of the National Republican
Party which had won the last two presidential elections.
Despite his orthodox means of coming to power, CalderSn
Guardia soon indicated that he planned to depart from
traditional ways, at least on the question of social
reform.
In his inaugural address, Calderdn called for a
more equitable tax structure, greater attention to the
neglected lands beyond the Meseta Central, a land
distribution program and a low-cost housing program, and
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a modern system of social security.

1

While Calderfin said

that he meant to avoid government activity in those
spheres open to private capital, he nevertheless outlined
an ambitious program and one which differed significantly
from the usual piecemeal approach to social problems.

2

1 There had been some social legislation before
Calderfinfs term and his critics, anxious to prove that
social reform in Costa Rica did not begin with Dr,
Calderfin, compiled a list of earlier legislation.
Examples were the setting of a maximum working day (1920);
a law on work accidents (1 9 2 5 )» minimum wage law (1933)?
a law for the protection, of mothers and children (1 9 3 3 )*
and registry of labor organizations (1937).
"La politics,
social," Surco, IV (May-June 19*4*0 , *41. Surco was a
publication of the Center for the Study of National
Problems; this issue is especially interesting because
it is devoted to a critical analysis of the Calderfin
Guardia administration, written just as Calderfin was
leaving office.
Founded in 19*40, the Center was an organization
of young intellectuals, most of them associated with the
University of Costa Rica, who proposed to undertake a
nonpartisan examination of Costa Rican public issues, In
19*45, however, the group abandoned its nonpartisan stance
and joined with the Democratic Action Party to form the
Social Democratic Party, the most intransigent of the
political groups opposing Calderfin.

2 John Patrick Bell, Crisis in Costa Ricai The
19*4-8 Revolution (Austin* University of Texas Latin
American Monographs No. 2*4-, 1971), 27» Although dealing
primarily with factors leading to the 19*4-8 revolution,
Bell provides a good brief account of the Calderfin
administration. A pro-Calderfin account written by one of
his supporters is Josfi Albertazzi Avendano, La tragedia
de Costa Rica (MSxico* privately printed, 1951)« The
standard liberacionista version, highly critical of the
Calderfin administration, is Alberto F. Cafias, Los 8 afios
(San JosS* Editorial Liberacifin Nacicnal, 195517 1 7 -6 2 .
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Calderfin's ideas had "been formed in his early
y e a r s . H e was from a devoutly Catholic San JosS family
and, while studying medicine in Europe, he had been
influenced by the ideas of social reform expressed in the
papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragessimo Anno.
Ke became concerned about Costa Rica's poor and seems to
have developed a sense of mission with regard to his own
role- in improving their lot.

As he explained later, "X

reduced the entire program of my government to a simple
but extremely important statement:

'to raise the

economic, moral and cultural level of the working
b
classes.'"'
The cornerstones of Calderfin's social program
were a social security system, a Labor Code and a chapter
of constitutional amendments providing a legal basis for
these and future pieces of social legislation,*’ The

3 Calderfin traces the development of his social
thought in his El gobemante y el hombre frente al
uroblema social costarricense (San JosfiT"privately
printed, 1942), especially 3 -2 6 ,
4

Ibid>, 2b,

Italics in the original.

5 Other Calderfin programs designed to help the
poor were a law for the protection of Indians, National
Bank-sponsored agricultural cooperatives, a plan for the
distribution of some unused public lands to landless
peasants, and a housing program. Costa Rica’s first income tax law, passed in 1947 during the administration of
Calderfin's successor Picado, is also generally considered
a calderonista reform because of the close relationship
between the Calderfin administration and that of his
handpicked successor.
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first of these programs which Calderfin proposed to the
Costa Rican legislature was the social security system,
said to be the first such plan in Central America.

Under

Calderon's proposal, all agricultural and industrial
workers under sixty years of age would be covered by the
social security insurance program, with the employer,
employee and the state making compulsory contributions.
The proposal met resistance in the National
Assembly but, due to the large sway the president had
over the Costa Rican legislature in those days, Calderfin
was able to get the bill passed.

The system began to

operate in the four major cities of the Meseta Central in
1 9 ^ 2 with provisions for the eventual extension of the

program throughout the country.
Later that year, in his annual May 1 congressional
address, the President submitted his second major piece
of social legislation— a proposed chapter of social
guarantees to be added to the constitution as amendments.
The amendments were not specific, but were a general
statement of principles about the state’s obligations
toward public well-being and a definition of the social
limits of private property.

They allowed the state to

set up cooperatives, establish a social security system
and enact legislation regulating labor conditions and

61

union activities.
In presenting his social guarantees chapter,
Calderfin tried to portray his program as "being in line
with Catholic thinking and with developments in other
Latin American countries.

Insisting that Costa Rica

must not try to withdraw from the "universal currents"
of the age, he defined his government's policy as that
of "absolute respect for private property within the
n

limits of public necessity."''
Once congress had given provisional approval to
the constitutional amendments— a second vote was required
when the new congress convened— Calderfin felt he had a
basis for introducing his Labor Code, the first such
Q
m o d e m comprehensive code in Central America.
Pushed
through congress in 19 ^ 3 » the proposal was a codification
of new and existing labor laws. The code

provided for

tie creation of a Labor Ministry and labor courts to
handle worker grievances, guaranteed the right of labor
to organize and made collective bargaining mandatory in

6 Rafael A. Calderfin Guardia, Mensa.ie del
Presidente de la reoublica Doctor -don Rafael A Calderfin
Guardia al uoder legislativo introduciendo el -proyecto de
reforma a la Carta Magna, para establecer el capltulo de
garant-Ias sociales CSan Josfii Imprenta Nacional, 19^2),
15-lb.

7

Ibid., 3, 5.

8
Howard I. Blutstein, et. al.. Area Handbook
for Costa Rica (Washington: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1970), 252.
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case of disputes.

The code included little that seems

radical today, hut it was loudly protested at the time by
critics who were already inflamed by Calderfin*s earlier
reform measures and his arm-twisting methods of getting
his program approved.
As soon as the nature of his program became
clear, members of the business community and large
landowners began a vocal criticism of Calderfin which
continued until the revolution of 19^8.

Although many of

them probably would have opposed social reforms under any
circumstances, Calderfin made matters worse by his manner
of governing.

He did not seem to have a good grasp of

economics or public finance and large-scale programs of
public works and services were begun without adequate
provision for their financing.^

Just at that time, a

number of Costa Rican thinkers, many of them associated
with the Center for the Study of National Problems, were
beginning to advocate economic planning and a larger role
for technocrats in government.

Calderfin's personalistic,

disorganized methods of running the country offended them.

9 Stacy May et al.. Costa Ricas A Study in
Economic Development (New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1952), 2 8 1 . Interestingly, the Twentieth Century
Fund Study Group made a similar observation about some of
the programs begun by the Governing Junta of 19^8-1949
whose members had been among Calderfin's most severe
critics on the issue of economic planning.
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Calderfin had no effective system for overseeing
such important functions as the letting of government
contracts on the basis of competitive bids.

Although he

himself did not get rich at public expense, some of his
subordinates did, and opponents could pin the charge of
corruption and maladministration on his government,
This did not sit well in a country with a tradition of
frugality in government,
Calderfin was further hampered by factors beyond
his control, principally caused by the war,

Costa Rica

had the largest volume of foreign trade of any Central
American country, much of it with Western Europe,

Hence,

the country was hit hard by the wartime severing of trade
ties and suffered from shortages and inflation.

Inflation

was exacerbated by the influx of American dollars in
connection with the construction of the Pan American

10 "la labor de fomento," Surco, IV (May-June
1944), 70-74-, See, in ...particular, the list of "contracts
without bids" on page 71.
11 Costa Ricans of all classes had generally
expected their governments to operate on low budgets.
The tradition of frugality in government can be traced to
the country's colonial period of generalised poverty in,
which- even the governor, according to some accounts, haa
to grow his own crops. Deeply rooted in this tradition,
Costa Ricans did not fully appreciate the changing nature
of government expenses and the budgetary difficulties
faced by a wartime administration.
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highway, by far the largest public works project
Rica had ever undertaken.

Costa

12

The charges of corruption and mismanagement,
Calderon’s heavy-handed way of dealing with congress and
his apparent willingness to use the social legislation to
further his political purposes alienated Costa Ricans who
logically should have supported Calderfin's program, such
as the young men of the Center for the Study of National
13
Problems. J Otilio Ulate, who was skeptical about
Calderfin's social legislation but was chiefly alienated
by what he viewed as Calderfin's undemocratic methods,
also turned against the President and, through his
influential newspapers, Ulate eventually became the chief
spokesman for all the anti-Calderfin forces.

12 Joaquin Garro, Las decadas del siglo veinte
y otros temas (San Josfi: Impr'enta Vargas., 1966), 18;
John and Mavis Biesanz, Costa Rican Life (New York;
Columbia University Press, 1954), 247-43.
13 For example, in what seemed particularly
fortuitous timing, the Social Security System went into
effect, amid much government fanfare, just days before
the 1942 off-year congressional elections. While Calderfin
thus used the social programs to gain popular support,
his commitment to social welfare was genuine. He wanted
popular support to guarantee the success of future social
legislation. The Opposition charges-of Calderfin’s
demagoguery were in this sense not fair. Surco, the
Center's organ, was especially critical of Calderfin's "nar
cissistic , excessive, personalistic, panacea-like,
deifying propaganda about the social legislation,"
Anxious to prove that their hearts were in the right
place, the editors of Sure'o added that "it is not that we
are denying the importance of [social:] legislation....
what we are opposing is the demogogic, politicking, absurd
pretension of calderonistas and Communists that it is
a 'conquest' of Dr, Calderfin." "La politica social," 40.
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Having alienated important supporters, Calderfin
was afraid he might be unable to push the rest of his
program through congress.

After some hesitation, he

turned to the Communist Party and agreed to a limited
alliance, concluded on the basis of an understanding with
Communist Party chief Manuel Mora, who had been in control
of the party since its founding and could be expected to
deliver.

No Communists were given positions in the

cabinet, but it was decided that Communist deputies in
the legislature would back the executive program
provided Calderfin agreed to make further efforts toward
\h,
social reform.
In 19^3, having reached an agreement with
Calderfin, Mora dissolved the Communist Party (the Bloque
de Obreros y Campesinos), thus making the agreement more
palatable to members of Calderfin’s National Republican
ic
Party. J In trying to maintain an accommodation with
the government, Mcra was in keeping with the wartime
practices of Communist leaders elsewhere.

After

dissolving the Bloque, Mora immediately formed another

14 Ricardo FernSndez Guardia, Cartilla histfirica
de Costa Rica (San Josfi: Imprenta Lehmann, 1 9 6 7 ) , 154-.
Independent observers disagree as to the extent of
Communist influence in the Calderfin and Picado admini
strations. FernSndez Guardia believes that their
influence was considerable and writes that one of
Picado's ministers left the government after unsuccess
fully attempting to control high-handed Communist
employees (p. 1 5 7 )•
15

Caftas, Los 8 aflos, ^9*
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party, Vanguardia Popular.

Vanguardia's origins were

generally known, but the new party nevertheless was more
acceptable to the Costa Rican people because neither the >name nor the party's history was as overtly Communist
as that of the Bloque.
CalderSn's alliance with Mora was further
encouraged by statements made by Costa Rica's archbishop
Victor Sanabria whose opinions were important to the
devout CalderSn,.

Sanabria praised the Vanguardia-backed

social legislation and said in a public letter that he
could find nothing wrong with a Catholic joining the
Vanguardia Popular

Once having made a pact with

Mora, Calderdn found it difficult to turn back, because
the pact itself alienated still more former CalderCn
backerso

As his other supporters defected, CalderCn

became even more closely associated with the Communist
Party in the public mind.

In retrospect, this "pact with

the devil" was an expensive tactical blunder.
Another matter which cost the President support
was his treatment of Jos€ Figueres, a coffee grower who
strongly denounced the government in a July 19^2 radio
speech.

Figueres was arrested and eventually forced to

leave the country, as Costa Rica's first political exile
since the Hinoco days.

Figueres was the only man

Calderon exiled, and CalderCn permitted constant criticism

16

Alexander, Communism. 3 8 8 .
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of his administration in the press and congress, but
the Figueres incident did much to brand the President a
dictator.
The furor over Figueres*. ouster must be seen in
the Costa Rican context.

While the exile of any person

from his country is deplorable, in many countries it is
a common means of dealing with political opponents.
Calderdn's record of one political exile and no political
prisoners during a four-year wartime administration must
have been one of the better civil liberties records in
the Hemisphere and in most other parts of the world.
Despite its many shortcomings, however, Costa Rica was
an extremely civilized country in which the sort of
treatment given Figueres was unacceptable.
All of these factors worked to undercut CalderSn's
position, but his ultimate downfall was due to public
misgivings about his commitment to Costa Rican democracy.
Costa Ricans were accustomed to a certain amount of
official pressure during political campaigns, but
Calderdn overstepped the bounds of custom and lost
public confidence.

He continued to have many followers,

as evidenced by his good showing when he ran for
president ten years after the revolution of 19^-8.

The

perception that he had subverted democracy, however,
became sufficiently widespread that a small group of
revolutionaries could count on the acquiescence of most
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of the people when they "began an armed revolt.
In particular, the election of 1944 drew passive
critics into active opposition and made liberal and
conservative opponents of the regime willing to work
together to prevent Calderon from serving a second term,
CalderSn was constitutionally unable to succeed himself
in 1944 and he picked congressional president Teodoro
Picado, a law professor, as his successor.

It v/as widely

assumed that Picado was a stand-in for CalderSn who again
1 rt

intended to run for president in 1948*
Picado*s chief opponent in the 1944 race was
former President LeSn CortSs (1936-1940) who by then had
broken with CalderSn.

CortSs had the backing of much of

the anti-CalderSn group but others, such as Ulate,
declined to give active support to CortSs because of his
XS
own record of authoritarian government.
The campaign
was marred by violence.

Just a week before the election,

one man was killed during clashes between partisan
groups in San JosS,

Ulate, who blamed government forces

f.or harrassing the Opposition, announced that he was
closing El Diario-and La Hora in protest.

Vowing not to

resume publication "until public liberties are restored,"

1? Ligia Estrada-MolinaTeodoro_Picado .
Michalskyi Su aporte -a’la historiografia (San JosS:
Imprenta Nacional, 1 96 7 )""• 201j Arturo Castro Esquivel,
Jos-S Figueres Ferrer; El hombre v su obra (San JosS:
Imprenta Tormc, 19555\ 57.
~
18

Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica. Ill,
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Ulate editorialized:

"It is evident that we have

entered into a dictatorial regime in which the
Communist Party takes part in the exercise of authority;
and our conviction is that independent papers should not
19
be published under these conditions." ^
Election day was also violent, with four killed
in the country.

After the votes were counted, the

government announced that Picado had won about 90,000
votes to some ^6,000 for CortSs,

While it is impossible

from this vantage point to know who won the race, it
seems clear that Picado's margin could not have been
that great.
Soon after Picado became president, Figueres
was allowed to return to Costa Rica,
publication of his newspapers. ~

20

and Ulate resumed

Picado was a

conciliatory man of considerable ability, but his
efforts to maintain national unity were crushed between

19 El Diario de Costa Rica. Feb, 8 , 19^. Ulate
noted that El Diario, the country's oldest paper, had
never before suspended publication in the 25 years since it
was founded. He added that salaries of employees would
continue to be paid while the papers were closed.
20

Castro, Josg Figueres Ferrer. 62,

21 El Diario actually ceased publication only
for a short period of time, probably about two weeks,
after" which Ulate'allowed members of the Center for the
Study- of National Problems to put out the paper.
According to his daughter, Ulate himself resumed control
of the paper after about a six months' absence.
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the CalderSn group and what came to "be called simply
"the Opposition."

The problem was compounded by the

presence of an element of intransigence not typical of
Costa Rican politics in the past.

Perhaps because they

viewed their objectives as so important for the country,
the reformers of the 19 ^0 *s were not inclined toward
compromise.

CalderSn had made it plain that his

dedication to social reform overrode his commitment to
democratic government and that he was willing to exert
pressure to see his goals realized.

CalderSn’s most

outspoken opponents, JosS Figueres and his supporters in
the Social Democratic Party (PSD), were even more
determined than the president.

They viewed things in

black and white terms and condemned the government in
blanket fashion.

Figueres said that ’’everything" about

the administration was bad and spoke about the need to
"destroy completely" calderonismo.

In a public speech

on his return from exile in 19^4, he described the
country as enveloped in a night of darkness, claiming
that the sun would begin to shine again only with the
22
founding of a new Second Republic.
Such attitudes
made compromise difficult.
Nevertheless, compromise might have been
achieved and revolution avoided, if more moderate

22' Castro, JosS Figueres Ferrer, 6 3 -6 6 .
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members of the Opposition, such as Ulate, had managed
to keep the upper hand within the movement.

The

Opposition drew only a minority of its support from the
pro-Figueres Social Democratic Party; its major strength
came from Ulate's National Union Party and from the
Democratic Party, then headed by LeSn CortSs.

In 19^5

all these parties merged to form Compactaci8n Nacional,^
Thus, all the anti-Calder6n forces were united in a
2b
"strange alliance"
composed of groups with widely
divergent goals;

the young men who wanted to modernize

and reform Costa Rica and traditional leaders who simply
wanted to end Communist influence in the government and
restore democracy.

As post-revolutionary years would

prove, the two groups were united only by their
opposition to CalderSn and not by any fundamental
consensus on the way the country should be governed.
Compactaci-Sn Nacional was defeated in the
congressional elections of 1 9 ^ 6 but had high hopes for
the election of 1 9 ^8 .

Since Cort-Ss had died in 19^6, a

convention of all Opposition forces was held in February
19^7 in order to choose a presidential candidate.

23

At

Ibid.. 71.

2^ Claudio GutiSrrez Carranza, "Ensayo sobre
las generaciones costarricenses, 1823-1953«M Revista de
la Universidad de Costa Rica, X (Nov. 195^)» oTT

the convention Ulate emerged, as the nominee, after
defeating the other chief contenders— Figueres and
Fernando Castro Cervantes, a businessman from the
Democratic Party.

Alberto F, Caflas* description of the

balloting gives an idea of the base of support of each
candidate ;
It seemed evident from the first ballot that..,
the big capitalists, the conservative mentalities
favored Castro; the mature intellectuals and
young businessmen were for Ulate; and the
students, young intellectuals and "hotheads”
voted for Figueres. But Ulate carried the
numerical advantage. 25
Figueres, who received the least number of votes of the
three, was eliminated after a second ballot; most of his
supporters probably then voted for Ulate rather than
Castro, whom they considered "excessively conservative."
CalderSn, as expected, was nominated by the
National Republicans and a bitter campaign was underway.
Although denouncing Calderon and his pact with the
Communists, Ulate indicated his support for CalderSn's
social legislation, assuring voters that:
Our government will maintain in force the laws
that recognise the social rights and. work rights
of the working and peasant forces....The people
have a right to just retribution for work, the
application of social justice, education for their
children and, above all, the right to health,27

25

CaF.as, Los S a fio s . 85 .

26

Ibid.

27

El Diario, Feb. 6, 194 .8 .
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The election took place on February 8, 19^8.
On the 2 8 th the Electoral Tribunal announced its official
finding!

Ulate led by over 10,000 votes and was awarded

the victory, subject to confirmation by congress as
required by law.

28

There are indications that CalderSn

planned to concede the victory to Ulate but that reports
of Opposition fraud during the elections made him change
his mind.

There were charges that Opposition voters had

deliberately stalled and loitered at the polls in order
to prevent calderonistas from voting before the polls
closed,

Sensitive to this charge, El Diario on

February 13 maintained that "it was ulatismo which, to a
sizable extent, did not get to vote,.let's be done
with the farce to the effect that calderonistas and
Communists were unable to vote."

Although some of the

charges were probably true, it seems unlikely that the
outcome of the election would have been different.
Whatever CalderSn's original intentions may
have been, on March 1 the calderonista-dominated
congress, undoubtedly carrying out his will, voted to

28 Ibid. , Feb. 29, 1 W .
The Electoral
Tribunal reported 5^,931 votes for Ulate to
for
CalderSn. One member of the three-man tribunal,
however, said he had not had sufficient time to count
the votes and withheld his signature from the decree
announcing Ulate*s victory.
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annul the election. ^

This action played into the hands

of JosS Figueres who, since the time of his exile, had
been planning to launch a revolution against CalderSn
and seeking an event which would guarantee the necessary
level of public support.

10

29 Apparently the calderonista congressmen
planned to try to have CalderSn elected first designate—
equivalent to first vice president— when the new congress
convened on May 1, Past Costa Rican custom had been for
the congress to "call" the first designate to serve as
acting president for fcur years in the absence of a
president. Albertazzi, La tragedia, 83.
30 That the congressional action was the pretext
rather than the reason for the revolution is the finding
of Charles D. Ameringer:
Although there appeared to be a cause-andeffect relation between the nullification
of Ulate's election and the initiation of
military action by Figueres, the war was
no spur-of-the-moment act— there had.been,
as Figueres had said, a six-year period of
"gestation."
Ameringer, The Democratic Left in Sxile (Coral Gables:
University of Miami, 197^)» 75«
A similar conclusion is reached by John Patrick
Bell who has carefully traced the development of
Figueres' plans for revolution and his success in
thwarting compromise between CalderSn and more moderate
Opposition leaders. Bell, who is more "critical of
Figueres than most, describes his motives:
He had dedicated years of his life to the
conspiracy and had overextended the credit of
his commercial enterprises in order to help
finance the effort..,.He stood to lose most if
the revolution failed. If it succeeded, he was
assured of a prominent position in Costa Rican
politics and was likely to become the arbiter
,of the nation's destinies, as well as an
international figure of some stature.
Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica. 132.
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The Revolution of 1948

Although Figueres, who was probably motivated
not only by personal ambition but also by concern for
his country, had long ago decided to resort to
81
revolution,
his plans did not take final form until
December 1947.

At that time he joined the Caribbean

Legion, a group of conspirators who aimed at the
82
overthrow of dictators in the region.-'
The group's arms came to be stored in Guatemala,
whose President Argvalo was sympathetic to their aims.
When Figueres began his revolution on March 10, materiel
and military officers were flown from Guatemala to assist
the revolt. ^

With the aid of the Legion, but with an

31 Liberacionista Caflas describes Figueres after
1944: "His occupation is now that of a conspirator..,,
Figueres insists that the reigning clique will not be
expelled by means of the ballot." Caflas, Los 8 aflos, 6 8 ,
32 Figueres* connections with the Legion went
back further than December l6 , 1947 but that date was
significant because at that time Figueres joined with
revolutionaries from Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic
in pledging mutual support for efforts to "destroy the
ruling dictatorships in their fatherlands," The agreement
was formalized in a "pact of alliance/" reprinted in
Otilio Ulate, Hacia donde lleva a Costa Rica el Seflor
Presidente Figueres? tSan JosS: Universal,1955)» 18-21,
For a discussion of the Legion*s role in Costa Rica see
Ameringer, Democratic Left, 72-87.
33 Ibid.. 7 6 . On the Legion's role in Costa Rica
also see Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair (Chicago:
Quadrangle, 1 9 6 7 ), 161-62; FemSndez Guardia, Cartilla
histCrica, 162. As noted below, the OAS found Legionnaires
receiving-government aid in Costa Rica.in December 1948. .

76army composed largely of Costa Ricans, Figueres was able
to force Picado and CalderSn to flee to Nicaragua in six
weeks.

Picado still had control of the government and

much of the country when he gave up the fight, but he
was deeply disturbed by the 2 ,0 0 0 casualties, the growing
Communist influence in the government since the
revolution began and by Figueres' threat to launch air
raids against San Jose.

Picado agreed to open

negotiations with Figueres who demanded initially that he
be named first designate to the presidency, thus
insuring that control of the government would pass
directly to himself on Picado*s resignation.-^

Picado,

however, apparently rejected this plan because six days
later, on April 19, 1948, the President and a Figueres
representative signed a pact in which Picado agreed to

34 Communist influence increased during the
revolution because the Communists put up the most
determined resistance to Figueres. Workers' militias
were formed which were often more effective than
government troops. Fern&ndez Guardia writes that
Vanguardia Popular was the only political faction to
fight for the government. Cartilla histSrica. 162.
35 "Memorandum de los jefes de la rebeliSn como
base para la capitulacifin del gobiemo de Picado," dated
April 13, 1948, reprinted in Marco Tulio Zeledfin,
Historia constitucional de Costa Rica en el bienio
1948-49 (San~Josg7 privately printed. 1950). 29-30.
Figueres * comrades-in-arms Alberto MartSn and Fernando
Valverde were to be named second and third designates,
respectively, according to the memorandum.
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yield the government to Santos Le6n Herrera, at that
time third designate to the presidency! the revolu
tionaries, for their part, promised to maintain the
social reforms and to respect the lives and property of
those who had supported the government during the
revolution.^

Thus, Lefin Herrera was the nominal head of

the country until May 8 , traditional inauguration day in
Costa Rica, when he turned the government over to
Figueres— who had, in fact, been the obvious power behind
the throne during the brief interim government«
It is interesting that Ulate did not sign the
peace pact and was not included in the negotiations.
Once he launched his revolt, Figueres assumed the
leadership of the anti-government forces and bypassed
Ulate, the presumed president-elect.

Ulate had been

reluctant to turn to revolution, and it is said that
Figueres believed that those who had failed to take up
arms lost any claim to the leadership of the
Opposition. 37
The decision to go to revolution seemed to
reflect a good deal about one's political philosophy, the
relative importance- he ascribed to different political
values.

Most of the traditional politicians were

36
"Facto de la Embajada de MSxico," reprinted
in Zeledfin, Historia constitucional, 30-3^.

37

Interview with Luis Alberto Monge, Aug, 19,196?.
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hesitant to overthrow the government and plunge the
country into what obviously would be a violent struggle»
given the bitterness felt on both sides.

Those who led

the revolution were the "students, young intellectuals
and ’hotheads'” whom Canas describes as supporting
Figueres at the 19^7 convention.

Thus, by excluding

those who took no part in the revolution Figueres also
excluded those whose political philosophy differed
significantly from his.
Figueres, however, recognized that Ulate had
considerable support in the country and he signed a pact
with Ulate on May 1.

Ulate agreed that a Revolutionary

Junta would exercise legislative and executive powers from
May 8 , 19^8 until November 8 , 19^9» during which time a
constituent assembly would draw up a new constitution.
Figueres recognized Ulate’s election as president and
agreed that at the end of the Junta administration he
would surrender the presidency to Ulate who would then
serve his four-year term as first constitutional president
oQ
of the "Second Republic.
With this agreement, the path
was cleared for Figueres to assume direct control of the

38

"pacto Ulate-Figueres,” reprinted in Zeledon,
Historia constitucional, 35-36. The pact stipulated that,
subject to approval of the constituent assembly, the Junta
might extend its tenure six months if it considered the
extension necessary in order to complete its work. It was
also stipulated that the assembly should ratify Ulate's
election as- president.
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government.
One historian has charged that by signing the
pact Ulate provided "the key which opened the door to the
de facto r e g i m e , U l a t e ' s motives for this action are
a matter of conjecture.

He probably realized that he

had little choice but to sign the pact if he wanted
Figueres, who was in control of the country, to recognize
his right to the presidency.

Beyond his personal

ambition to become president, Ulate was perhaps loath to
do anything to encourage further unrest in the country
and was thus willing to lend a semblance of legitimacy to
the Junta.

In addition, Ulate probably did not

anticipate that once in office the Junta would depart so
diametrically in its program from the traditional path,
and consequently was not fully cognizant of the
significance of the event.
It is occasionally reported that Figueres offered
the presidency of the Junta to Ulate before deciding to
take the position himself.

These reports, however, are

not consistent with Figueres' attempt to gain power
directly from Picado; any such offer to Ulate must have
been a -pro forma one, made in such a way as to let Ulate
know he would have no power in the Junta.

That Ulate, a

strong advocate of constitutionalism, would reject an

39

ZeledCn, Historia constitucional. 9.
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offer to head an extra-legal government could have been
anticipated.
The question seems to have been not whether Ulate
would head the Junta but whether Figueres ever intended
to turn the government over to Ulate.

Indications are

that Figueres at first did not plan to recognize Ulate's
election but, rather, to void the 1 9 ^ 8 elections and hold
new ones.

Ulate himself thought this.

He believed

that Figueres signed the Ulate-Figueres Pact only because
Figueres had decided he might otherwise find it impossible
to govern.

Reporting substantially the same facts but

with a different interpretation, Junta minister Gonzalo
Facio says: that:
Ulate always thought, incorrectly, that we
meant to deny him the presidency. We only
meant that he was to have no part in the
Junta. We would then hold new elections but,
since none of us was going to run, Ulate
would have been the logical winner.iJ-0

Jos6 Figueres and the Second Republic

Choosing his cabinet from among his supporters in
the revolution, Figueres created a twelve-man governing
committee which he called the "Founding Junta of the

kO Interviews with Otilio Ulate, July 27, 19^7
and Gonzalo Facio, Aug. 8 , 196?•

Second Republic.

ZlI

The high-sounding title of the

committee reflected Figueres' view of the provisional
government's rolet

He did not simply plan to oust

calderonismo from Costa Rica but to create a new political
and social order to replace the old one which he thought
1^2
was obsolete.
The most forceful of Figueres* ministers,
such as Economy Minister Alberto MartSn and Social
Welfare Minister Benjamin NdJiez, shared this attitude.
Mart-Sn explained that he regarded the Junta government as
an opportunity to give the country a "golpe de timdn a la
izquierdar-a^-.yank of the helm to the left.

Such an

approach helps to explain the exclusion of traditional
political leaders.

The presence of leading lights from

the "first republic" might have put a damper on the
Junta's plans.
Since there was no constitution in force and no
congress in session, the provisional government had few

41 The members of the Junta are listed in La
gacetat diario oficial, afio LXXj. No. 105 (May 11, 1948).
42 See Castro, JosS Figueres Ferrer. 227-40, for
Figueres* statement on his view of the need for
transcendent change in Costa Rica.
43 Interview with Alberto MartSn, Aug, 13, 19&7.
After a disagreement with Figueres, MartSn resigned from
the Junta early in 1949 and- subsequently took no part in
the activities of the National Liberation Party formed
by Figueres and his supporters.
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checks on its powers.

ZlZIt

Ruling the country through

decree-laws, Figueres and the Junta were able to bring
about far-reaching changes in Costa Rica during their
brief turn in office.^
Figueres' actions caught the country's elite off
guard.

Following the revolution, they had expected to

return to the "normal"— in other works, pre-194-O— way of
4*6
running the country.
They were unprepared for a
new-style government which aimed at a reorientation of
the system.

In the end they would find that the

Figueres Junta brought changes in many ways more drastic
than the social reform legislation of CalderSn.
Ironically, by aiding the Opposition movement and
acquiescing in CalderSn*s ouster, Costa Rican
traditionalists had paved the way for an even more serious
challenge to the established order.
The Junta's first actions were aimed at ferreting
out enemies and crushing potential sources of counter-

44 The chapter of the 1 8 7 1 constitution which
guaranteed civil liberties remained in force while the
new constitution was in preparation.
4-5 Much of the information on the work and goals
of the Junta came from interviews with Junta members JosS
Figueres, Daniel Oduber, Benjamin NflHez, Alberto MartSn,
Uladislao Gimez, Francisco Orlich, Radi Blanco and
Gonzalo Facio during the summer of 1967- For a more
detailed study of the Junta see Judy Oliver, "Twelve Who
Ruled in Costa Ricas. The Junta of 194'8-4-9'’ (unpublished
M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1 9 6 8 ).
4-6

Interview with Daniel Oduber, Aug. 21, 19&7•
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revolution.

The Junta outlawed the Communist Party— its
47
major adversary during the revolution;
dissolved the
pact with Picado on the grounds that Picado's followers
48
had not fulfilled their part of the bargain*
and fired
llQ
a number of government employees
and judges who were
believed to have been supporters of CalderSn.

The

civil servants were often replaced by university-trained
experts who did much to create the nucleus of a profes
sional civil service.

But the new judges, according to

one observer who was generally sympathetic toward the
Junta, were chosen with an eye to their political
affiliation.^
To deal with calderonistas the Junta created two
special tribunals whose judgments were not subject to

47 Costa Rica, ColecciSn de leyes, decretos,
acuerdos v resoluciones, 'Segundo'Semestre de 194&-(Shn
Jos§: Imprenta Nacional, 1949)» No, 105 of July 17.
48 The Junta said Picado followers had violated
the pact by not turning in their arms and protecting
citizens in their control area after the signing of the
pact. Ibid. , Primer de 194.8, No. 77 of June 22.
4-9 The decree stipulated that anyone who had held
any form of public employment from May
8 ,1944 to May 8 ,
1 9 4 8 could be fired without the severance pay required in
the Labor Code. Portions of the Labor Code which
contradicted the decree were rescinded by the decree
itself. Ibid.. No. 7 of May 8 .
50
51
(San Josl:

Ibid., No. 3 of May 8and No.

8 of May 12.

Joaquin Garro, Veinte afios de historia chica
Imprenta Vargas, 1967J 21.
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appeal.

One of these tried CalderSn and Picado employees

and supporters suspected of having persecuted their
adversaries during the 1940-48

period when "terror was

enthroned;" and the other tribunal confiscated property
of calderonistas who were believed to have enriched
themselves at public expense.

The second of these

special courts, the Tribunal of Probity, was empowered to
operate on a presumption-of-guilt basis, confiscating
property and holding it until the owner came to court to
prove rightful ownership.

Since many CalderSn supporters

had fled the country and some were denied readmittance or
felt it unsafe to return, it was often difficult for them
to regain their property. ^
The special tribunals were the blackest mark on
the Junta’s record and were widely condemned in Costa
Rica, particularly in the Constituent Assembly, which met
from January to November 1949 and which, in addition to

52 ColecciCn de leves. Primer de 1948, No. 16 of
May 19 and No. 4i"~of June 2.
53 Fo** example, the minutes of the Junta meetings
record that Manuel Mora was denied permission to return
to the country. Junta Fundadora de la Segunda Repdblica,
"Actas de las Sesiones" (unpublished transcript), entry
for Feb. 8 , 1949. Actually, few Costa Ricans were denied
readraittance but some felt, rightly or wrongly, that it
would be unsafe for them to return to Costa Rica at that
time. Among them was former calderonista congressman
JosSu F.ernSndez .who. took his family to Honduras and
remained there for two years. Interview with FernSndez,
July 10, IO6 7 ,
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writing the new constitution, acted as a sort of nonvoting
parliament.

Typifying the assembly criticism of the

tribunals, Representative Vargas Fern&ndez said:
The fact that I am energetically condemning
them Qthe tribunals] does not mean that I am
defending criminals or those who sacked the
public treasury, but I believe that these
delinquents should go to the common tribunals.
Humanity recoils against special tribunals.
Unfortunately, there has been revived in
Costa Rica something which represents a
retrogression to the Middle Ages.5^
The existence of such courts had been forbidden
in the Consitution of 1 87 1 which the Junta had abrogated
on assuming office

the provecto, or proposed new

constitution, which the Junta itself submitted to the
constituent assembly also prohibited the creation of
extra-legal courts.

Yet it should not be inferred that

the Junta initiated a reign of terror.

The courts

handed down no death sentences and did not conduct a
roundup of political opponents.

It is said that they

did not even manage to recover a large amount of
property, causing Junta member Alberto MartSn to lament
later that "it was the worst scenario for us,

We were

considered thieves, but we didn't make off with the
money.

54 Asamblea Nacional Constituyente de 194-9,
Actas, I (San Josg: Imprenta Nacional, 1953), 371*
55

ColecciSn de' leyes. Primer de 1948, No. 2 of

56

Interview with Alberto MartSn, Aug, 13, 19^7«

May 8 ,
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A number of the Junta's economic measures drew as
much fire as the creation of the special tribunals.
More than any Costa Rican president of the past, Figueres
aimed at giving the government a leadership role in the
economy.

He favored a planned economy with extensive gov

ernment

direction— a balance, as he saw it, between

capitalism and socialism.

Figueres wanted to improve the

living standards of the Costa Rican poor but rather than
attacking the social problem directly, as CalderSn had,
Figueres put greatest emphasis on economic reorientation,
believing that a planned economy would yield abundance
for all.^

Although his mastery of economics has

been questioned, there was little doubt about the
sincerity of his intentions.
The Junta came into office anxious to begin a
program of public works, social services and economic
reorganization but found it difficult to put such a
program into effect.

The economy had been in poor shape

even before the revolution, and many business activities
and government programs had come to a standstill during
the revolution.

The government's sources of revenue

were limited and these were strained even further when
the Junta decided that the government would assume the
cost of the revolution, indemnifying those who had

uosti

57 JosS Figueres, Cartas a un ciudadano (San
Imprenta Nacional, 1956)* 51«

8?
suffered losses.
After about six weeks in office, the Junta
members discussed the difficulties of "fulfilling the
primordial ends of the revolution" within current
eg
budgetary limits,
and decided to issue two decrees
which raised a storm of protest among the elite.

The

decrees nationalized all private banks and imposed a
ten percent capital levy on all resident persons or
economic entities, Costa Rican or foreign, with a capital
worth of 50*000 colones (about $9*000),^

The capital

levy affected only the wealthy, many of whom had financed
the anti-Calderfin movement and were furious at the Junta’s
"ingratitude."

They did everything in their power to

circumvent the tax and were largely successful, because
the law was difficult to enforce.
The tax probably had a negative effect on economic
development because, as the Twentieth Century Fund Study
Group who visited Costa Rica in 1950 noted, it led to
the withdrawal of bank deposits, to hoarding and
channeling of funds into easily concealed, and often

'58
of May 25.

19^8 .

59

,

60

ColecciSn de leves, Primer de 19^8, No. 33
Junta Fundadora, "Actas, 11 entry for June 15,

ColecciSn de leves, Primer de 1 9 ^8 f No. 70
and 71 of. June 21. . The government'paid generously for
•the bank stocks at a cost of 70 million colones.
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non-productive, outlets.

6*i

In this way it reduced the

volume of hank deposits and worked at cross purposes
with the bank nationalization decree which was designed
to put more money at the disposal of investors.
Costa Rican banks had been set up to facilitate
foreign trade, and about two-thirds of their loans went
to merchants and traders, with coffee planters absorbing
a large portion of the loans available for agriculture.
Figueres wanted to make more money available for long
term capital investment in industry and diversified
agriculture, and he was also anxious to establish a
firmer grip over fluctuating prices and interest rates. J
The nationalization of the commercial banks and the
creation of a state-directed banking system would,
as Figueres saw it, further these ends.
Under the new system, banks did gradually begin
to direct more of their money toward agriculture and
industry, but the nationalization decree was not followed
by other legislation defining the functions of the banks

61

May, Costa Rica. 253*

62

Ibid.. 255.

63 JosS Figueres, Forque fueron nacionalizados
los bancos comerciales (San Jos^j Imprenta Nacional,
19^8), 4-5.

89*
under the new system and thus full utilization of the
national banking system was not possible until a later
period.
Less dramatic than the economic measures but
probably of greater benefit to the country were a number
of administrative reforms carried out by the Junta,
Costa Rica was in need of such reformj governmental
inefficiency was by no means unique to the CalderSn
administration.

Part of the problem lay with the

country's poorly organized governmental machinery and
underpaid civil servants.

The government had an ad hoc

character, the personnel and policies changing at the end
of each administration.

The Junta was fairly successful

in imparting a degree of stability and professionalism
to the bureaucracy, despite the Junta's own early
disruptive measures, such as the wholesale firing of
political opponents.
The Junta reorganized the haphazardly structured
ministries, raised government salaries, and took the first
steps toward the creation of a civil service system and a
comptroller general's office.

Several government

dependencies were transformed into autonomous institutes,
one of Figueres' fondest schemes for decreasing the power

6 ^ U.S. Embassy, San Jos§, "Annual Economic
Report for 1950*" prepared April 5, 1951*- Despatch No,

839, V.
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of the executive over government operations.^

The

autonomous institutes were government corporations,
roughly similar to TVA.

A few of them had existed in

Costa Rica "beginning in 1914,^ but the Junta was the
first government to introduce autonomous institutes on a
large scale.^
The men of the Junta put great store in the new
constitution as a means of institutionalizing the
administrative changes they had begun.

The Junta had

some clashes with the Constituent Assembly, the great

65 Jos6 Figueres, "Unity and Culture," in
Harold Eugene Davis (ed.)f Latin American Social Thought
(Washington: The University Press of Washington, D.C.,

1961) , 480.
66 Rodrigo Facio, "La constitucion politics de
1949 y la tendencia institucional," Revista de la
Universidad de Costa Rica, XIII (July 1956), 108.
67
The idea behind the creation of the autonomous
institutes was an admirable one and probably in many cases
the system has worked well. The institutes, however, have
led to some duplication of effort and confusion, and the
numerous charges of presidential "meddling" indicate that
the institutes are not always as autonomous as they were
intended to be. 3y 1966 even the National Liberation Party
had had second thoughts about the system and the party’s
program that year urged "recognition of different degrees
of autonomy.1! Partido Liberacion Nacional, Nuestro
programs de traba.io. 1966-1970 (San JosS: Imprenta Vargas,
i9 6 0 ), :-4. For discussions of the autonomous institutes,
see Joaquin Garro, La derrota del Partido Liberacion
Nacional (San Joslr Imprenta Vargas, 1958), 12-14;and
Mario Echandi, Los hombres pftblicos frente a los dineros
publicos (San Jos§: Imprenta Nacional, 1962), 9-2^,
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majority of whose .delegates were supporters of Ulate

6ft

rather than the Junta, and many of whom were vocal
69
critics of the Junta.
The assembly, in a move which
infuriated the Junta members, rejected the Junta's
•proyecto as the basis for discussion in elaborating the
new constitution and chose instead to use the 18?1

68
In December 19^8 the Junta held elections
for representatives to the Constituent Assembly, The
results were as follows 1

Partido Uni-fin Nacional (pro-Ulate) ...... .3^
Partido Constitucional
(believed to be pro-Calder6n)......... 6
Partido Social Demficrata ( p r o - J u n t a d e p
Partido Confraternidad Nacional (regional)...1

deputies
deputies
uties
deputy*

Garro, Veinte afios, 3 6 .
Yery similar results came from elections held in
October 19^9 for .two vice presidents and 4-5 congressmen
to be installed when Ulate was inaugurated in November.
In the October elections, Ulate*s National Union Party
won both the vice presidential posts and 33 of the ^ 5
deputy positions. The Constitutional Party finished a
poor second and the Social Democrats came in third.
Ulate, the presumed president-elect, had not had to
stand for election. The Junta, in accordance with the
Ulate-Figueres Pact, had recognized Ulate*s election.
New York Times. Oct. k, 19^9 s and John Martz, Central
America; The Crisis and the Challenge (Chapel Hill;
University of North Carolina Press, 1959), 230.
69
The best source* of information on the
Constituent Assembly is Rubfin HemSndez Poveda, Desde la
barra; cfimo se discutifi v- emitifi la Constitucifin
Pollticade 19^9 ISan Jose: Editorial Borrase, 1953)•
Desde la barra is based on HernSndez Poveda's daily
column in La Prensa Libre on the assembly events.
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constitution.

70

Each section of the proyecto was

carefully considered, however, and in the end the
majority of the innovations found in the proyecto were
71
incorporated into the 19^9 constitution.(
Chief among
these were the abolition of the army;^ the outlawing of
Communist parties; female suffrage; autonomy for the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal; provisions for a civil
service system; and a number of measures designed to
reduce executive power.

Among the last were provisions

for autonomous institutes and a somewhat greater role
for municipal bodies and the national legislature;
popular election of vice presidents instead of the
appointment of presidential " d e s i g n a t e s a n d a
provision requiring ex-presid'ents to- wait eight years

70

HemSndez Poveda,. Desde la barra. 1 1 6 ,

71

Ibid.. 152-53.

72 The decision to abolish the army was largely
a symbolic gesture, but also led to some reduction in'
government.expenditures. On December 1, 19^8. Figueres
announced the disbanding of the Army of* National
Liberation— the army of the republic had been disbanded
following its .defeat by the revolutionary forces— but
said that a 1 ,0 0 0 man national; police'*'force and. 7 0 0 -man
Coast Guard would be maintained. New York Times. Dec. 2,
19 ^ 8 , Thus, the army was abolished in name, but not in
fact.
One observer reports that these public security
forces have since carried out. many of the functions
normally performed by armed forces and that they, in
this sense, constitute an army. Wayne Lamond Worthington,
"The Costa Rican Public Security Forces; A Model Armed
Force for Emerging Nations?," (unpublished M.A, thesis,
University of Florida, 1966), 135.
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before standing for reelection to the presidency." 7 3^
During its eighteen months in office, the Junta
issued 844 decree-laws which significantly affected
Costa Rican life.

Although they were not innovators in

the area of social reform, the men of the Junta kept
CalderCn's social reform program intact which was more
than Costa Ricans had ejected.

And the Junta made large

and permanent changes in the political system and
administrative machinery, as well as in the government’s
role in the economy,
What was the role of traditional political
figures during the Junta period?

Most of them became

critics of the Junta, but due to the Junta's uniquely
powerful position, opponents of the regime could do little
more than register ineffectual protest.

Otilio Ulate

soon became- disenchanted with the Junta program, but only
later did he become openly and harshly critical of
Figueres and his group.

Ulate seems to have felt bound

by the pact with Figueres, to the extent that he several
times publicly defended the Junta when it was under
attack.

During one short-lived revolt against the Junta,

73 On the 194-9 constitution see Facio, "La
constituciSn polltica;" HernSndez Poveda, Desde la barra;
and HernSn G. Peralta, Las constituciones de Costa' Rica
(Madridi Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1 9 6 2 ), 111-18,
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when it appeared* that the rebels would offer Ulate the
presidency, Ulate said that he was "lOOfo behind
Figueres" and refused to back the revolt.^

When

CalderCn forces led an abortive invasion from Nicaragua
in December, 1948,^ Ulate offered to help the
government and served briefly as a member of the Junta.

76

Ulate made no attempt to pressure the Junta out
of office prematurely.

He even went along, when the Junta

members requested a six months* extension— which they
later decided not to use.

74

Speaking to the Constituent

New York Times, April 3» 1949.

75 'Ehe invasion was due as much to poor Costa
Rican-Nicaraguan relations as to Calderon's desire to
overthrow Figueres. The OAS team sent, at Costa Rica's
request, to investigate the incident was critical of
both countries, Nicaragua was blamed for failure to
prevent CalderCn*s invasion. Costa Rica was censured for
harboring members of the Caribbean Legion who aimed at
the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. For the
OAS report see Robert Burr, The Dynamics of World Power;
A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy.
1945-1973. Ill (New York: Clelsea House, 1973), 106.
76 ColecciCn de leves. Segundo de 1948, No. 301
of Dec.. -11. Ulate may .have been more of a thorn-in the
Junta's side than a help, because he thought .the
government was taking heavy-handed measures during the
invasion. For*-example, on December 20, nine days
after the invasion, Ulate asked that civil liberties
suspended during the emergency be restored, but the
Junta did not vote to restore them until January 1 0 ,
Junta Fundadora, "Actas," entries for Dec, 20, 1948 and
Jan, 10, 1949.
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Assembly in support of the Junta request, Ulate
explained that:
I have some discrepancies with the Junta,..
but I could not bring myself to deny my
confidence to those who have won it through
struggle and danger and who have since
dedicated themselves to national service. 77
While Ulate*s Diario did occasionally criticize the
Junta, in the main Ulate seems to have waited until he
78
could have a turn at the helm,1

77

Asainblea, Actas, I, 175*
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El Diario gave fairly balanced treatment to
the Junta. Covering the controversial bank nationali
zation decree, for example, the newspaper quoted Chamber
of Commerce figures and business leaders as expressing
concern, but also printed a quite favorable commentary
from another source. El Diario. June 22, 23 and 2 6 , 1948,

CHAPTER XV
THE ULATE ADMINISTRATION:

I

THE PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAM

Ulate*s Political Beliefs and Program

Better than any Costa Rican since Ricardo
JimSnez, with whom he has been compared,**" Otilio Ulate
represented the ideals of 1889.

As he made clear from

the day of his inauguration, Ulate believed in Costa
Rica*s traditional way of life and thought that further
radical transformations of the country were not
desirable at that time.

He had a Burkean belief that

change should evolve naturally from existing institutions
and customs and he felt that timing was important in
determining what path was appropriate.

Ulate was not a

natural innovator, concentrating instead on making
existing programs and institutions work well.
Illustrative of his practical, straightforward approach
was his remark, just before taking office, that he wanted
the government to operate like a business.

1 ..Costa Rieaii'historian/Carlos* KelSndez and
Ulate*s-sometime-political associate Mario Echandi both
noted similarities between Ulate and Ricardo Jimgnez whom
Ulate admired. Interviews in San JosS, June, 197^.
2

El Diario de Costa Rica, Nov, 1, 19^9.
96
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Ulate*s chief political tenet was his belief in
democracy and civil liberties.

Violations of the suffrage

produced an intransigence which was otherwise rare in
Ulate.

For example, despite his opposition to the elec

tion of Teodoro Ficado as president in 19^* Ulate would
not give full backing to Picado's opponent Ledn CortSs
because of CortSs* authoritarian reputation.*^

Ulate*s

criticism of the Calderfin regime had early centered on
Calderfin's undemocratic methods of keeping power and
dealing with political opponents, and this was the key
theme that El Diario hammered home throughout the Calder 6n years.

There were other political figures with whom

Ulate had more serious ideological differences, but his
distaste for Calder(5n*s undemocratic practices was such
that the usually amiable and conciliatory Ulate avoided
personal contact with Calderfin for the rest of his life,
3 John Patrick Bell, Crisis in Costa Rica:
19^8 Revolution (Austin: University of Texas Latin
American Monographs No, 2^, 1971), 111.

h,

The

4 In the mid-1960*s Ulate found it politically
expedient .to effect a temporary political coalition be
tween his National Union Party and Calderfin's National
Republican Party for the 1966 elections, Ulate*s friend
Dr, Jorge Vega said, however, that throughout the lengthy
negotiations and political campaign Ulate avoided direct
contact with Calderon, interview with Jorge Vega, San
Jos§, June 5, 197^* Ulate did have a ceremonial meeting
with Calderdn when President. Mario Echandi brought to
gether the three protagonists of the 19^8 revolution—
Ulate, CalderCn and Figueres— for a symbolic gesture of
national unity in i9 6 0 . Interview with Mario Echandi,
San Jos§, June 6 , 197^.

Ulate's most deep-seated and consistent political
commitment, then, was not to program or to party, hut to
the political process itself.

As he explained his

feelings:
X have a passion for free suffrage, a
devotion to free suffrage, and on this
point I have never had any vacillation or
any weakness. I think suffrage can redeem
America from dictators,5
It had been the tradition in Costa Rica for the
president to oversee, and to a certain extent, to
influence the electoral process; hut under Presidents
CortSs and CalderSn the interference became more
pronounced.

Thus, Ulate's view— perhaps a hit simplis-'

tic— was that the threat to Costa Rican democracy began
at that time.

Criticizing an attempt in 19^3 to increase

presidential control over the electoral machinery, Ulate
said:
follow

"When the first step is taken, the ones that
lead to the precipice.,.the path of diminishing

the suffrage right leads, necessarily and fatally, to the
single party.
Ulate felt that the president should not even
show a preference toward any candidate, because "like

5 Otilio Ulate, Hacia donde lleva a Costa Rica
el Sefior Presidente Figueres? fSan JosSt Imprenta
Universal, 1955), 31.
6

Ibid., 32.
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Caesar's wife, the president must not only be honest, he
must appear honest.'

Commenting on President Cortes'

support of CalderSn's candidacy in 1939, Ulate complained
that Costa Rican democracy was weakened just by the
Q
association of the government with a political party.
Otilio Ulate thought that the principal test of
a democratic government was its willingness to guarantee
civil liberties to its citizens.

He felt that suspension

of civil liberties was justifiable only in emergencies
which were "imminent and of vast proportions" or else
such suspensions could come to be used as a political
g
instrument to carry out persecutions.
As we have seen, Ulate criticized CalderCn
openly on the grounds that he neglected to assure the
safety of citizens in political activities, once closing
his newspapers in protest.

Ulate's criticism of the

Junta's suspension of civil liberties because of
perceived threats of national security was less
pronounced, but he did press the Junta to shorten the

7

Interview with Otilio Ulate, San JosS,
July 27, 1967.
8

Ulate, Hacia donde, 31,

9 Otilio Ulate, Mensa.ie del presidente
constitucional de la retyfiblica de Costa Rica, a la
honorable as amblea legislativa, el 1° de Mayo, de 1952
(San Jos§: Imprenta Nacional, 1952)7 3-
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periods of emergency rule. 10

Coming to power after a

decade of authoritarian, or undemocratic, rule, Ulate
put stress on returning the country to constitutional
democracy.

He took great pride in telling the Legislative

Assembly, in his last annual report as president, that
constitutional liberties had been suspended "not one day,
nor one hour, nor. one minute" during his tenure. 11
Along with restoring constitutional government
and democracy, Ulate hoped to put an end to the bitterness
caused by the revolution.

He believed that history had

shown the wisdom of granting amnesty after conflicts and
that Costa Rica, in particular, had followed this path;
Throughout the whole history of the country,
at the end of armed conflicts, the conqueror
has managed to achieve a reconciliation and
has been benevolent with the vanquished,
granting him political amnesty. 12
This spirit of conciliation, he believed, helped to
account for the country's relatively tranquil history.
Ulate's belief in amnesty was part of his
conviction that, with few exceptions, all had the right
to participate in the life of the nation.

As he told the

10
See, for example, Junta Fundadora de la
Segunda Republica, "Actas de las sesiones" (unpublished
transcript"), entry for Dec, 2 0 , 1 9 ^8 , cited in chapter 3 .

11

Ulate, 1953 Mensa.ie. 29.

12

Ulate, Hacia donde. 30,
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Costa Rican legislature in asking for a general amnesty
for CalderSn supporters, Costa Rica must demonstrate that
13
"there is equality of opportunity for all."
Ulate.also
let it he known that those who had fled the country after
the overthrow of Picado could return during his
Ik
presidency.
When there were complaints about Manuel
Mora*s return, Ulate simply said that he would enforce
the constitution, which allowed all Costa Rican, citizens
freely to leave and return to the country.^
Ulate*s attitude toward Mora stemmed from his
belief that the nation was strong enough to accommodate
differences and to withstand challenges.

A practical

governor, rather than an ideologue with a specific
program to put into effect, he was more liberal in his
attitude toward opposing groups than was, for example,
the Junta of 19^8-19^9.

The leaders of the Junta had

turned to revolution to defend democracy, but once in
power the Junta had shown a reluctance to share the
freedom it had sought to save.

One is reminded of Guido

13

Ulate, 1952 Mensa.ie. b a

lb

El Diario. Dec. 17, 19^9.

15 Ibid.. Jan. 29, 1950. Such a provision had
been included in the chapter on civil liberties of Costa
Rican constitutions at least as early as 1 8 5 9 , H e mS n
Go Peralta, las constituciones de Costa Rica (Madrid*
Instituto de Estudios Politicos, 1962), 4-00, 465.
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de Ruggiero's comment concerning the sometime intolerance
of liberal parties:
It often happens that the very energy with
which Liberals defend their own cause destroys
their calm estimation of the difficulties and
makes them unjust toward their adversaries
and therefore in the last resort, dogmatic
and illiberal. 16
While Ulate was more tolerant of political
opposition, his record with regard to the Communist
Party was not entirely consistent.

He defended the

right of individual Communists to civil liberties but
showed some ambivalence about the Party's right to
participate in the political process.

Although always

opposed to Gommunism, Ulate had been an early defender
of the Party's right to carry on political activities
and, during the 1939-19^0 presidential campaign, he
even found himself on the same side of the fence as
Mora when they both backed Ricardo JimSnez' candidacy,^
As the Communist Party's influence in the
government grew after 19 ^2 , however, and Ulate's concern
over' GalderCns pact with the Communists increased, his
statements about the Party's right to exist became more
equivocal.

He once went so far as to praise the

legislature's decision to outlaw Vanguardia Popular as a
•16 . -Guido de. Ruggiero, “The History of European
Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959)» 360,
1? JimSnez eventually withdrew from the race and
did not contest Calderon Guardia at the polls.
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"just and prudent" move#

On a later occasion, however,

Ulate said that a Communist Party should he allowed to
function in Costa Rica and that Costa Rica could afford
to let the Party take its chances at the polls,^

Still

later, when a proposal to legalize the Communist Party
in time for the 1970 elections was heing discussed,
Ulate expressed the opinion that "Communism is not a
current problem for Costa Rica" and hence there was no
need for a campaign against it.

20

And in a diary of

random political thoughts which he kept during his later
years, Ulate scored the use of "anti-Communist atti
tudes...as a justification for the economic and social
paralysis in which our countries are living at the
present time."^'
Ulate's views thus seemed shaped by the circum
stances.

His close associate Lie, Fernando Lara says

that Ulate always believed that Communists should be
allowed to form a Party and function in Costa Rica.

18

Ulate, 1953 Mensa.ie.11.

19

New York Times. July 25, 1953*

22

20
Recording of Ulate*s response to anewsman’s
question, "Homenaje a Otilio Ulate."
21

Otilio Ulate, unpublished diary, Otilio Ulate

Papers.
22
197^0

Interview with Lie. Lara, SanJosS, June 5,

While -this may he true, he did seem willing to support
the ban against Vanguardia Popular because of his
conviction that that party was responsible for much of
the discord of the 19 ^0 *s.
Other than his belief in constitutional democracy,
Ulate never espoused a definite political philosophy.
In the tradition of Costa Rica's personalistic leaders,
he disliked the idea of adherence to a set ideology,
citing Miguel de Unamuno's statement that "of all
tyrannies, the tyranny of ideas is the most odious."
Ulate explained his thinking:
i have more faith in personalistic parties
than in ideological parties. Costa Rica
owes more to her illustrious leaders,
through their teachings and public actions,
than to principles.23
In part, Ulate's reluctance to see the
development of ideologically-based political parties in
Costa Rica may have been due to his unwillingness to
release the strong personal hold he retained over his
own National Union Party until his death.

Ulate's

opposition, however, went deeper than that; he was
skeptical about the very nature of ideological parties,
believing that they were used to keep one group in power
on the pretext of providing continuity of policy.

23

Ulate, 1953 Mensa.ie,
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Ulate wrote!
Alternation in power is an essential
condition of Costa Rican democracy,,■
neither with the pretext of the continuity
of a regimen of ideas..,nor with any other
pretext should governmental groups try to
pass one government to another.24

’

Judging from his experiences during the 19^0's with the
Communist Party, Ulate also believed that such ideolo
gical parties were divisive and led to conflict rather
than conciliation.

In the style of 1 8 8 9 , Ulate*s

objective was government by consensus in which, whenever
possible, the government tried to obtain the acceptance
of the country's leadership and major segments of the
population for major initiatives before launching them.
In a sense, however, Ulate longed for a past, approach to
government to which his own political methods did not
belong.

Ulate had risen to national prominence through

his fiery editorials, and he remained all his life a
tough scrapper, launching verbal attacks against
politicians and programs he disliked.
Although he claimed to eschew ideology, Ulate did
have a coherent approach to national problems.

Ke

believed in the private enterprise system, once
describing this as a major difference between his views
and those of JosS Figueres* National Liberation .Party

2k

El Diario.- Feb. 10, 1953.
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whose proclivities for government control he
25
distrusted, ^ In a speech at Columbia University, Ulate
esqplained his opposition to all forms of statism:
Every growth of the state comes at the
expense of society, of its vital forces, at
the cost of its historical spontaneity,,,.
At the present time the democracies are
committing the error of delegating to the
state certain functions of prepotency and
absorption normally found only in totalitarian
regimes. 26
One of Ulate’s chief complaints about the Alliance
for Progress was that it placed too much faith in the
governments of Latin America and made no allowance for
the participation of the local private sector in
27
development programs. ' Ulate*s attitude toward other
aspects of U.S.-Latin American relations
of two impulses.

was a mixture

In the main, Ulate admired the United

States, which he considered the country where democracy
had come nearest to perfection.
But Ulate was critical of some aspects of
American foreign policy, such as support for dictators
within the hemisphere.

Ulate was opposed to any

intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries
but felt that Latin dictators, because of their military
25 -Otilio Ulate, response to questionnaire from
newsman Sidney Lens, Aug. 31, 1963, Ulate Papers,
26

Otilio Ulate, "Responsible Freedom in the
Americas! The Individual and the State," Vital Speeches.
XXI (Oct, 195^-Oct. 1955), 969-70.
2?

Sidney Lens questionnaire; Lara interview.
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connections, had a natural advantage in competition with
democracies and that democratic governments should he
given all aid consistent with correct relations.

In a

speech to the Inter-American Press Association in New
Orleans, he expressed his view that "as long as the InterAmerican system gives equal treatment to dictatorship
and democracy, tyrants will prosper and overcome
democracy.

28

Ulate thought that many Latin dictators owed
their origin to United States arms sales and military
assistance, which he particularly opposed because of his
fear of militarism in the region.

Ulate*s message to the

United States was that*
Countries in which democracy is just talcing
root, such as ours, should not be militarized
because that weakens a country's institutions,
puts suffrage in danger and tempts would-be
dictators, nor is there any need for arms and
an army because...the Inter-American System
has the necessary material elements for the
defense of countries which suffer aggression. 29
Ulate also had disagreements with the United
States over economic matters.

Like many Latins, he

believed that some of the vast amount of U.S. economic
assistance to Europe after World War II might better have

28 Hispanic American Report. VIII, No. 11
(Dec. 1955)•
29

Ulate, Hacia donde, 8 .
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been spent in Latin America.

And he shared another

common Latin concern about the preponderant influence of
U.S. companies and multinational corporations over the
economies of the smaller Latin countries, such as Costa
Rica.

Ulate's approach to government, however, was a

pragmatic one, and he believed that at Costa Rica's
stage of development private foreign investment was
necessary.

Defending his position to villagers whose

town had just been electrified with the aid of foreign
capital, Ulate said:
I also suffered from ultra-nationalism,
irreconcilable with foreign capital— to
which one always attributes an absorbing
and imperialistic tendency--when I did not
have the responsibility of the office which
I now hold...but, seeing things from the
inside, one has to think whether our means
are sufficient and whether, disdaining
foreign capital, we are harming higher
interests which we have no right to dispose
of arbitrarily. 31
Ulate was generally fair to foreign investors, taking
the position that, as long as foreign capital was needed,
it should have the same treatment as Costa R i c a n . H e
said that Costa Rica should ask "just retribution" from
the foreign investor but also offer him security for his

30 Otilio Ulate, "Nuevo Plan Marshall y nueva
politics intemacional americana," America. LVI (Jan.June.1958), 8 .
31

El Diario. Aug. 8 , 1950.

32 Sidney Lens questionnaire.
May, Costa Rica. 295-96, 301.

See also Stacy

investment.

33

Ulate prided himself on having the same sort of
evenhanded approach in his dealings with foreign
countries.

Despite his "belief that democracies should

deny military assistance to dictatorial regimes, Ulate
believed it was the duty of a head of state in other ways
to maintain correct relations.

As a private citizen he

had frequently criticized Nicaragua's Luis Scmoza and
Guatemalan strongman Jorge Ubico, and even allowed exiles
from Guatemala to use column space in his paper to
express their views.

As head of state, however, he

considered it his duty to avoid involvement in partisan
causes, and asserted that "the president cannot act in
3ii
the same way as the journalist."^
Ulate was for this reason critical of Figueres'
support of the Caribbean Legion and opposed the decision
of Figueres, who was president of Costa Rica in 195^» to
boycott the tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas
as a protest against the P€rez Jimgnez r e g i m e . L i k e
the leaders of. many small countries, Ulate believed that
Costa Rica should rely heavily on international
organizations for defense and economic assistance.

33

El Diario. Aug, 8 , 1950*

3^

Ulate, Hacia donde, 22.

35

Ibid., 1^-15.
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disliked Figueres' action "because he thought it cast
Costa Rica in the role of detractor of the interAmerican system.^
In truth, Ulate never had much interest in the
domestic politics of other countries, either as president
or as a journalist.

His editorials against Somoza over

the years were directed against Nicaraguan intervention
in Costa Rican affairs rather than against Somoza's
domestic policies.

In the main, he was interested in the

politics of other countries only in so far as they
related to Costa Rica, believing in the "traditional
37
serenity and isolation of the ticos,
He was part of
a national tradition that had a "Middle Kingdom" view
of Costa Rica, seeing the country as unique in Central
America, superior to its neighbors and best kept aloof
from their quarrels.
Ulate's admiration for Costa Rica and its
historical development made him reluctant to advocate
radical change, and this attitude may have influenced his

36

Figueres persisted despite Ulate*s views,
writing to the Secretary General of the OAS that Costa
Rica would not attend the Caracas meeting "until there
is a change in the human rights conditions prevailing
there." Jos£ Figueres, Letter to the Secretarla General
de la Qrganizacion de Estados Americanos, Feb, 17, 195^»
Partido Liberacidn Nacional Papers,
37 Ulate, Hacia donde, 2k»
for Costa Ricans.

Ticos is the nickname
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approach to social problems.

It is difficult to

pinpoint Ulate's beliefs on the social reform issue
because, like most Costa Rican leaders of the past, he
had no clear program of social reform, only a series of
responses to particular problems.

like most of the

Opposition, he had spoken out against CalderCn's social
legislation, but like the others he had given no very
concrete reasons for his views.
Ulate probably shared the feelings and the
dilemma of most of Costa Rica's traditional leaders in
this regard.

They did not like Calderfin's new, mass-

scale social welfare programs— either because they feared
the Labor Code would threaten their prerogatives, or
because they believed that such programs were not a
proper government concern.

At the same time, most of

them subscribed— at least verbally and in many cases
quite sincerely— to the popular conception of Costa Rica
as a land of few class antagonisms and of mutual concern
for the public well-being.

They did not feel comfortable

opposing the legislation, especially since CalderCn had
invoked the name of the Church and presented his program
in highly moral terms.

Thus, no one wanted to speak

against the legislation per se. Rather than attacking
the reform.in-:principle, detractors focused on secondary
considerations, pointing out--quite correctly— that the
programs were poorly financed, were sometimes headed.^.by
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Communists, and were "being used by Calderfin for political
purposes.

These were the views of Costa Rican

conservatives of good faith in the early 1940's and the
views to which Ulate probably subscribed.
By the time of the 1948 election the situation
had changed.

The social reform laws, once on the books,

gradually began to seem like part of the environment, at
least to less intransigent members of the elite, such as
Ulate, who had always been more concerned about
CalderCn's undemocratic practices than about the
legislation.

During the 1948 campaign Ulate, either

because he realized the laws were popular or because he
had decided the programs would work well once divorced
from calderonismo, pledged to maintain existing social
welfare legislation.

Still condemning CalderGn, while

endorsing his program, Ulate vowed*
The Opposition will maintain and defend
the Social Legislation [but],,.S ocial
Legislation must not be the resource of
a single party for distribution as a favor
but rather an effective progress of an
economic democracy, 38
The sincerity of such statements was open to
question, since Ulate's supporters included businessmen
and landowners who continued to oppose social reform.
The degree of influence these people had with Ulate over
the years is a matter of conjecture, but they may simply

38

El Diario. Feb. 6, 1948.
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have hacked the business like
evils.

Ulate as the lesser of

Ulate was not inclined to yield to pressure; as

we have seen, he suffered considerable financial losses
over matters of principle, and he was not at all wealthy
when he died.

Ulate seemed genuinely concerned about

the poor and once stated that Latin American democracy
could best be preserved by a strong social reform
movement.^9

Entries in his political diary indicate

areas of concern and also show Ulate's practical, oneby-one approach to problems:
Nobody has worried about rural housing,,,,
It is embarrassing to think that the project
for Rural Sanitation of the Health Department
has not been carried out at a national level,...
All the districts of the Republic should be
included in a plan to provide rural housing
with latrines, sc that each one of the
peasants of Costa Rica will have a latrine
with the appropriate hygienic conditions.,..
So many demagogues, every four years,
dramatise the necessity for Agrarian Reform,
but none of them has presented a project
that explains how to carry it out.^O
Ulate himself, however, was not given to the
formation of systematic, government-directed programs of
social reform.

He had the conservative's concept of the

negative role of government— that government was
primarily designed to clear obstacles to the natural

39 Television address by Otilio Ulate, May 2,
1962, cited in a letter to Ulate from Benjamin Nufiez,
May 5» 1962, Ulate Papers.
^0

Ulate, unpublished diary, Ulate Papers.

course of life.

Coining to office after the traumatic

19^0's , Ulate put greatest emphasis on restoration rather
than new avenues of government activity,

In his first

annual message to congress, Ulate described his chief
goals i
I seek only one more glory: that when I
leave office, those who voted for me and
those who did not will both be of the
opinion that I guarded as my own two
properties of theirs: the freedom of
suffrage, -with the other fundamental
■ freedoms; and the public treasury. With
confidence rebuilt, the rest was less difficult.
My first task, therefore, was to restore
the Nation's confidence,4l

The Situation in the Country

Otilio Ulate faced ma.jor
power

problems when heassumed

from the Pounding Junta of the Second Republic on

November 8, 19^9»

The atmosphere in the country during

the past several years had been more conducive to
destroying the first republic than to building a second,
The corruption and maladministration of the CalderSn
years, the poorly financed social programs and public
works of CalderSn and Picado had left a legacy of
financial disorders which the Junta had not been able to
alleviate and which, in some cases, had worsened under
the Junta.

^1

There had not been a balanced budget since

Ulate, 1950 Mensa.is.
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194-0.

As the Twentieth Century Fund Study Group

pointed out, ."public finances in Costa Rica were in a
sorry state" during the 1940's. ^
Costa Rica's internal debt had increased
dramatically since 1948, chiefly as a result of the
i4.iL
revolutionary costs and bank nationalisation.
The
foreign debt had not been serviced since 1942.

Costa

Rica's commercial debt was such that the foreign trade
on which the country was very dependent was threatened by
h.c
a serious foreign exchange problem.
The shortage of
foreign exchange was so severe that one congressional
deputy said simply, "No hay divisas— there is no foreign
46 '
exchange"
with which to pay for further imports.

42 U.S. Embassy, San Jose, "Annual Economic
Report, 1949," prepared April 17, 1950, Despatch No. 389 1
1-2; and "Annual Economic Report, 1950," prepared April 5,
1951, Despatch No. 839» 4.
43 Stacy May et al.. Costa Rica; A Study in
Economic Development (New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1952J, 281.
44

U.S. Embassy, "1949 Report," 2, 35*

45 U.S. Embassy, "1949 Report," 1-2, 29-30;
"1950 Report," 4-5, 33-34-.
46 El Diario, Feb. 17, 1950. See also El Diario
of Dec. 2, 1949 for a discussion of the "disastrous
situation" which Ulate's undersecretary of. finance said
he found on entering office.
Junta Minister Gonzalo. Facio protested such
characterizations. He claimed that the economy was in
even worse shape when the Junta took office and that the
Junta had actually made some improvements. El Diario,
June 13, 1950.
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This deteriorated economic situation was in part
the result of government attempts to finance social
welfare programs, but these programs were not in good
working order when Ulate took office.

Many of the programs

had never been given sufficient funding and, in addition,
many of the programs of the CalderSn years had broken down
during the revolution, and the Junta had been able to
revive only a part of them.

The labor movement had also

suffered a setback during the Junta period when one of
the country's two major labor confederations, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Costa Rica, was declared illegal
because of its Communist orientation.

State-decreed wage

increases were theoretically in force in much of the
country in 19^9, but high inflation tended to nullify
their effects•
Costa Rica had to import several basic foodstuffs
at a relatively high cost to consumers, and partly for
this reason, the average Costa Rican had a diet
significantly less nutritious than that of the average
LlQ
American.
The government had no basic agricultural
program, despite the importance of such a program in an
agricultural country.

^7
(Londom

One of the purposes of the bank

Franklin Parker, The Central American Republics
Oxford University Press,196^), 291.

4-8

May, Costa Rica, ^4-48 .

11?
nationalization had "been to provide additional credit
for diversified agriculture, "but comprehensive 'oank
legislation had not followed the nationalization, and the
role that the nationalized banking system was to play
Llq
was not clearly defined. 17
Political and social cleavages in the country
were perhaps as serious a problem as the economic
dislocations.

A long period of tension had culminated in

the revolution, which had been the bloodiest in Costa
Rica's history.

Costa Rica, as we have seen, had had

fewer internal disturbances than other countries in
Central America and, of the revolts that had taken place,
many were minor affairs with little or no loss of life.
The 19^8 "revolution of national liberation" was
something different.

Some 2,000 men-’0 lost their lives

during the six weeks' revolt, a number roughly equivalent
in terms of the country's population to ten times the
number of Americans who died in the Vietnam war.

Pro

government forces had sustained almost all of the
the casualties, with less than one hundred from among
the revolutionaries.

^9

U.S. Embassy, "Annual Economic Report, 1950,"

h.
50 Costa Rica's population in 1950 was 600,875.
Costa Rica, DirecciSn General de Estadistica y Censos,
Censo de noblacifln, 22 de mayo de 19SO (San JosS:
Ministerio da Economia y Hacienda, 1953), 5^.
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In the circumstances, conciliatory measures by
the victorious revolutionaries seemed called for, hut
it is not the nature of revolutionary governments to show
charity to the vanquished.

The Junta— which still

perceived a threat to the country from calderonistas and
Communists— was no exception.

A number of Junta measures

rubbed salt into the wounds of caldemnistas. Calderfin
followers were particularly embittered by the Junta's
decision to void the general amnesty pact signed with
President Ficado, a decision taken so early in the Junta
period as to raise doubts about whether the pact was
signed in good faith.

Chief opponents of the Junta—

CalderCn, Mcra and oxhers— remained in forced or selfimposed exile during the Junta period, thus providing a
continuing source of anti-government feeling.

Plots

against the Junta government, arrests, suspension of civil
liberties and an invasion by exiled elements had all
helped to keep tension high throughout the Junta period.
Public confidence in the government was low.
Business circles were angered by CalderCn's social
legislation and then stunned by the Junta's bank
nationalization and capital levy, which were far more
serious to them.

Business activity declined and was slow

to recover after the bank and levy decrees in June, 19^8,
thus further contributing to the country's economic
problems.
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Many Costa Ricans perceived government actions
of the past decade as a threat to democracy.

The Junta

had done much to restore faith in democracy by holding
two fair elections and abiding by the results— which
were unfavorable for the Junta.
however, ruling

The Junta itself,

through decrees and without a congress

or constitution, probably added to Costa Ricans' perception
of their government as becoming authoritarian.

Accustomed

to a less assertive government, Costa Ricans during the
Junta period felt somewhat uncomfortable waiting for
what was called the "gacetazo" or "blow from the official
gazette,"-'
If Ulate faced problems, he also came to office
with certain advantages.

The Junta, through its

Institutional reforms and several far-sighted suggestions
for the constitution, had laid the groundwork for a
governmental system and bureaucratic structure better
equipped to meet the needs of the Costa Rican state.
Political developments also favored Ulate.

It could be

argued that CalderSn and the Junta, however questionable
their methods, had undertaken needed reforms and that
Ulate was now coming in with clean hands to collect the

51 The Junta issued an average of three decreelaws every two days during the 13-month government,
Because laws were so numerous and because no congress was
m session to debate proposals, there was sometimes no
notipn in the country that ..legislative action was under
consideration until a new decree was published m
La Gaceta.
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spoils.

Simply by standing for democracy, order and

tolerance, the new president had a broad appeal to Costa
Ricans of all classes.

Judging from the lopsided

victories his party had won in the two elections held
during the Junta administration, the country appeared to
have endorsed Ulate even more completely than when he ran
for president in 19^8,

Thirty-three of the forty-five

congressmen elected to the new congress installed at the
time of his inauguration were members of Ulate's National
Union Party, and Ulate himself is said to have come'into
office with greater popular support than any previous
president.^2
Costa Ricans wanted to believe in Ulate, a man
who had built his reputation on the defense of civil
liberties.

Both of the forces which had challenged Costa

Rica's traditional system— the calderonistas and the
Figueres group— were at least partially discredited.
Ulate's administration, therefore, appeared to offer the
traditional system Ulate represented a chance to reassert
itself.

52

New York Times, Nov. 9, 19^9

CHAPTER V
THE ULATE ADMINISTRATION: II
DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY

Economic Reconstruction and Development

Ulate made it clear from the first that he
regarded the economic situation as the country's
paramount problem and the one which would absorb most of
his attention, at least initially.

He also stressed that

the economic issues to be addressed first would be those
involving a restoration of the country's financial
position.

Development programs would have to wait until

the house was set in order.
In farewell remarks to employees at the office of
El Diario. Ulate stated some of his immediate goals,
giving particular attention to the foreign exchange
problem,^

Costa Rica had a backlog of over $17 million

in unpaid commercial debts, as compared to the country's
p

international monetary reserves of less than $6 million.

1

El Diario de Costa Rica. Nov, 1, 19^9*

2 U.S. Embassy, San JosS, "Annual Economic
Report, 1950," prepared April 5i 1951* Despatch No. 339*
3^.
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This was an unhealthy, if not unusual, discrepancy for a
small nation so dependent on foreign trade.

Costa Rica

had begun having balance of payments difficulties during
the war, but at first the adverse trade balance was
offset by the influx of U.S. government expenditures in
connection with the Pan American Highway and later by
United Fruit Company's capital expenditures in the
country.

The Costa Rican government had always drawn a

large percentage of its revenue from customs receipts
and was reluctant to limit imports.

As the situation

continued with no effective action to reverse it, however,
Costa Rica's currency, the colfrn. declined in value and
this, in turn, worsened the inflation which already had
been high for a number of years.

Both the inflation and

the trade imbalance were related, in part, to laws and
governmental machinery inadequate to deal with the
country's problems.
The Ulate administration's first major act,
therefore, was the proposal of a Law for the Control of
International Transactions.
markets for foreign exchange.

First, the law created two
For purchasers of imports

considered most important for the country, there was a
market through which dollars could be obtained at the

3 Stacy May, et. al.. Costa Rica; A Study in
Economic Development (New York: The Twentieth Century
Fund, 1952)» 286,
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official rate; for all other imports, a "free" or "street"
market v/as created in which importers could obtain
dollars for a greater number of colones at rates
determined by supply and demand.

In addition, the law

placed "surcharges" of 10, 55» 75 or 100 percent on
imports, the figure varying according to the country's
need for the item.

b By thus discouraging imports in

excess of the country's ability to pay for them, the
government was able to eliminate the backlog of requests
for foreign exchange in April, 1951; subsequently, Costa
Rica began building foreign exchange reserves.-’
The law considerably increased the cost of most
imports; thus it was not popular and was frequently

b Costa Rica, ColecciSn de leves. decretos.
acuerdos v resoluciones, Primer Sernestre de 1950 (San
JosS: Imprenta Nacionai,1950), No, 11^8 of March 28,
Ulate suggested such a law even before he came
into office, but before it could go into effect, the
United States had to agree to waive rights granted under a
1936 commercial treaty in which Costa Rica and the U.S.
gave preferential treatment to each other. Because most
of Costa Rica's exports had ready markets abroad, the
country found it did not need preferential agreements, and
the United States agreed to terminate the agreement in
order to help Costa Rica improve its poor economic
situation, "after U.S. approval was granted, the law
went into effect in April, 1950. By that time, the
commercial debt had grown to over $20 million. See The Department of State Bulletin, the Official Weekly Record
of United States Foreign Policy, XXII, No, 565 (May 1,
1950) and XXIY, No. 616 (April 23, 1951).
5 Costa Rica, Banco Central, Segunda.memoria
anual, afto 1951 (San JosS: Imprenta Torino, 19525 , b5*
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criticized in the national press.J Ulate himself
acknowledged that it was "perhaps the most drastic legal
disposition that has been dictated in the country.'1^
The government, however, persevered with the program, and
it was the finding of the U.S. Embassy that the results
"more than justified the temporary sacrifices."

8

Ulate

tried to win some measure of acceptance for the law by
insisting that it would be replaced, probably in about
eighteen months, by less severe legislation.

Since it

was not customary for Costa Rican governments to give up
lucrative sources of revenue, such pronouncements were
Q
received with skepticism.
In September 1951, however,
the government announced that the situation had improved

6

See, for example, La NaciSn. Feb. 27, 1951.

7 Qtilio Ulate, Mensa.ie del nresidente
constitucional de la reoflblica de Costa Rica a la
honorable asamblea 1egislativoel 1^ de 1951 fSan Jos§:
Imprenta Nacional, 1951), 7*
8 U.S. Embassy, "Annual Economic Report, 1950,"
The Ulate administration shared in the country's
hardships. Time noted on Jan. 2 3 , 1950 that Ulate,
"proclaiming that 'a little Franciscan poverty' was
necessary if the 1950 budget were to balance, slashed
his own salary by 23 % (to $ 5 7 0 a month)."
36.

9 Costa Rica, Informe de labores de la asamblea
legislativa del 8 de noviembre de 1949 al 30 de octubre
de 1953 tSan Jos§» Imprenta Nacional, 195^), 50.
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to the point that the law could he rescinded.'1'0

The law

was replaced by a more moderate measure, the Law of
International Payments, which maintained the dual system
of foreign exchange markets but eliminated the import
surcharges.11
The administration of the foreign exchange law
was handled by a Central Bank created as an autonomous
institute in January, 1950.

12

Despite business community

sentiment against the nationalization of the banks, Ulate
did not attempt to restore private banks but simply tried
to develop a coherent policy for the nationalized banking
system whose operations had not been spelled out in
legislation following the Junta's nationalization decree
of June, 19^8.

Legislation was also passed which defined

the functions of the entire banking system and gave all
of the banks a role in the granting of long-term loans for
diversified agriculture, a chief stated aim of the Junta
in nationalizing the banks.

As a result of the Ulate

administration's efforts, Costa Rica was left with

10 U.S. Embassy, "Annual Economic Report, 1951,"
prepared April 8, 1952, Despatch No. 1102, 30,
11 Coleccifin de leves. Segundo de 1951, No. 1351
of Sept, 28.
12 ColecciSn de leves. Primer de 1950, No. 1130
of Jan. 28,
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the "best credit system in Central America.
The Central Bank, as its name implies, was given
power to control the country's monetary flow and in
addition was charged with "directing the economic policies
14
of the country and of its banking system."
The Bank
was also later given control over the servicing of the
national debt.

The Central Bank became a prime tool in

the execution of the Ulate administration's economic and
fiscal policies, being particularly helpful in orienting
agricultural credit policies and stabilising the value of
the col6n.
Like many underdeveloped countries, Costa Rica
had never had a strong central bank or federal reserve
and thus no very effective means of controlling the
money supply.

Partly as a result of this, the country

had not been able to deal well with inflation and, like
many small Latin American countries, had suffered high
rates of inflation during and after the war.

Ulate*s

Central Bank drew some press criticism on the ground that
the Bank was pursuing deflationary policies, but the
Bank maintained that it only aimed at a lower rate of
16
inflation.
Ulate was sensitive to criticism about

13 Ralph Lee Woodward, Central America; A Nation
Divided (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976)7 225.
14

U.S. Embassy, "1 9 5 0 Report," 39.

15

Banco Central, Primera memoria. afio 1950, 6 2 .
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inflation, once saying that his greatest concern was "to
alleviate the cost of l i v i n g . V i r t u a l price controls
remained on "basic foods and, at one point, the government
sponsored a program to set up rent-free markets in each
town to which farmers could bring their produce or home
made items to sell directly to consumers.1*'7 The program
18
did not work well, however,
and Costa Rica continued
to suffer from inflation until 1952 when prices finally
lo
leveled off. " The inflation, as in the past, was
partly due to factors beyond Costa Rica's control, such
as the Korean war.

Ulate insisted in 1951 that Costa

Rica's cost of living increases had been less than in
most Latin cnuntries, and he cited figures in support of
his claim.^
With the beginnings of sound banking and trade
policies, the government was able to turn to the problem

16
17
of Oct.. 5*
18

El Diario, Aug. 8, 1950*
ColecciSn de leves. Segunao de 1951» No. 135^
Informe de labores de la asamblea, 53*

19 U.S. Embassy, "Annual Economic Report, 1952,"
prepared March^r~-1£53, Despatch No. 828, 29.
20 Ulate, 1951 Mensa.ie. *1— 6, 22-23* United
Nations figures cited by Ulate in his 1951 congressional
address showed Costa Rica with a price index of 265 in
September 1950, based on an index of 100 in 1937*
According to these figures, Uruguay was the only Latin
American country with a lower rate of inflation during
that period.
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of Costa Rica's debts#

The level of internal borrowing

by the Costa Rican government had been rising for a
number of years.

In 1949 alone the internal debt had

increased by seventy percent, chiefly as a result of the
Junta's decision to assume the cost of the revolution and
to nationalize the banks, giving bonds in lieu of the
shares of the banks' former shareholders,

21

Ulate

checked this trend, stating his determination to work
within the confines of the budget.

In 1950 the

government began to reverse the internal debt picture,
ending the year with approximately a nine percent
increase in the internal debt.

22

Despite continual

payments on the debt, Costa Rica in 1950 also reversed
its pattern of imbalanced budgets and began to show
28
budget surpluses. J The budget for 1950 had been set up

21 U.S# Embassy, "1950 Report," 38. The internal
debt rose from 156,26^,844 to 2 6 7 ,7 6 1 ,7 8 9 colones during
1949. . The foreign debt was reduced during 1949 by about
12 million colones as a result of a repayment of an IMF
loan and a regular payment on an Export-Import Bank loan.
U.S. Embassy, "Annual Economic Report, 1949," prepared
April 17» 1950, Despatch No. 389.. 35* The street, or true
value of the coign in August 1949 was about US $.13 versus
the official rate of about US $ .1 8 set by the government.
22

U.S. Embassy, "1950 Report," 3 8 .

23 Ibid.. 37. The Costa Rican government had
claimed a technically balanced budget for 1949, but the
government's published figures on the regular budget did
not include considerable expenditures under an "extra
ordinary budget" which left government expenditures as a
whole in excess of government receipts. See U.S, Embassy,
"1950 Report," 4, and Stacy May, Costa Rica. 281-82.

129
to balance, but due to careful control of government
expenditures and to revenues higher than anticipated, the
government ended the year with a budget surplus.

In the

words of the U.S. Embassy, this was "a phenomenon
unexampled in Costa Rican public affairs for the last
"2L
decade.
Budget surpluses and a decrease in the internal
debt continued to be the pattern in Costa Rica throughout
the Ulate years.

During the course of his term, Ulate

reduced, the total internal debt by 28 percent.2'’
The administration had a less satisfactory record
of handling the foreign debt, which had not been serviced
since 19^2,

26

Although Ulate indicated an interest in

coming to an agreement with foreign creditors soon after
he took office, and discussions were held, no agreement
was reached.

Ulate did not resort to additional foreign

borrowing, but the foreign debt continued to pile up as
a result of unpaid interest accumulation.

Finally, in

late 1 9 5 2 , the administration reached an agreement with
U.S. creditors who held about 75 percent of the foreign

24. Ibid,., .37. .
■25 -Costa,- Rica's .internal', debt., was 191,968 .
colones at the end of 1953» U.S, Embassy, "Annual Econo
mic Report, 1953," prepared March 3, 195^, Despatch
No. 658, 5.
26

U.S. Embassy, "19^9 Report," 2.
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debt, and payments were resumed in 1953.

27

By the end

of his administration, Ulate reduced the foreign debt by
about twenty percent from its high of 168 million colones
oQ
at the end of 1952.
Although the Ulate administration
was slow in working out an agreement on the foreign
debt, the ultimate agreement was considered acceptable
by the U.S. Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, and
it did much to restore Costa Rica's credit rating.
In November 1951* as he reached the halfway
point in his four-year term, Ulate announced a new focus
in the administration's economic p o l i c i e s . A s he
explained, the first two years of his term had been
devoted to stabilizing the country's finances and
improving the credit rating.

While maintaining these

policies, Ulate now proposed to begin a large-scale
program of public works and agricultural development.
The program emphasized the building of roads, dams and a
new international airport to replace the inadequate San

27 Hispanic American Report. IV, No. 11 (Dec. 1952);
New York Times, Oct. 30, Oct. 31, 1952 and Jan. 7, 1953*
The Times of London reported on. Dec, 8, 1952, that a
similar offer was made to British bondholders who held
most of the remainder of the debt,
28

U.S. Embassy, "1953 Report," 5*

29 New York Times. Nov., 2, 1951; Hispanic
American Report. Ill, No. 12 (Dec. 1951).

131
JosS airport.

The purchase of agricultural machinery

was encouraged and other efforts were made to modernize
agriculture with the objective of making the country as
nearly self-sufficient as possible in basic food crops
and meats.

Industrial growth was encouraged to the

extent that the limited internal market could support it
but otherwise was not emphasized.

The goal of the

program was the creation of an infrastructure for a more
modern economy and an improvement in the living standard
of the average Costa Rican.
It was first announced that a loan in support of
the development program would be sought from the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD)

However, IBRD was- reluctant to approve a loan

until the government had come to terms with its existing
31 so Costa Rica decided to go ahead with
foreign debt,-'
the program on the basis of internal revenue.

Early in

1 952 the government reported an unexpectedly large

budget surplus of over 22 million colones— the largest in
the country's history according to the Central Bank.-*2
The government announced that these surplus funds

30

Ibid.

31

U.S. Embassy, "1951 Report," 3 3 .

32

Banco Central, Segunda memoria, afio 1951. 8 0 .
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would be devoted to the development project and said that
foreign loans would not be needed,^3

Ulate was sensitive

about avoiding any appearance of yielding to foreign
pressure, and he seemed defensive when he said in a
public speech in January 1952 that Costa Riba would not
fall under the sway of any foreign economic power.

He

said that he had made an offer to the World Bank— nothing
was said about the IBRD— and would refuse any offer from
the bank which Costa Rica found unreasonable.-^"

Three

days after this speech, on January 11, El Diario
reported that Costa Rica had decided that World Bank
assistance would not be needed, possible indicating that
unacceptable conditions had been stipulated by the bank.
Ignoring U.S. aid extended through Point Four programs,
Ulate later claimed that:
My government came to the end of its term
without asking for or receiving a single
dollar from the United States, because our
little country, with a democratic system of
government, permanent peace, a literate
population and the house in order, was
wounded by the demands of the World Bank.35

33 El Diario. Feb. 6 , 1952 and Sept. 23, 1952.
The following year Costa Rica again had a record budget
surplus— over Zh million colones. about one-half of
which was assigned to the public works program.
3^

Ibid., Jan. 8 , 1952.

35 Otilio Ulate, "Nuevo Plan Marshall y nueva
pol-ltica intemacional americana," AmSrica. LVI {Jan.June 1958), 6 ,
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Ulate had outlined an ambitious program, but
one with sound financial planning.

The development plan

accomplished a great deal, particularly with regard to
public works, which Ulate said were being completed at a
faster pace than at any time in the country's history.
Ulate took great pride in the large numbers of roads,
bridges, water systems, schools and other works built
during the last two years of his administration, and his
annual messages to congress detailed the works completed.
Construction on the Pan American Highway, which had been
halted in 19 ^ 5 , was resumed, and the highway completed
almost to the Nicaraguan border*^7

of particular

importance was the opening of the section between the
Meseta Central and Liberia, the capital of Costa Rica’s
remote northwestern province of Guanacaste,

Guanacaste

had long been Costa Rica’s neglected province and was
isolated during the rainy season.

The opening of the

all-weather highway was important in giving the farmers
of the province a chance to market crops on the Meseta,
Other than the highway, the largest single
construction project was the building of El Coco

36

Ulate, 1952 Mensa.ie. 15,

37 Hispanic American Report. IV, No. 13 (Jan.
1952) and VI, No, 5 (June 1953)* Hispanic American
Report said in June 1953 that the highway was completed
to within twenty miles of the Nicaraguan border.
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International Airport which was begun and almost
completed during Ulate's administration.-^®

After some

delays due to problems with funding, construction was
also begun on another large project— a new thermal plant
to alleviate Costa Rica's chronic shortage of electrical
power.39
^
While these development projects laid the
groundwork for future prosperity, greater immediate
benefit to the people probably came from the agricultural
improvement plan.

Like many other countries whose

economies had developed on the basis of one or two export
crops, Costa Rica had to import large amounts of
foodstuffs— an arrangement which was costly to the nation
in terms of foreign exchange expenditures needed for other
purposes, and burdensome for consumers who had to pay
ho
higher costs for the imported food.
In an effort to
encourage the growing of food crops, the government built
irrigation systems, expanded credit facilities and

38 The airport was near enough to completion so
that Ulate could land there on his return from a trip
abroad in-June 1953« New York Times, June 29, 1953**
39 U.S. Embassy, "1953 Report,"
The
shortage of oil, coal and other sources of energy made
Costa Rica dependent on hydroelectric energy which had
been in short supply for years. For a discussion of the
problems involved in developing sources of electrical
energy see Stacy May, Costa Rica, 158-69.
hO

Ibid., hh.
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technical assistance to desired agricultural sectors
and guaranteed price supports.

Jli

The agricultural plan,

as a whole, led to greater purchases of agricultural
machinery, improved livestock sanitation, and higher
crop yields.

Early in 1952 the Consejo Nacional de

produceiSn, which handled the price regulation policy on
food crops, announced that its silos were full.

lio

The

following year the Central Bank reported that Costa Rica
had produced its largest harvests ever of the three foods
it,*}
basic to the Costa Rican diet— heans, c o m and rice.
In 1953* after satisfying local demand, Costa Rica began
LlIl

exporting all three crops,
and also attained selfLk
sufficiency in beef. J While some farmers had to sell
their crops abroad at a loss, the large food crop yields
generally were a benefit to the nation, increasing farm
incomes and improving the nutritional quality of the
diet of low income consumers.

In the opinion of the U.S.

Embassy, Costa Rica's rapid transformation from importer

41 The Central Bank reported in 1951* ,for
example, that during the previous year a record numbered
loans had been extended to small farmers through the
country's Rural Credit Boards. Banco Central, Primera
memoria, a^o 1 9 5 0 , 6 2 .
42

Banco Central, Segunda memoria, afio 1951* 47.

43

Banco Central, Tercera memoria. afro 1952, 51*

44

Banco Central, Cuarta memoria. afio 1953, 51*

45 The country continued to import other food
stuffs, particularly wheat, which could not feasibly be
produced in Costa Rica. U.S. Embassy, "1953 Report," 7* 9*
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to exporter of "basic food crops was, to a great extent,
due to government encouragement.

LA

After 1951 Ulate*s efforts at financial
restoration were coupled with the development program
calling for large-scale outlays, yet Ulate was able to
continue the record of budget surpluses, debt repayment
and currency stabilization.

It was said that Costa Rica

at this time was enjoying the "highest level of prosperity
Ln

in its economic history," f How was the administration
able to achieve such success?
Part of the answer lies in the increased sources
48
of revenue open to the government.
Costa Rica's first
personal income tax law was passed in 1947 * but not a
great deal of money was collected in the first years of

46 U.S. Embassy, "1951 Report," 3 6 . Unfortunate
ly, Costa Rica in later years reverted to the status of
importer of basic foodstuffs. In 1966 Charles Denton
found Costa Ric's urban poor paying high prices for
imported food. Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics
(Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971), 16.
47

U.S. Embassy, "1953 Report," 2,

48 During the Ulate administration, for example,
the government's annual receipts increased from 138
million colones-in 1940 to 216 million in 1953*
Government revenues during the previous decade had grown
from 42 million colones in 1940 to 118 million in 1949.
Inflation during the 1940's was high, as shown by the UN
figures cited by Ulate in his 1951 congressional address,
but even allowing for the inflation rate cited, it can
be seen that the government's real income had increased.
See U.S, Embassy, "1950 Report," 6 0 ; and "1953 Report," 6 .
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tax's existence.

Measures taken by the Junta and the

Ulate administration helped to insure that a sizable
portion of the tax was collected, although evasion
remained a commonplace in Costa Rica as in most parts of
Latin America.

A more important new source of tax

revenue came from the United Fruit Company's Costa
Rican subsidiary ConrpaMa Bananera under the terms of a
new contract signed with the government of Costa Rica
and approved by the Costa Rican legislature in December
194-9.^

The contract stipulated higher taxes for the

company, and subsequent three-way discussions between
the Ulate administration, United Fruit Company and the
U.S, Internal Revenue Service resulted in an arrangement
whereby Costa Rica received a larger percentage of
Compafila Bananera's total tax payments.^
Still another form of taxation available to the
Ulate administration came from the ten percent capital
4-9 ColecciSn de leves. Segundo de 19^9, No. 1 12 6
of Dec. 31- Negotiations for the contract began under the
Junta but, after Ulate took office, the contract was
rewritten in terms more favorable to Costa Rica. For Jos§
Figueres* favorable comments on .the re-negotiated banana
contract see El Diario, Dec, 29, 19^9.
Another new source of revenue came from a contract
with Union Oil Company, according to which Union paid the
government for the right to explore for oil with certain
rights to exploitation if oil were found,-. Exploration
turned up no oil but did produce revenue, ..ColecciSn de
leves. Segundo de 1951* No, 1 3 8 2 of Nov, 9*
50

El Diario. May 19, 1950.
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levy ordered by the Junta,

Proceeds from the tax were

collected in one percent annual installments, beginning
in 19^8.

Ulate had been opposed to the levy when it was

first adopted, and as president he said on several
occasions that he intended to abolish the tax as soon as
possible.

*51

Installments continued to be collected,

however, and Ulate did not request congressional
abrogation of the levy until 1953 when he asked that the
levy be rescinded immediately without collecting the
*52
payment due for that year.
The request causeda heated debate in
legislature where a number of deputies argued

the
that it

was dangerous to the country's financial position to
abolish so lucrative a tax. ^

However, in the end the

assembly did vote to rescind the tax and no money was
cl,
collected on the 1953 installment,
t
Because he waited until 1953 to abolish the tax,
critics claimed that Ulate sought to reap the benefits of
the revenue during his term and, at the same time, take
credit for ending an unpopular levy.

Ulate countered

51

Ibid.. Aug. 8 ,1950 and Feb. 3. 1953-

52

Ibid.

53

Informe de labores_de la asamblea, 57.

Feb. 3» 1953.

Co_lecci(5n de leyes, Segundo de 1953» No. 1 6 2 ^
of Aug. 21.
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these charges by contending that due to the financial
situation confronting the government when he took office,
he could not immediately end the tax.

He said that even

the Twentieth Century Fund Study Group, a team of
American economists whose advice Ulate took seriously,
it
had warned against trying to end the tax precipitously. ^
Whatever their private advice to Ulate may have been, the
Twentieth Century team found the tax harmful to the
country*s development and advised that Costa Rica should
make it clear that the country intended never again to
resort to such a measure. ^
The Study Group found Costa Rica's taxation
system, as a whole, outmoded and unsystematic.

The

government relied on a multitude of small indirect taxes,

55 El Diario, Aug. 8 , 1950* The Twentieth
Century Fund Study Group visited Costa Rica in 1950 in
connection with a detailed examination of the country's
economy, one of a series of studies begun by the Fund
about five years earlier. With the inauguration of the
Point Four program such studies were useful in developing
assistance programs for the countries in question. Many
of Ulate's major economic measures— such as the creation
of the Centrad. Bank and the passage of the law for the
Control of International Transactions— were already
initiated before the Group arrived and others were in the
planning stage. The findings of the Group, however, were
helpful to Ulate in formulating later economic plans.
56 Letter from Stacy May and the Twentieth
Century Fund to the Manager of the Banco Central, June 27,
1950» copy in Otilio Ulate Papers.
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many of them v/ith revenue allocated in advance to
specific projects rather than to the general budget,^
Possibly acting on their advice, Ulate ended a number of
erg

these minor taxes along with the capital levy.-'
While abolishing these small taxes, Ulate
initiated a lucrative new one by placing a five percent
ad valorem tax on coffee entering beneficios. or
processing plants.

Powerful coffee growers fought the

tax for almost a year after it was initially proposed,
but by January 1952 Ulate was able to persuade the
national legislature to approve the tax.^

Coming during

a year of a successful harvest, coupled with high prices
on the world market, the tax put no undue strain on the
coffee industry and contributed significantly to the
revenue needed for economic development.

Because-of the

importance of coffee in the national economy, it has‘:
been said that "in Costa Rica, the best Minister of
60
Finance is a good crop of coffee."
Ulate was fortunate
in governing the country during the record harvests of

57

Stacy: May, Costa Rica, 284,

58 El Diario, Feb. 3. 1953; U.S. Embassy, "1953
Report," 4.
59- ColecciSn de leves, Primer de 1952, No. 1411
of Jan. 19.
60 Interview with Carlos MelSndez, San Jos§,
June 1,.1974.
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1952 and 1953r

and. thus observers are correct in

attributing part of his economic success to the coffee
6?
crops.
It should be noted, however, that the country’s
economic recovery began before these bumper crops— during
1 9 5 0 * when the crop was of average size, and 1 9 5 1 , when

Costa Rica's coffee harvest was said to have been "one of
the smallest during the past ten years.
Ulate's development plans were also furthered by
increased technical assistance from the United States and,
to a lesser extent, from international organizations 3uch
as UNICEF and FAQ.

Point Four programs emphasizing

agricultural training and assistance began operating in
Costa Rica in 1951 in close coordination with the national
development program«

The San Jose government cooperated

fully with these programs, and the New York Times stated
in 1953 that Point Four programs in Costa Rica had
"probably made greater progress than in any other Latin
American country. " -J Of special importance was the work
of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences

6 1 Banco Central, Tercera memoria. alio 1952, 51;
and Cuarta memoria. ano 19537 ^9.
62

(San JosSi

Joaquin Garro, Veinte afios de histor.ia chica
Imprenta Vargas, 196?), 49.

63

Banco Central, Segunda memoria. afio 1951, 46,

64

U.S. Embassy, "1951 Report," 6 .

65

New York limes. Jan. 12, 1953.

Ik2
in Turrialba on the eastern escarpment of the Meseta
Central.

The Turrialba school was the center for United

States agricultural research programs for all of Central
America, but during its early years the school devoted a
disproportionate amount of attention to Costa Rica and
66
provided valuable advice on agricultural development.
A paramount factor in Costa Rica's economic
resurgence was the Ulate government itself.

The greater

availability of credit and foreign exchange, the building
of water systems and r.oads, the technical assistance
programs and sound financial policies all'contributed to
the revival of the economy*

Ulate's policies not only

achieved the specific ends for which they were designed;
taken together, they worked to create a climate of
confidence in the vitality of the country and stability
of the government which is the best assurance for
healthy economic development anywhere.

Social Legislation

The most stz’iking feature of -the Ulate
administration's social legislation was the lack of
hostility shown toward the reformist measures enacted

66 John D. Martz, Central America! The Crisis
and the Challenge (Chapel Hill: Qniversity or north
Carolina Press, 1959)* 235*

during the 19^0's.

When they were first proposed, most

of the measures had drawn fire from Costa Rican
conservatives and sometimes from Ulate himself.

Yet

when he came to office, Ulate largely worked with existing
programs rather than against them.

A survey of the major

social reform legislation of the CalderCn and Picado
years— the social security system, the chapter of social
guarantees added to the constitution, the Labor Code and
graduated income tax— shows that Ulate made no
rescind these measures.

attempt to

He did little to expand the

scope of existing programs and some of them stagnated
for lack of attention, but his administration provided
the first adequate funding ever given a number of the
programs.
Budgets during the Ulate years continued to
devote about the same percentages as had the budgets of
past administrations toward public education, public
health and social welfare.

Given the Ulate administra

tion^ greater revenues, this of course meant that actual
expenditures on the programs rose during his tenure.
*

Despite the great significance which Costa Ricans of all
political persuasions saw in the social welfare programs
adopted during the 19^0's, the percentage of the budget
devoted to welfare-related programs did not seem to undergo
dramatic change.

Budget allotments, by percentage, for

these categories, in several selected years, were as

144'
follows;
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1928
Public
Education
Public Health and
Social Welfare

1942

1?.0

17.1

4.1

5*2

1947
18.6
3»1

1948

1953

1 6 .5

14.4

2.6

4,2

The Ulate administration also enforced existing
legislation which required the Minister of Labor to
review wages and set new minimum levels for each type of
economic activity every two years, and government-decreed
minimum wage increases averaging thirteen percent in

67 No systematic evaluation of the budgets of
these years has been undertaken. Comparison of the
budgets is difficult because ordinary budgets were
sometimes supplemented with extraordinary ones which
changed the relative weight given to all categories. In
addition, budgetary categories have undergone changes
which can sometimes render raw figures quite misleading.
For example, the 1928 budget lists "public health and
social protection" as one figure, whereas some later
budgets break these figures into two separate categories,
and still others list in the national budget a myriad of
small budgetary allotments for local public health
projects. With all due caution for oversimplification,
however, budget figures for major categories may give
a rough idea of the percentages of the budget allotment to
social welfare programs. Information taken from Costa
Rica, Direccifin General de Estadistica y Censos, Censo de
poblaciSn de Costa Rica. 11 de mavo de 1927 (San JosS:
Ministerio de Economla y Hacienda, I960, 84; Costa Rica,
Centro de Control, Congreso Constitucional, Presupuesto
de gastos del gobiemo de la renflblica. e.iercicio de
1942 (San Jos§Y Imprenta Nacional, 1942), 146T Stacy May,
Costa Rica, 282} and Costa Rica, Informe de la labor
realizada por la oficina del nresuouesto durante el afio
1953 CSan JosS; Imprenta Nacional, 1955J, 35-3b, 44.
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1950 and ten percent in 1952 were ordered.

Minimum

wages established for the banana zones, where United
Fruit Company was the major employer, were substantially
higher than for any other region, as had been the pattern
in the past. 7

Since the 1930's, union activity had

been greater and wages usually higher among banana
workers in the lowlands, perhaps because the Costa Rican
government was more willing to support wage demands when
United Fruit, rather than some Costa Rican employer on
the Meseta Central, was paying the bill.

The wage increases

nationwide fell slightly short of the increases in the
cost of living in that period, and workers with families,
as in the past, faced difficulties in maintaining minimum
healthy standards of living.

Thus, workers' wages

continued to be poor and did not reflect the prosperity
of the Ulate years. Probably more by neglect than by
design, workers did not fully share in the "situaciSn de
70
bonanza"' which the country was experiencing.

68
U.S. Embassy, "1950 Report," 40; ”1952
Report," 2 9 .

69

Ibid., "1950 Report," 40.

70 This was the Central Bank's description of
Costa Rican economic growth in 1953* Banco Central,
Cuarta memoria, ano 1953 > 57*

1*4-6
Workers, however, benefitted from the betterfinanced social programs, particularly in the field of
education.

One of the chief problems in education was

the shortage of schoolhouses.

The number of Costa Rican

students had grown by 39 ^ between 19*4-6 and 1 9 5 0 , and
construction had not kept the pace.

71

While the bulk of

his construction projects came in the last half of his
administration, Ulate announced a school-building project
as early as March 1950.

Costa Rica had 88*4- primary

schools at the end of 19*4-9, and Ulate announced in 1953
that 317 new ones had been built during his first three
years in office,

71

El Diario called this the most rapid

school-building record in the country's history.

nh,

Rephrasing Costa Rica's standard boast about having more
schoolteachers than soldiers, Ulate claimed that there
7 *5

were now more schoolhouses than soldiers, J

Attention was also given to highereducation.
Land was acquired and plans made for theopening

71

Ulate, 1950 Mensa.ie, 2 6 ,

72

El Diario. March 19, 1950.

73

Ulate, 1953 Mensa.ie, 15.

of a

7*t El Diario. July 20, 1952.
75 New York Times. Sept. *4-, 1953. The New York
Times reported that Costa Rica's 2 0 0 th school was opened
in September 1953, and the Kisnanic American Report indi
cated a similar figure when it said in December 1953 that
the Ulate administration had built 1,000 schools. These
figures, however, seem too high in light of -the building
rate described by Ulate in 1953 •
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University City on the outskirts of San JosS to house the
76

University of Costa Rica.'

A number of new schools of

higher education were also founded, including an
agronomy school, a new College of Letters and Philosophy
attached to the university, a mechanical arts school and
a nursing program which attracted students from all over
Central America.

77

A number of farmer training programs

were also begun in cooperation with U.S. agencies,
especially the agricultural research institute in
Turrialba.
Within the field of public health, the admini
stration’s chief legislative measure was a General Law of
Medico-Social Assistance, approved early in Ulate's
tenure, which reorganized Costa Rica's public health
programs and extended some of their operations.

The

law expressly said that "the state guarantees medical
assistance to all inhabitants" and that services would be
78

free for those too poor to pay.r

In providing such

services, the government relied to a considerable extent
on close cooperation with U.S. or international

76 ColecciSn de leves. Primer de 1953, No. 1580
of June 3* The university had been organized in 194-0 from
several existing colleges, but its separate schools were
still housed in different bu.ildings around tha city.
. 77 Coleccxfln de .leves, Segundo de 1950, No. 1231
of Nov. 2 0 ; Hispanic American Report, IV, No. 10 (Oct.
1951) and V , No, 5 (June 1952J.
78 Coleccign de leves. Primer de 1950, No, 1153
of April 13,

14 8

organizations offering technical assistance.

A

Department of Nutrition was established to carry out
UNICEF-related projects, and a number of Costa Rican
public health programs were started under its auspices,
including a

major school nutrition project.

A number of the new health programs emphasized
preventive medicine.

By comparison with more developed

countries, Costa Rica had always devoted a relatively
higher percentage of the public health budget to
treatment and a relatively low percentage to prevention
of diseases, a self-perpetuating pattern which is
difficult to break, given a stable source of revenue.
With international assistance and larger government
revenues, the Ulate administration was able to begin
programs of prenatal care, mass vaccinations, and. public
79

sanitation. '

Point Four medical directors were

particularly helpful in guiding the creation and
operation- of programs of malaria control, water supply
and drainage systems, dispensaries and hospital
improvements.

80

As the New York Times noted in 1953*

Costa Rica seemed to be taking good advantage of

79 Coleccifin de leves, Primer de 1951» Executive
Decree No. 5 of May 8; Ulate, 1950 Mensa.ie. 29-31; 1951
Mensa.ie, 10-12; 1952 Mensa.ie, 21-24; and 1953 Mensa.ie. 7-9.
80

New York Times. Jan. 12, 1953*
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international opportunities to improve public well.
81
being.

Institutional and Administrative Reform

As with social legislation, most of the
institutional and administrative reforms undertaken
during the Ulate years were based on earlier effort s . The
Junta had begun a number of valuable reforms, but some of
them had been instituted on a provisional basis or for
other
tenure.

reasons had not been completed during the Junta's
Many of these ideas were incorporated into the

constitution, but constitutional terminology, of course,
was general in nature, often serving only as an enabling
act for future legislation.

It remained for the Ulate

administration, the first to assume office after the
constitution was promulgated ,to put these concepts into
concrete form.

As in the case of CalderCn's social

legislation, Ulate made no attempt to undo the basic
program initiated by the Junta and, in many cases, Ulate's
legislation was based specifically on Junta decrees.

Nor

was any attempt made to change Junta-inspired portions of
the 1 9 ^9 constitution, despite the fact that 33 of the
k-5 congressional deputies— a sufficient number to pass a
constitutional amendment— were members of Ulate's PUN,

81

Ibid.
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The general theme of the new reforms— decreasing
the power of the executive and decentralizing government
functions— was accomplished chiefly through the creation
of administrative "bodies with varying degrees of autonomy
from the central government.

While this was not entirely

consistent with Ulate's personalistic approach to
government, he fulfilled the constitutional mandates*
Along these lines, Ulate created the Central
Bank as an autonomous institute and structured it in
Qp

such a way as to give it considerable independence.

A

civil service system was also created which, it was
thought, might serve as a model for Latin America.^
The civil service system provided for examinations and
theoretically impartial recruitment; like most such
legislation, it included provisions making it difficult
for the executive to fire civil servants for political
84
reasons.
A separate law gave employees of the

82 ColecciSn de leves, Primer de 1950, No. 1130
of Jan. 28,
83 U.S. Embassy, "1953 Report," 13» ColecciSn de
leyes, Primer de 1953* No. 1581 of May 28.

84 Although there continue to be some reports of
favoritism and corruption, observers ten years after the
creation of Costa Rica's civil service system found Costa
Rican civil servants were "careerists" and among the
"most efficient and broadly educated" in Latin America.
U.S. Department of Labor, Labor Law and Practice in Costa
Rica (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19^2),

15^17.
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legislative branch some of the same security of tenure
as

that given to executive branch personnel under the

civil service law,®-*
An Office of Comptroller General was created to
oversee government spending and, in order to give the
Comptroller General independence from the executive
branch he was to monitor, he was made responsible to the
legislative branch.

A Law of Financial Administration

detailed the functions of each office of the government
which handled public money, stipulating that one office
only, the Proveeduria General, was to buy supplies for
86
all executive branch offices.
Together, the creation of
the Comptroller General position and the financial
administration law were said to establish for the state
"complete control" over its fiscal and financial

Qry
matters. {

This characterization seems euphoric in view

of some subsequent misuse of government funds in Costa
Rica, but the new laws did decrease the opportunities for
the sorts of fiscal irregularities that were prevalent
during the CalderOn years.

85

ColecciCn de leves. Primer de 1952, No. 14-30

of March 14-,
. 86 Colecclfin. de -leves. Segundo de 1950, No, 1252
of Dec, 22} Primer de 1951, No. 1279 of May 2*, Primer de
1952, Executive Decree No. 5 of Jan. 24-,
87

Informe de labores de la asamblea. 52.
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Culminating earlier steps toward removing the
electoral process from central government control, the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal was given autonomy and
separate funding.

Other legislation more clearly defined

the functions of the lower levels of the electoral
machinery, particularly the Civil Registry and Electoral
88
Registry.
Protection of individual rights from
arbitrary government actions was also advanced through a
law of anroaro-, a common Latin American legal concept
providing a recourse similar in some ways to judicial
89

review. '
Also in accordance with the constitution, laws
were passed which established a theoretically autonomous
90
position for the municipalitiesy
but here the efforts
toward autonomy were only partially successful.

Like

most Latin countries, Costa Rica had never had a tradition
of strong local government and it was difficult to create

88 Colecci&i de leves. Segundo de 1952, No. 1535
and 1536 of Dec, 10.
89

ColecciSn de leves. Primer de 1950, No, ll6l
of June 2. For a discussion of the uses of amparo. which
evidently originated with the Mexican constitution of 1917,
see Alexander .T, Edelman, Latin American Government and
Politics (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey Press,~~1965), 46^-68,
90
No. 1^01.

ColecciSn de leves. Segundo de 1951, No, 1378,
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one.

91

There were no legislative bodies on the

provincial level, and local government officials
continued to look to San Jos§ for leadership and
initiative.

Ulate admitted that the municipalities

continued to be dependent on the central government to a
large degree.

However, he believed that inter

governmental relations were becoming more harmonious and
that the projects on which San Jos§ worked in cooperation
with the provinces moved forward more satisfactorily
under the system of somewhat greater independence for
the municipalities. 92
Ulate wanted his administration to operate on a
sound, businesslike basis, and he was cognizant of the
need for a measure of institutional reform.

Although

Ulate believed that the most important key to good
government was the selection of good governors, the
net effect of institutional change during the Ulate
years was to move Costa Rica in the direction of the
.91

As Amoldo JimSnez explained the problem:

A new, endemic and vigorous municipal spirit
had not yet matured in the civic conscience
and for that reason, it was illogical to
expect from the new constitution precepts
that expressed, clearly and with vigor,
movements which were not yet well defined.
JimSnez, "El rSgimen municipal," Revista de la Universidad
de Costa Rica, XIII (July 1956), 9 ^
92

Ulate, 1952 Mensa.ie, 5*
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creation of a rational government, in Max Weber's sense.

Foreign Policy

Ulate might have taken a page from George
Washington's farewell address in formulating his foreign
policy.

He emphasized cordial, correct relations with

all countries but avoided involvement with partisan
causes, and especially opposed military pacts and
intervention in the affairs of other states.

Like Costa

Rican governments of the past, the Ulate administration
had a strongly Western outlook on general foreign

affairs

questions, particularly where Communism was concerned.^
Ulate declined to resume relations with the Soviet Union»
which the Junta had broken ,and during the Korean war the
government of Costa Rica lifted the ban against its
citizens' participating in military activities, in order
to permit Costa Ricans to volunteer for service with UN
ck
forces in Korea.
While he thus clearly supported the West in .
foreign policy questions that were global in scope and had

93 Costa Rica has traditionally emphasized close
ties with the West and Third World rhetoric is less
pronounced there than in many Latin countries. This
foreign policy stance had not altered during the 19^2-19^8
period when Communists had some influence in the government.
9** Department of State Bulletin. XXIII, No. 5^9
(Oct. 16, 1950); New York Times. July 28. 1950.
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little impact on Costa Rica, Ulate maintained a policy
of neutrality in matters that were closer to home.

Other

than his friendship with the United States and support
for Western democracies, Ulate largely confined his
interest in foreign affairs to Central America where the
thorny questions were relations with Nicaragua and
Guatemala.

The issues at stake in "both cases were

legacies from the Junta, which had believed that Costa
Rica should take a stand, pro or con, on each government
and deal with it accordingly.

The Junta viewed

Guatemala's government as good, one with which Costa
Rica should develop close ties.

Nicaragua, on the other

other hand, was ostracized and anti-Somoza exiles were
made welcome in Costa Rica.

Ulate had no such Wilsonian

commitment to crusade for just causes.
The Figueres-Somoza quarrel had strained relations
almost to the breaking point, and they remained that way
until Ulate took office.

Ulate did not develop close ties

with the Nicaraguan government, but through several
gestures he signaled that he wanted to relax tensions
between the two countries.

For example, he raised Costa

Rica’s diplomatic mission in Managua to ambassadorial
s t a t u s . N i c a r a g u a responded in kind and agreed to

95

Ulate, 1952 Mensa.ie, 27.
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return three Costa Rican planes which had been held
since 1948, when fleeing calderonistas

had taken them

to Nicaragua.^
Ulate's most important step was a brief visit to
Nicaragua as part of a general tour of Central America
in June 1953.

At the Managua airport Somoza greeted

Ulate with the usual Latin embrace, and he later
conferred the Order of Rubgn Dario on his guest.^
Although as a newspaper editor Ulate had often criticized
Somoza, a much-publicized photograph of Ulate's airport
abrazo with Somoza was used by Ulate's opponents in an
attempt to brand him as a friend of the dictator.
At the other end of the Central American political
spectrum was Guatemala, whose regime had aided Figueres
during the 1948 revolution and established very close
ties with the Junta government.

As the government of

Guatemala continued to drift to the left,

98

other

governments in the area became concerned and rumors
circulated that the other four Central American nations
were forming a military pact against Guatemala,

The idea

of unified action to deal with Guatemala had some

96

Ibid.. 28.

97

El Diario. June 28, 1953.

98 In 1951 Guatemalan President Juan JosS ArSvalo,
who had supported the Caribbean Legion, was succeeded by
Jacobo Arbenz, in whose government Communists and other
extremists played a major role.
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supporters in the region.

Nicaragua talked about the

need for "coordinated" a c t i o n a n d Honduras later
permitted the revolution against Arbenz to be launched
from Honduran soil.
For his part, Ulate disliked the trend of events
in Guatemala, and Costa Rica at one point had so serious
a disagreement with the Guatemalan ambassador that he was
declared persona non grata.'*'00

99

However, Ulate refrained

El Diario. April 11, 1953-

100 Information on the Guatemalan ambassador’s
expulsion is contradictory and incomplete. In June 1953,
soon after Ulate left on a two-week trip to El Salvador,
Honduras and Nicaragua, Acting President Oreamuno
declared Guatemalan Ambassador 0 'Meany persona non grata
and recalled Costa Rica's ambassador from Guatemala for
further instructions. Justifying the move, Costa Rica
claimed that 0 'Meany had invited Ulate to visit Guatemala
and that the invitation had been accepted for some time
after the Costa Rican elections in July. However, the
Guatemalan foreign minister, according to the Costa Rican
account, denied that such an invitation had been extended
and 0 'Meany followed suit by saying he had not invited
Ulate to Guatemala. ColecciSn de leyes, Primer de 1953,
Executive Decree No. 9 of June 2^.
The stated Costa Rican version of the events seems
unsatisfactory. A more likely reason for the expulsion,
suggested by Ronald Schneider, is that the Guatemalan
ambassador had aroused the ire of San JosS officialdom by
involvement with local Communist activities. Schneider
writes that from 1951
195^ many Guatemalan diplomats
were expelled from neighboring countries because of
involvement with local Communists, and he reports that one
Ambassador Jorge Arankowsky was expelled, from Costa Rica
after addressing a Communist labor rally. Although Costa
Rica lists the expelled ambassador's name as O'Meany— a
name not bearing a particularly close resemblance to
Arankowsky— it is possible that accounts have become
garbled and that 0 'Meany and Arankowsky were one and the
same. See Schneider, Communism in Guatemala. 19^4-196^
(New York* Praeger, 1958)7 297*
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from criticism of the Guatemalan government and probably
showed more forbearance toward Guatemala than did any
other Central American head of state during that period.
In particular, Ulate stressed that Costa Rica would not
consider joining any Central American military alliance
which excluded Guatemala,

In remarks made to Costa Rican

villagers in February 1953 1 Ulate said*.
The government has not received proposals
for forming military pacts and even if we
do receive them, we will not accept them,
not even for the purpose of fighting
Communism. We must keep our hands off the
politics of sister nations.101
Shortly after that the Organization of Central
American States (ODECA), which all five Central American
countries had joined at the time of its formation in 1951»
decided to accept El Salvador's suggestion that the
problem of Communism in the region be considered at the
next meeting.

The measure was clearly directed to the

matter of Communist influence in the government of
Guatemala, and Guatemala withdrew from ODECA, claiming
that the other countries were interfering in a member
102
state's internal affairs.
Ulate took the occasion to
reiterate his determination to stay out of Guatemalan
affairs.

In public letters to Costa Rica's ambassadors

101

El Diario. Feb. 11, 1953.

102

Ibid.. April 3, 1953.
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in Guatemala and at the United Nations, he reminded all
concerned that:
the current government of Costa Rica has
maintained inflexibly and clearly, in official
word and deed, a cautious and correct conduct
of cordiality in relations with all Central
American countries and complete avoidance of
any intervention or influence, no matter how
slight, in the domestic politics of any of
them. 103
A week later, representatives of the four remaining
ODECA members met in San Jos§ to reaffirm their
commitment to the organization and to ask Guatemala to
reconsider its decision to withdraw.

IOZl

Guatemala,

however, ignored their overture^-* and remained on bad
terns with its Central American neighbors until the
overthrow of the Arbenz government in 1954.
Because of his belief that countries should not
meddle in each other's affairs, Ulate was unsympathetic
toward exile groups who launched revolutions against
their governments from other countries.

He said he could

not understand "the tolerance with which some governments
watch the development in their territory of plans for
subversion to be carried to other countries.'

Equally

exasperated with the subversive exile groups themselves,
Ibid.. April 10, 1953.
104
Ibid.. April 1 7 , 1953«
105
Five weeks after this Declaration of San JosS,
according to El Diario, Guatemala had notresponded.
El
Diario, May 21, 1953.
106
Ulate, 1951 Mensa.ie. 2 0 .
.103

160
Ulate once complained that Costa Rica had offered a haven
to exiles of various lands but that a few had repaid
this hospitality by encouraging Costa Rican youth to
support revolutions against the governments of their
native lands with no concern for the difficulties this
would make for Costa Rica.101*7 One incident of this
nature which incensed Ulate was an attempt by a group of
Hondurans to denounce the government of Honduras in a
Costa Rican radio broadcast,,

The government of Costa
1Oft
Rica decided to prohibit the broadcast.
The Costa
Rican Supreme Court, however, overruled the government's
action on the ground that freedom of speech without
prior censorship was the law in Costa Rica,^0^

107 El Diario, July 13, 1950• Ulate, however,
continued to accept foreign exiles. Among those offered
asylum in Costa Rica during the Ulate administration were
Romulo Betancourt, who had sought refuge in Costa Rica
in the past, and Juan Bosch, El Diario, March 11 and 12,
1952.
108

Ibid., July 13, 1950.

109 According to the UN Yearbook's account of the
incident, the Hondurans had planned to broadcast a program
commemorating the "massacre" of Hondurans at San Pedro
Sula, for which they blamed the government of Honduras.
Acting on a request from the Honduran ambassador, Costa
Rica's undersecretary for foreign affairs circulated a
memorandum to various radio stations, telling them not to
broadcast the program. The Costa Rican Supreme Court
voided the undersecretary's order, holding that it
constituted a violation of free speech. United. Nations,
Yearbook on Human Rights for 19*50 (New York, 1952), 57.
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Ulate was not convinced of the validity of the
Court's reasoning and later defended his position, citing
an experience of his own in which the roles had been
reversed.

Ulate said that he, as a journalist, had

allowed Guatemalan exiles opposed to Guatemalan strongman
Ubico to use space in El Diario to condemn their regime.
Ricardo JimSnez, then president of Costa Rica, had
prohibited this, telling Ulate that he could say whatever
he liked about the government of Costa Rica, but could
not use his newspaper to get the government of Costa
Rica into trouble with its neighbors.

109

Ulate decided

that JimSneZ was right and came to regard the curtailment
of extreme media attacks against the domestic policies
of neighboring governments as a legitimate activity of
the government of Costa Rica, albeit one very seldom
exercised by Ulate.

That Ulate advocated responsible

journalism and restraint on the part of the press is not
surprising, but his willingness to sanction government
curtailment of the freedom of the press, even for reasons
of national security, seems strange in view of his own
professional background and his commitment to civil
liberties.

It can only be explained by his desire that

Costa Rica maintain a posture of absolute noninvolvement
in the internal affairs of other nations, a position
which was a cornerstone of his foreign policy.
• 109 Ulate describes his exchange with Jira€nez
in his. Hacia donde lleva -a Costa Rica-el Seflor Presidente Figueres? (San Josfi*
Imprenta-Universal., 1955 )> 22.

CHAPTER VI
THE ULATE ADMINISTRATION:

III

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Ulate administration was a period of
restoration more than of innovation.

Relative to his

predecessors in the 19^0's, Ulate introduced few
controversial programs.

Partly for this reason, a

number of political and social sectors which had felt
alienated from the government at one time or another
during the past decade were brought back into national
life, and hatreds born in the revolution began to fade.
It was logical that Ulate's businesslike approach should
have met with approval from wealthy Costa Ricans and
business circles, but, at the other end of the spectrum,
Communists and calderonistas also found the atmosphere
more favorable once Ulate took office.

This was true

despite the fact that the recently outlawed Communist
Party was the one group whose activities were restricted
to a considerable extent during the Ulate years.

Communists and Calderonistas

The role of Vanguardia Popular in the Calderdn and
Picado governments had made Costa Ricans suspicious of
Communist parties, a concern which was heightened by the
162
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Cold War atmosphere prevailing at that time.

Nevertheless,

soon after he came to office, Ulate let it he known that
all Costa Ricans, whatever their political roles during
the 19^0*s, were free to return and many of them did.^
Calder6n and Picado declined the invitation hut Manuel
Mora, head of the outlawed Vanguardia Popular, returned
in the spring of 1950 and. immediately immersed himself
in lahor and political activities.

By 1953 he was ahle

to reform and gain official recognition for a new
?
Communist-oriented lahor confederation.
Mora was one
of the most astute political figures in the country, as
well as an effective lahor organizer, and his influence
was such that he was a continual headache for Ulate.

The

legal limits of Mora's activities were not entirely
clear.

The constitution prohibited the formation of

Communist political parties,

1

and the Junta had declared

El Diario de Costa Rica. Dec. 17, 19^9*

2 U.S. Embassy, San Jose, "Annual Economic
Report, 1950," prepared March 1, 195^* Despatch No. 6 5 8 ,
15.. A large number of calderonistas also returned.
Interview with Jos£ Fernandez, June 20, 1 9 6 7 ■
3 Article 98 of the constitution prohibited the
functioning of parties which "tend toward the destruction
of the foundations of the democratic organization of Costa
Rica or that threaten the sovereignty of the country, all
within the judgment of the legislative Assembly by a vote
of at least two-thirds of its members, following a previous
statement of opinion by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal."
Costa Rica, Constituci6n politica (San Jos£: Imprenta
Nacional, 196?) ■"

164
that the Communist labor organization, ConfederaciSn
iL
de Trabajadores de Costa Rica, was also illegal.
At
the same time, Costa Rica's 1949 constitution, like the
previous one, had a strong chapter on civil and political
liberties, which were guaranteed to all citizens.

Under

certain circumstances the guarantees could be suspended,
but Ulate was determined to avoid that step,-^

Hence,

the government kept a wary eye on Mora and on at least
one occasion arrested him for a brief period,

but no

systematic policy of repression was carried out,
Ulate and Mora, however, by no means reached an
accommodation.

Ulate blamed the Communist leader for

much of what had gone ’wrong in Costa Rica during the
1940's; and Mora, for his part, regarded Ulate as a
leader of the 1948 revolution which had ousted the first
Costa Rican government in which he felt he had had a
chance to see some of his goals reached.

The two thus

remained at loggerheads and engaged in verbal duels, as
can be seen by an exchange of telegrams published in La

4 Franklin Parker, The Central American
Republics (Londom Oxford University Press,, 1964), 291.
5 The president, with congressional approval,
could suspend the guarantees or, if congress were not in
session, could briefly suspend them on his own authority.
Constitucifln polltica. Article 1^0.
6 Mora was arrested in August, 1950* in
connection with a plot against the government, Hispanic
American Report. Ill, No, 9 (Sept. 1950).

Hora in May 1950*

Mora cabled the president to say that

he had heard that, due to "political motives," the
constitutional guarantees were going to be suspended and
his house searched.

He added that, even if the

guarantees were not suspended he was "disposed" to permit
a house search, but asked that the search be carried out
by "decent" authorities who would not disturb sick
family members in his house.

Bristling at Mora's

suggestion that "political motives" might persuade him
to suspend the guarantees, Ulate replied.that there was
no such plan.

He informed Mora that he could rest

assured that the Mora family was safer than "our
anguished and persecuted families" had been during the
period when "your group" participated in the government.'
On a number of occasions, the disagreement went
beyond verbal exchanges.

On several different occasions,

Communist meetings were raided, and Communists were arrested
in connection with a series of victimless bombings in
Q

San Jos£ in the early spring of 1951*

The most serious

incidents came in August, 1950 and April, 1951 when the
administration uncovered plots to overthrow the government.

7 Mora's cable to Ulate and the president's reply
are both published in La Hora, May 20, 1950.
8

Hispanic American Report, IV, No. k (April, 1951)*
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Q
Communists were implicated in at least the first plot .'
Rafael Angel Calderon Guardia's uncle, Prospero Guardia ,
was the apparent organizer of a coup which was to have
followed the wave of bombings in 1951 and. Rafael's
brother Francisco Caldertfn was said to be in charge of
supplying arms.10

Former President Calderdn, who had

organized the December, 19^8 invasion in an effort to
regain control of the country, was thought to be directing
the 1951 plot from Mexico, and to prevent any such plans,
the Mexican government announced that it would prevent
arms shipments to Costa Rica.

11

The uproar over the

discovery of the plots soon subsided and those arrested
were released.
Ulate was particularly concerned about subversive
activity which had foreign connections.

Before the

revolution, many Costa Ricans had made a distinction
between international Communism and the native comunismo
criollo of Manuel Mora's party, which seemed less

9 Hispanic American Report. Ill, No, 9 (Sept, 1950);
IV, No. 5 (May 19501. El Diario~ u g . 12 and 13, 1950 and
April 5» 1951*
Harry Kantor later wrote that Communists were
implicated in both of the plots. Kantor, Patterns of
Politics and Political Systems in Latin America (Chicagoi
Rand McNally, 19^9)* 199* This statement, however, is not
in agreement with contemporary accounts given in El Diario,
the Hispanic American Report and the New York Times, which
tied the Communists only to the 1950 plot.
10

New York Times. April 3, 1951•

11

Hispanic American Report. IV, No. 5 (May, 1951)*

threatening because of its Costa Rican origins.

The

anti-Communist nature of the revolution and the feelings
engendered by it tended to blur this distinction, but the
Ulate administration's position on Communist activities
indicated that his government still acknowledged some
difference between the two.

In 1953» for example, Ulate

told congress that authorities in the banana zone , a
longtime center of Communist labor activities, had seized
Communist literature which contained violent attacks
against the government and had delivered the material to
him*

Ulate said that he had found no justification for

the seizure and had ordered the literature returned. He
added, however, that he considered material brought in
secretly from Soviet bloc countries to be a more serious
threat than that produced domestically and vowed that the
government would continue to prevent its entrance into
12
the country.
Literature of this nature had been taken from
Manuel Mora's brother Eduardo in July, 1952 as he was
returning from a Berlin meeting of a group called the
Partisans of Peace, and other material related to the
Partisans of Peace was seized when it arrived in the mail

12 Otilio Ulate, Mensa.ie del Sefior Presidente
constitucional de la repflblica don Otilio Ulate presentado
a la asamblea legislative el. 1° de mayo de 1953 (San Jos§t
Imprenta Nacional, 1953)* 11.
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from Mexico,

13

The would-be recipient of the Mexican

mail sued under the new law of amoaro
returned to him.

lit

to have the mail

The Costa Rican Supreme Court, however,

held that the mail could be seized because it was
"avowedly Communist" in nature and thus came under
article 98 of the constitution which prohibited the
formation and activities of. Communist parties. ^
The most far-reaching legal decisions during this
period on the future role of the Communist Party were not
made by the Ulate administration or the courts, however,
but by the legislature.

The constitution had entrusted

the legislature with the duty of ruling on the legality
of political parties suspected of Communist activities.
In 1950, soon after his return to Costa Rica, Mora tried
to reform Vanguardia Popular and petitioned the legislature
to set aside the Junta decree-law abolishing the party,
Ulate did not take a stand on the matter, simply asking
that congress exercise its authority and make a decision.
Congress upheld the decree and said that Vanguardia could

13

El Diario. July 22, 1952.

1^

See chapter 5*

15 For a discussion of the case, see United
Nations, Yearbook on Human Rights for 1951 (New York, 1953)»
53.
16 El Diario, July 11, 1950,
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not operate in Costa Rica#

17

In 1953 Mora again tried to form a party, the
Progressive Independents, with the hope of entering
candidates for congress in the 1953 elections.

This time

Mora kept a lower profile and did not advertise his
connection with the party.

Another man was listed as

the party's head in the petition for inscription on the
•jg

electoral rolls;

and only 900 of the required 3,000

signatories to the petition were former members of
Ip
Vanguardia. 7 The Supreme Electoral Tribunal thus
recommended that the party be recognized as legal and
allowed to enter the 1953 race.

However, in a move said

to have been led by Figueres1 supporters, the legislature
ruled against the Progressive Independents and voted to
strike the party from the electoral rolls.

20

Ulate signed

the congressional bill but, on this occasion, he spoke
out.

He said he felt he had no right to veto an action

clearly within the legislature's purview but he expressed
his personal preference for letting the Progressive

17

Ibid1
. , July 27, 1950.

18

New York Times. July 15, 1953*

19 Harry Kantor, The Costa Rican Election of 1953';
A Case Study (Gainesville: University of Florida Latin
American Monograph Series No. 5, 1958)» 36.
20

New York Times. July 15 and 25, 1953*
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Independents take their chances at the polls.

21

Ulate

probably expressed the feelings of many Costa Ricans
who viewed the constitutional provision as not quite fair
and were not sure that Manuel Mora and the Communists
should be permanently removed from political life.
Ulate's views, in general, were more conciliatory
toward Communists and calderonistas than were those of
most former leaders of the prerevolutionary Opposition.
In 1952, for example, Ulate asked congress to declare a
general amnesty for those guilty of political crimes
during the CalderCn and Picado years.

22

Congress turned

21 El Diario. July 25, 1953* The prohibition
technically remained in force until 1976 but Communists
were allowed to enter the 1970 elections under the banner
of the Socialist Action Party (PASO), and Mora won a seat
in Congress, See the Times of the Americas. Jan. 28, 1970;
and a Jan. 19, 1977 report by the news service ACAN as
published in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin
American Daily Re-port. Jan. 21, 1977.
22 Ulate, 1952 Mensa.ie.
Ralph Lee Woodward
presents a misleading picture in describing Ulate as
"ruthless" in his dealings with Communists, Ulate did seek,
to limit Communist activities— which were prohibited by law.
But, given the Cold War atmosphere of the time, the anti
communist nature of the 19^8 revolution and the existence of
Junta-initiated laws and constitutional provisions denying
Communists the right to conduct political activities, Ulate
was quite lenient in his dealings with the Communists, If
the Ulate administration had a number of clashes with
Communists, it was largely because Communists were
allowed to resume a number of their former activities and
hence there were more occasions for friction between the
government and the party. See Woodward, Central Americai
A Nation Divided (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976),
225.
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23
down Ulate's request, u but he had made his views known
and this may have contributed to the decreasing level
of violence in Costa Rica.

No plots against the

government were uncovered after the spring of 1951 and.
in 1952 Mora, in an interview with a visiting scholar,
acknowledged that restrictions on Communists had eased
and that he had been able to resume a number of his labor
2iL
activities since Ulate had taken office.

Formation of the National Liberation Party.

While Ulate's policies may have closed a number
of political wounds, Jos£ Figueres and the former members
of the Junta became disenchanted with Ulate as it became
clear that ,while he would not dismantle existing programs,
he was not going to proceed along the lines drawn by the
Junta.

The prerevolutionary Opposition forces had begun

to drift apart soon after the revolution and, while Ulate
and Figueres remained formally polite until their bitter

23 Ulate blamed liberacionistas for blocking the
amnesty request. Otilio Ulate, Hacia donde lleva a Costa
Rica el SeKor Presidente Figueres? (San Jos§, Imprenta
Universal, .1955^*30.
2^ Robert J, Alexander, Communism in Latin
America (New Brunswicki Rutgers University Press, 1957)1
390.
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split during Figueres' 1953-1958 administration, it was
clear that they and their supporters were dividing into
separate camps.

After the Communists and calderonistas.

Ulate's most severe critics were Figueres' supporters
in the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the smallest and
most reform-minded of the political groups which formed
the prerevolutionary Opposition.

The men of PSD gradually

realized that Ulate intended to run the country pretty
much in the way it had always been run, and that was not
why they had gone to revolution.
This feeling was shared by Jos£ Figueres who,
although not a member of PSD, held many similar views.
It was clear even before Ulate's inauguration that

25 Figueres joined the Social Democratic Party at
the time of its formation in 19^5 but resigned a month
later for reasons that were never entirely made clear,
Burt English says that irregularities later came to light
in the Finance Department Figueres headed, but Figueres
cited only "petty jealousies-'^ within the party leadership
as his reason for resigning. Burt English, Liberaclfin
Nacional in Costa Rica (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1971)', 37.
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p^
Figueres planned to run for president in 1953»
Figueres needed a vehicle for his campaign*

and

For both of

these reasons, the National Liberation Party (PLN) was
created.
Soon after Ulate assumed power, Figueres and
his friends began holdings meetings which culminated in
the official founding of PLN in 1951*

On Columbus Day

of that year, the party— in an unusual step for Costa
Rica— issued a Fundamental Charter which stated its view
of democracy and the role of the state.

Concerned

primarily with economics, the Charter envisioned a mixed
economy which leaned toward socialism.

26

The document

Because of the eight-year lapse required by
the 1948 constitution Figueres would not normally have
been eligible to stand for election in 1953* However,
a special transitory article had been added to the
constitution which exempted the Junta members from this
eight-year requirement for the 1953 race only. The
seriousness of Figueres* plans for 1953 may be indicated
by the fact that he threatened to resign as President of
the Junta when members' of the Constituent Assembly let it
be known they were considering removing Figueres* special
eligibility. Arturo Castro Esquivel, Jos5 Figueres Ferrer;
El Hombre y su Qbra (San Jose: Imprenta Torino, 1955), 222;
kubin-HernSndez Poveda-, Desde la barrai cfimo se discutiS
v emitifl la constituciSn politica de 19^*9 (San Jos5:
Editorial Borrase,”1953)> 2 3 0 .- Resignations and threats
to resign were not foreign to Costa Rican politics, and
often caused even opponents to rally around in.support.
For example, the members of the Junta, whose irregular
status offended many Costa Ricans, three times threatened
resignation and each time secured at least some face-saving
concessions from their political opposition, rather than an
acceptance of the resignations. See,in addition to Castro
Esquivel, the New York Times. Oct.. 28-30, 194*9; and Junta
Fundadora de la Segunda Repdblica, "Actas de las sesiones,"
entries for March 22, April 20 and April 21, 194*9.
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viewed Costa Rica's economic past as based on the
profit motive and vowed to "complement and ennoble" this
motive with "the spirit of service which gives impulse to
an economy of abundance" and whose chief goal would be "the
satisfaction of the needs of all."2''7 The charter assigned
to the state the duty to help economically weak groups
and said that the country's public administration and
"the whole juridical order" should aim at the "constant
realization of wellbeing" of the public.2®
In fulfillment of these goals, the charter recognized
a role for private enterprise but said that "activities of
public interest" should be carried out by autonomous
institutes wherever a natural monopoly existed.2^
The leaders of Liberaci-6n viewed it as Costa Rica's
first noncommunist ideological party which operated on a
mass scale and a permanent basis.

Emphasizing the

ideological, nonpersonalistic nature of the party, PLN
leaders describe the charter as having been drawn up and
the party formed in a series of meetings held during 1950 and
1951 at the fincas of JosS Figueres and Francisco Orlich;

27 Partido LiberaciCn Nacional, "Carta Fundamental,
12 de octubre de 1951" (mimeographed pamphlet, no date), 3 . 4.
The Carta was updated,somewhat in 1 9 6 9 .
28

Ibid'. . 5.

29

Ibid.
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and they point out the contributions made by men other
than Figueres,-^0

Benjamin Mftez, the Junta's labor

and social welfare minister, is credited with having
authored most of the social and Christian ideas in the
charter.

Labor experts Alfonso Carro and Luis Alberto

Monge and former Junta ministers Daniel Oduber and
Gonzalo Facio are among the others said to have made
significant contributions.

At least one student of the

party has agreed that PLN meets the requirements of a
modern political party as opposed to a coalition of men
brought together solely to support one man's political
32
career.
He sees the party as having forced other Costa
Rican political parties to adopt more structured, less
personalistic approaches.
Is PLN really such a party?

The ideas expressed

in the- charter— particularly in the field of economics,

30 Much of the information given here on the
formation of the National Liberation Party came from
interviews in San JosS in the summer of 1-96? with PLN
leaders. Particularly helpful in this regard were Daniel
Oduber, Luis Alberto Monge, Jos§ Figueres, Uladislao GSmez,
Benjamin Ndftez, Gonzalo Facio and Alfonso Carro. For a
published account based largely on interviews with many
of the same people, see English, LiberaciCn Nacional.
k-8-65.
31 Fr. MJiez says that the others later claimed he
"slipped in a goal" ("met! un gol") by working so many of
his ideas on Christianity and social questions into the
Carta Fundamental. Ntttiez interview, San JosS, Aug. 11,

.

1967

, ,

32

English, Liberacifin Nacional. 146,

which was the charter's chief focus— are strikingly
similar to the personal views of Figueres as evidenced
hy his writings, ^

PLN leaders, while agreeing that the

charter conforms largely to Figueres' views, see this as
due to a consensus of views rather than Figueres'
rih,

imposition.-^

This explanation seems plausible because '

many of the charter ideas had been expressed earlier in
the literature of the Social Democratic Party with which
most PLN leaders had been affiliated,.

The question then

arises i If the leaders of the movement of National
Liberation wanted a permanent ideological party to
embody their views, why did they have to create a new
party when the Social Democratic Party already existed?
PSD had been founded in 1945, had long supported views
similar to those expressed in the PLN charter and had
courageously defended the Junta program in the 1949
Constituent Assembly against a majority sentiment favoring
a more moderate approach.
It is said that PSD's poor showing in the elections
held during the Junta period demonstrated that it would
not be a satisfactory base for a mass party.^

Thus,

the PSD ideology and membership, roughly speaking, were
33 For a-brief assessment of Figueres* political
thought, see Judy 0. Milner, "Political Thought of JosS
Figueres," South Eastern Latin Americanist. XVII, No. 1
(June 1973). 1-4.
34 . Interviews with Uladislao GSmez and Gonzalo
Facio, Aug, 1 and 8 , 1967.
35 English, LiberaciCn Nacional, 48,
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transferred to PLN which, with the charismatic Figueres
as the single new ingredient of significance, became a mass
party.

PSD died soon thereafter.

One cannot help

wondering whether PSD itself could not have made a similar
transformation if Figueres had joined it and whether the
new party was created, in part, to ensure Figueres1
control over the party from its formation.
Certainly some of PLN's opponents scoff at the idea
of the party1s ideological base and its supposed distinction
from the other personalistic parties of Costa Rica.
Otilio Ulate was of the opinion that JosS Figueres
"always was and still is the .iefe mgbcimo of National
Liberation.

Party activity has given some indication-

that Figueres had a preponderant sway over the party and
was reluctant to accept party decisions which conflicted
with

his views.

Despite occasional intraparty squables,

the party has never nominated a presidential candidate
who did not meet with Figueres* approval, and in 1970
Figueres threatened to form a separate party if PLN
failed to nominate him for a third term as president.

37

Ulate*s PUN, on the other hand, went against Ulate*s
wishes in backing Mario Echandi for president in 1970

36

Interview with Otilio Ulate, July 27, 1967,

37

English, Liberaci-Sn Nacional. ^7°
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and Ulate took no active part in the election but
continued as head of the party.
In light of these facts, can it be said that
PLN is really a permanently structured ideological party,
transcending the ista parties generally characteristic of
Costa Rica?

As far as the party’s structure is concerned,

the answer would seem to be a qualified "yes."

More than

any other mass national party in Costa Rican history—
with the possible exception of the Communist party— PLN
has attempted to maintain a permanent existence and to
function between political campaigns.

It has made a

greater effort than any other party to set up offices,
committees of supporters and contacts

with the people

in all regions of the country, rather than concentrating
its efforts in San Jos§ or, at the most, in the Meseta
Central, as others have done.
The party has been more structured than other
parties.

It draws up platforms for each political campaign

and issues statements explaining party positions.

That

"party positions" are usually synonymous with "Figueres
positions" does not detract altogether from PLN's
contribution to the development of a more coherent
political process in which voters face clearer choices
on election day,
The question remains as to whether PLN's central
feature is its support for a set of political beliefs or
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its support for Figueres,

Party activity indicates that,

in its early years, the party largely followed Figueres.
Criticism was voiced,dissident views on basic
ideological questions were expressed, ^ but in the end,
the party as a whole came down on the side of Figueres in
major disputes.
Figueres* influence now seems to be waning, however,
Zl q

and his image tarnished somewhat.

The incumbent President

of Costa Rica, Daniel Oduber of PLN, and liberacionista
congressmen declined in 1975 to support Figueres * proposal

38 In the wake of PLN's 1966 election defeat,
Luis Alberto Monge and others attempted— with some
success— to wrest part of the party control from Figueres
and his inner circle of friends during a 1967 party
convention. Monge interview, Aug, 18, 1967. For a
published account of events leading up to the convention,
see Theodore S. Creedman, "The Crisis in Costa Rican
Politics," South Eastern Latin Americanist, XI, No, k
(March 1 9 6 7 ), 1-3.
39 For example, in 1967 a group of PLN leftists
held a series of meetings in the home of Fr. Benjamin
Nflftez and eventually issued a document calling for largescale economic and social reforms in Costa Rica, The
document, named the Patio de Agua after Nfiflez* home, did
not meet with the approval of Figueres. Henry Wells,
Costa Ricai Election Factbook No. 2 SuTmlement {Washingtons
Institute for Comparative Study of Political Systems, 1970),
9 , 18.
^0 It is widely assumed in Costa Rica that
Figueres has been involved in questionable financial
arrangements with fugitive American financier Robert Vesco,
a relationship which will be briefly discussed in chapter
7.
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for constitutional amendments which would have facilitated
Figueres' plans to return to the presidency as head of
kl
an authoritarian government*
The party’s 1978
presidential candidate, furthermore, will be Luis
Alberto Monge, leader of the "Young Turks," who while
admiring Figueres personally, began about a decade ago to
oppose Figueres' control of the party.
As Figueres' influence declines, it seems more
clear that PLN meets the criteria established by one
writer for a modern, meaningful political party:

(1) the

party has a day-to-day existence, has basic units in
various parts of the country and involves relatively
large numbers of citizens in such a way as to permit

&L Figueres stated in 1975 that Costa Rica needed
"important reforms to the state apparatus” which could
best be carried out by a government which would rule
through executive decrees for several months. The consti
tution prohibited such a government and also prohibited
Figueres from standing for re-election. (The 19^9 consti
tution had originally allowed re-election of presidents
after an eight-year lapse from the time they left office;
in 1969 it was amended to prohibit all re-elections,
current ex-presidents being allowed one more term-;which Figueres had from 1970 to 197^*) Figueres proposed
an amendment in 1975 which would have permitted his
re-election and said that once in office he would propose
other legislation enabling him to create the government
he thought needed. Figueres' plans were thwarted by his
own party. President Oduber and his cabinet issued a state
ment opposing the amendment and liberacionista congressmen
followed suit. See an Oct. 2 9 , 1975 ACAn report published
in FBIS, Latin American Daily Re-port. Oct. 30, 1975; and an
ACAN report of Nov. 21, 1975» published by FBIS on Nov. 2 5 ,
1975.
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some input into decision-making on the part of the rank
and files (2) the party stands for a particular program
or ideology; and (3) the party usually will represent
well-defined interest groups within the community.
Several factors— among them, a scandal which
surfaced as recently as May, 197?— threaten the party's
Il-\
future. ^ However, if party leadership is indeed going
to be more widespread, as now appears likely, and if the
party continues to exist and adhere to its stated beliefs,
then it seems reasonable to judge PLN as a qualified
success in having broken away from Costa Rica's strong
pattern of personalistic parties to offer the country a
modern political party based more on loyalty to ideas
than loyalty to men.

The Election of 1953

The 1953 election gave Costa Rica's new political

^2 Robert J. Alexander, Latin American Politics
and Government (New York: Harper and Row, 1 9 6 5 ), ^6-47.
Alexander believes that PLN meets these criteria. Among
other writers who have made a similar assessment of PLN
or its predecessor, the Social Democratic Party, are
Federico Gil, "Responsible Parties in Latin America,"
Journal of Politics. XV, No, 3 (Aug. 1953), 339; Kantor,
Costa Rican Election of 1953. 4-1; and English, LiberaciSn
Nacional. 1 4 6 .
~
43

See chapter 7 ,
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party its first chance to prove itself.
an important one for several reasons.

The election wa3
This was the first

presidential, election since the revolution, which had cut
short some political careers, launched others and caused
major political realignments.

Also, in accordance with

the 1949 constitution, women were voting for the first
time and Costa Rica had the largest number of registered
voters in national history.

This was also the first

election since the promulgation of the new constitution
which required impartiality on the part of the president
and Costa Ricans were waiting to see whether that
regulation would be followed.

Finally, the most significant

aspect of the election, although this was not generally
recognized at the time, was the entrance of the National
Liberation Party into Costa Rican politics.
In the usual Costa Rican tradition, campaigning
began early— about January, 1952— despite Ulate's plea
in May, 1951 that electoral activity be postponed for a year
so that the government could continue its work without
having to contend with political agitations.^

Chief

candidates, other than Figueres, were Mario Echandi, Ulate's
foreign minister who resigned his cabinet post to run on

44 El Diario, May 13$ 1951. After Ulate's remarks,
32 of the 45 congressional deputies voted to agree that no
political activities would take place for a year, El Diario.
May 1 6 , 1951* However, political activities resumed early the
next year and, in late January, 1952, Echandi resigned as
foreign minister in order to begin his campaign, El Diario.
Feb, 1, 1952*
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the PUN ticket and the Democratic Party candidate,
Fernando Castro Cervantes, a wealthy businessman who had
been one of the three chief candidates at the 1947 Opposition
convention which nominated Ulate as president.

Echandi

eventually withdrew and gave his support to Castro so
that the two could present a united front against
k<
Figueres. J
From the beginning, Figueres and the PLN dominated
the campaign.

Figueres was a tireless and effective

campaigner and the PLN's superior organization and larger
resources proved a great asset.

For example, there were

65 cantones— very roughly equivalent to counties— in the

country, and PLN had 168 offices, or almost three for each
can-tSn.

Other parties did not significantly vary from

the traditional pattern of concentrating their efforts
in the chief towns of the Meseta Central,

The Democratic

Party had something of a nationwide organization but not a
very effective one.
In addition, PLN was the only party to put forth a
detailed party platform, one based largely on the goals
outlined by the Junta and the PLN charter,

Echandi also

45
December, 1952 it was announced that Castro
and Echandi would join forces in an effort to defeat Figueres.
After some maneuvering, Castro emerged as the presidential
candidate for the newly-united forces. The two parties
continued to offer competing slates of candidates for
other offices, El Diario. Dec. 25» 1952.
46 Kantor, Costa Rican Election of 1953. 39.

had a program, somewhat less detailed; "but the Democratic
Party, in the old personalistic tradition, offered little
more than its candidate.

Despite the existence of a PLN

program which could be attacked or defended, much of the
contest centered around other issues.

Castro reminded

voters of Figueres' connections with the Caribbean Legion
and warned that Costa Rica might be dragged into foreign
conflicts.

He also implied that Figueres had Communist

leanings, to which PLN supporters responded by pointing
to the fact that the Communists themselves were backing
Castro.

This was correct, because Mora— and CalderSn

Guardia as well— cast their support to Fernando Castro
in an effort to defeat the man who had launched the 1948
L'p

revolution. f

The portrayal of the elderly Castro, a

prominent figure in the prerevolutionary Opposition
movement and sometime representative of the United Fruit
Company, as a "caldero-comunista" then became a feature
of the PLN campaign.

Stressing Castro's connection with

CalderSn, full-page advertisements in El Diario de Costa
Rica showed pictures of soldiers and strife during the
CalderSn days and said:

47 Calderon's Independent National Republican
Party ran candidates for congress, but both Mora and
Calderon backed Castro in the presidential race. Alexander,
Communism, 390. Calderon was still in self-imposed exile
but directed his party from abroad.

Do you remember?
The Castroites want Costa Rica to return to the
days of Calder 6n.'
^
Don't permit it, citizen.' They are the same.
The campaign was clouded by several bizarre
incidents.

In one of these, a small party called the

Revolutionary Civic Union (UCR) complained in September,
1952 that two of its members had been beaten by Civil
Guardsmen after they had a fracas with a colonel.

Ulate

ordered the Guard to investigate when he heard of the
incident, but UCR asked that congress open its own
investigation.

In a surprise move, congress voted to

initiate such an investigation without waiting for the
completion of the military report.

Ulate then announced

thatr he regarded the congressional action as an insult,
and he resigned the Presidency of Costa Rica, saying he
would not resume office until congress reported that he
9

was cleared of all charges.

Ulate’s resignation, as he

probably anticipated, brought a groundswell of support for
him.

Congress declared that Ulate had proceeded with

"absolute correctness" in the matter and asked him "in the
most respectful but the most vehement fashion" to resume
office.^

Ulate then returned to his post and proceeded to

fire culpable military officials.

4-8 El Diario, Feb. 15, 1953.
4-9 For an account of the major events of the
episode, see El Diario of Sept, 26 , 27 and 30 and Oct. 1.
7, 8, l4 and T9,” I93"2.
50 Ibid.. Oct, 8, 1952.
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Since no wrongdoing on his part had ever been
suggested, some viewed Ulate's reaction as intemperate,
one of wounded pride rather than reflection,^1

One

member of his government, however, said that Ulate regarded
the congressional action as an attempt to preempt executive
prerogatives and was serious in saying he would not resume
office unless congressional findings supported his
position,
Ulate figured prominently in the campaign only in
connection with a plebiscite to be voted concurrently
with the election.

In a move apparently designed to allow

Ulate to stand for office at the end of the next term,
Ulate's supporters secured congressional approval for
a plebiscite which urged the next congress to amend the
constitution to allow an ex-president to stand for reelection after only four years out of office instead of

51

Interview with Carlos Melendez, San JosS,

June 1, 197^.

52 Interview with Ema Gamboa, San Jos§, June 1,
197^* Ur. Gamboa, a prominent figure in the prerevolutionary
Opposition activities, served in the Education Ministry
during the Ulate administration and was briefly acting
minister of education.

18?
the eight years required by the 1 9 ^9 constitution.-^
For different reasons, neither Ulate nor Figueres
wanted to comment on the plebiscite.
favored it but he said nothing.

Ulate presumably

Figueres opposed the

plebiscite and, on at least one occasion, was reported
to have spoken against it;-'

but, mindful of Ulate1s

popularity at the time, Figueres generally remained silent,
Ulate also maintained silence on another election
matter which centered around charges brought by Echandi
and Castro who claimed that the director of the Civil
Registry and other Civil Registry officials were biased in
favor of Figueres. ^

The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE),

which had authority over the Civil and Electoral Registries,
investigated the matter and cleared the officials in

53 Despite a vigorous effort by PSD to defeat the
measure, the 19^9-1953 congress had voted in favor of the
amendment but the constitution required that, a second
favorable vote be given by the next congress. El Diario,
Mar. 27, 1953* The plebiscite was not binding on the new
congress; it served only to express-the will of the people.
The plebiscite was approved in the.general election but the
incoming congress ignored the plebiscite and made no change
in the constitution. An amendment in 19^9 prohibited any
re-election, living ex-presidents at: that time being allowed
one more term.
..
. -■
5^

El Diario. March 6 , 1953.

55 El Diario devoted considerable attention to the
matter. See the issues of Nov. 13, 18, 20 and 22; Dec. 2,
k, 10, 12, 16, 17, 20, and 23, 1952; Feb. 7, Mar. 4- and 5,
1953.
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question.

Castro and Echandi, however, were never convinced,

and it is possible that their concerns were justified.
According to one account of what might be a related
incident, another TSE investigation two years later
revealed that several Civil Registry officials had accepted
bribes from PLN supporters during the 1953 election,-^
Whatever the truth of the charges, it seems inconceivable
that they could have determined the outcome of the
presidential race.
It could be argued that Ulate should have personally
seen to the investigation of the matter of the Civil
Registry charges, but the constitution and electoral code
required the president to remain neutral in the election
and Ulate went to great lengths to avoid any appearance
of "meddling” in the electoral process.

Although it was

assumed that he favored PUN candidate Echandi, the
administration did not publicly back Echandi and the
press was told that the government had no candidate, ^
Echandi resigned from the cabinet as soon as his candidacy
became clear, possibly because of Ulate's desire to avoid
any appearance of the sort of "official" candidacies
he had denounced in the CalderSn years.

which

Ulate went so far

as to announce that any public employee who expressed his

56 John D. Martz, Central America t The Crisis and
the Challenge (Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina
Press, 1959), 2

57

New York Times, March 19# 1952.
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personal support for a candidate would be instantly
dismissed.
Given the constitutional provisions, Ulate’s
actions were probably proper but they had the effect of
placing government employees in an even stiffer straight
jacket than that created by the U.S. Hatch Act.

Not

everyone agreed with the wisdom of the constitutional
provisions.

Jos5 Figueres, as president during the

1 9 5 7 -5 8 campaign, took the position that the restrictions

were outmoded and, in a March, 1957 radio speech, said
he felt that he had a right to support the PLN ticket as
long as he remained impartial with regards to the actual
conduct of the election.

However, the Supreme

Electoral Tribunal, acting on. a complaint brought by PLN’s
opposition, ruled that Figueres had to abide by the legal
provisions which prohibited a president from showing a
preference for either party.

In a second radio speech,

Figueres accepted the Tribunal's verdict as binding on his
activities but said that he was still of the opinion that
the time had come to "abandon the myth of presidential
neutrality, " ^ 0

No one would have been less inclined to

agree with Figueres on this point than Ulate who, since

58 El Diario. March 19, 1952.
59 JosS Figueres, Los deberes de mi destino (San
JosS* Imprenta Vargas, 1957)» 13-15» 21.
60
JosS Figueres, La imparcialidad del nresidentet
(San Jos'S j Imprenta Nacional, '±95^)> 3* 1 9 .
"
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the days of his opposition to CalderCn’s involvement
in political races, believed in the wisdom of limitations
on executive involvement.
In addition to maintaining an impartial role,
Ulate tried to prevent violence.

After a fight between

political groups in Alajuela, he prohibited the carrying
of firearms until after the election, establishing a
minimum six-months* jail sentence for violations.

61

Regulations governing mass meetings required that no two
parties could hold a rally in the same town on the same
day and also required that liquor stores and the offices
of opposing political parties be closed while a mass meeting
was underway.

Police protection was provided and, in one

extreme case, police completely surrounded a meeting of
Communists in a park, thus allowing the Communists to
hold their public meeting without interference from hecklers
outside the police cordon,

62

In

his last annual message

to congress, Ulate expressed his satisfaction with the
government's role in the conduct of the campaign:
,..this has been the first time in many years
that, with scarcely three months le£t.-:before
the election, of a president, no authority has
fired a short at anyone, nor beaten, nor jailed,
nor harrassed— in any form, not even by verbal
explotion— any citizen, for political reasons
.
or any other reasons, in any part of the territory,
5l
62
63

New York Times. Sep, 23, 1952.
Kantor, Costa Rican Election of 1953. 57*
Ulate, 1953 Mensa.ie. 3 ,
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In-'bhe election,

held in July, 1953 > pLN

won a landslide victory, receiving about two-thirds
of the vote in both the presidential and congressional
64
races.
The plebiscite was also approved by a wide
margin but the incoming PLN-dominated congress exercised
its prerogative to ignore the plebiscite and the
constitution remained unchanged.
Most Costa Ricans regard 1948 as the great turning
point in their country's recent history, a date marking
their entrance into a new national era.

Sociologist

Eugenio Rodriguez Vega’s statement typifies this view:
"When the first shot was fired in 1948, traditional
65
Costa Rica was dead." J
Yet in many ways 1953 spelled
the end of an era in Costa Rica

more than 1948 had.

After the revolution of 1948, Figueres and his followers
took power by force and

enacted a programby fiat.

Until

the people had a chanceto speak, it was not clear whether
they would choose to continue along this path— so different
from that taken by Costa Rica in the past— or whether the
Junta period would remain as a high-water mark of radical
reform and the country would return to its traditional
ways.

The two elections held during the Junta's term, in

fact, seemed to indicate that the electorate had repudiated
the Junta program— the party representing the Junta's views
§5 Eugenio Rodriguez Vega, Ammtes nara una
sociologla costarricense (San JosS: Editorial Universitaria,
1953)» 76.
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received only a small minority of the vote, while Ulate's
National Union Party, representing traditional values,
was overwhelmingly endorsed.
Four years after leaving office, however, Figueres
and his colleagues were returned to power in a democratic
election by a margin suffiently wide to indicate to■them
that Costa Rica had voted a mandate for change, a green
light for the continuation of the program begun under the
Junta,

In the interval between November, 19^9 and

November 1953» Figueres and his political associates had
developed a political party which claimed to offer the
country a new program of development and a new concept of
the role of the state.

At the very least, the party had

demonstrated that it offered a new style of politics and
one which traditional forces had been unable to contain.
Figueres' plans— both for his own career and for the
country— had been clear from the moment he turned power
over to Ulate, yet nothing had stopped him,

Costa Rica's

traditional system, acting through a popular president
and a FUN-dominated congress had neither undone the Junta
legislation nor developed a political force capable of
meeting the challenge which Hgieres and the Junta had
presented.

CHAPTER VII
EPILOGUE
Neither Ulate's personal political strength
nor that of his National Union Party— the only major
party representing the values and goals of the traditional
system— was ever as great after 1953 as it had been
during Ulate's administration.

The changes in the

Costa Rican political system were not fully apparent,
however, until the presidential race of 1962.
In the years between 1953 and 1962, Ulate led an
active life.

He resumed the publication of El. Diario,

which continued to be a major interest all his life.^"

In

the years before he became involved in politics, Ulate
had regarded his watchdog role as a journalist as his

1 Although Ulate never lost interest in El Diario,
he did not maintain control of the paper during all of the
period after his presidency. The paper ran into financial
difficulties and was sold to others. Ulate then repurchas
ed the paper and resumed publication as soon as he could
raise a sufficient amount of money. Ulate's friends and
family believe that he was publisher of El Diario from the
time he purchased it in about 1936 until his presidency.
He resumed publication of the paper after leaving office
and seems to have had control of El Diario from about 19^9
to 1963 and again from 196? to 19^9^ A number of his
associates and other Costa Ricans have remarked on the
difference between Ulate's orderly handling of public funds
while he was president and his poor handling of his own
business enterprises. Ulate apparently did well what he
considered most important.
193
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chief contribution to the country and, he took up his role
again in his post-presidential years.
Freedom of the press was also one of the regional
issues which interested him, and Ulate was active in the
Inter-American Press Association, being elected Vice
Chairman in 1955*

2

Although he had little interest in

the politics of foreign countries, Ulate was concerned
about regional cooperation efforts which were nonpolitical
in nature, and he contributed his support to a number of
Central American development projects.

He was said to be

the prime mover behind a proposed Central American
Development Bank which the World Bank decided to back
in I960.''

in that same year, the Organization of Central

American States adopted the so-called Plan Ulate, a
proposal for a Central American Cattle Federation to
stimulate and improve livestock production in the
4
region.
However, as a leading Costa Rican said, Ulate was

2 New Xork Times, Nov. 6, 1955* Ulate, however,
later had a disagreement with the Inter-American Press
Association over the question of which countries should, be
listed as lacking in a free press and he may have withdrawn
his membership, at least temporarily. Ibid.. Apr. 2, 1957*
3

Hispanic American Report, XIII, No.7 (Sept. i 9 6 0 ).

4

Ibid., XIII, No. 2 (Apr. i 9 6 0 ).
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"a thoroughly political animal,"-* and Costa Rican
politics remained his chief interest.

He was the

undisputed leader of the National Union Party until
his death and, despite the party's declining strength,
it played a significant role when it acted in concert
with Calderon Guardia’s National Republican Party.
Only in the context of the shifting sands of
Costa Rican politics can a union of PUN and PRN be
understood.

The two parties and their chiefs had been

mortal enemies in 194-8 yet they gradually pulled together
out of a desire to defeat FLN which emerged as Costa
Rica’s major political force after 1953*

In addition

to the desire for power, Ulate had other reasons for
wanting to defeat FIN.

He had a bitter split with Jos&

Figueres in 1955 during the invasion of Costa Rica from
Nicaragua, the second such invasion precipitated by the

5 Interview with Alberto Mart£n, San Jos4,
June 5, 1974.
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Figueres-Somoza dispute.^
the very nature of FLN.

Ulate furthermore disliked

As we have seen, he believed that

parties claiming to be ideologically-based tended to be
doctrinaire, intransigent and foreign to the give-and-take
of Costa Rican politics.

Although Costa Rica’s establish

ment had once regarded Calderon's social reform as a threat,
Calderon's political style did not vary greatly from that
of Ulate.

Both were personalistic leaders who made no

attempt to transform their parties into modern mass parties
of the FLN variety.

In fact, it could be speculated that

6 In April, 1954, an attempt was made to assas
sinate Anastasio Somoza and Somoza charged that the plot
had been planned in Costa Rica. Costa Rica was slow to
answer the charge and, in the opinion of John Martz,
"the attempted assassination of General Somoza, which
quite rightfully enraged him, was clearly engineered .
from Costa Rica...It is remotely possible that President
Figueres did not know of the attempt personally, although
this is quite unlikely. There is no question that members
of his government and many high-ranking figueristas were
well aware of the plot.”
Somoza responded by permitting CalderSn to use
Nicaraguan soil to launch an invasion of Costa Rica in
Jan., 1955* During the invasion, Figueres clamped
censorship on the Costa Rican press and strongly criticized
Ulate who had offered to mediate in the dispute and whose
critical views of Figueres' support for Caribbean
revolutionaries were well known. According to Ulate,
Figueres in one radio speech, went so far as to denounce
"cowards and traitors" in the Costa Rican press who he
said had "syncronized" their verbal attack on the govern
ment with the invasion. See John Martz, Central America:
The Crisis and the Challenge (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1959), 185-196, especially 191-192;
Marvin Alisky, "The Mass Media in Central America,"
Journalism Quarterly. XXXII (Fall*1955), 481. For Ulate's
views and a reprint of portions of Figueres1 radio speech,
see Otilio Ulate, Hacia donde Leva a Costa Rica el Senor
Presidente Jos§ Figueres? (San Jos4; Imprenta Universal:
1955;, 9-10.
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Calderon's ouster in 19^8 was largely due to his failure
to create such a powerful movement in support of his
reform program.
PUN and FRN first hacked the same candidate in
1958 when Calderon, who was still in self-imposed exile,
gave informal support to PUN nominee Mario Echandi in
his successful hid for the presidency.

7

Despite the

combined efforts of PUN and PRN, Echandi probably could
not have been elected but for a split in the PLN ranks.
A number of liberacionistas were dissatisfied with the
choice of Francisco Orlich, Figueres' boyhood friend and
Public Works Minister during the Junta and Figueres
administrations, as the PLN presidential candidate.
Four of Figueres' cabinet ministers resigned after
Figueres expressed open support for Orlich, an action
Q

which some regarded as- a violation of the constitution.
Led by Jorge Rossi, they created the Independent

7 John Martz. "Costa Rican Electoral Trends,
1953-1966," Western Political Science Quarterly. XX,
(Dec., 1 9 6 7 ), 891. During the same election, Ulate was
elected to congress, but as we have seen, he took
virtually no part in congressional activities.
8 Hisuanic American Report, X, No. 3 (April 1957)*
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal later ruled that it was
unconstitutional for Figueres to support a candidate.
See chapter 6 .
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Party and chose Rossi as their presidential candidate.
When the final vote was tallied, Echandi had won with
102,8^1 votes, while Orlich received 94,783 and Rossi,
9

23»910.

It is logical to suppose that most of the vote

cast for Rossi, who soon rejoined PLN, would have
otherwise gone to Orlich and made him the winner.
The election revealed several voting patterns which
have, to a large extent, held in subsequent elections.^
First*despite the presence of several parties in the
race, it was basically a two-party contest— one of PLN
versus anti-PLN forces.

Echandi’s victory was possible

only because of the combined efforts of PUN and PRN.
The outcome of the election also demonstrated that PLN
had a solid base of support in rural areas, while a
significantly higher percentage of urban Costa Ricans,
both wealthy and poor, rejected PLN.

The coastal provinces

of Limfin and Puntarenas, both of them heavily rural, were
an exception to the pattern of rural identification with
PLN.

Banana workers in these regions, who had developed

a loyalty to CalderSn and his PRN in the early 194-0’s,

9

Ibid.. XI, No. 2 (March 1958),

10 For discussions of voting patterns in Costa Rica
since 1958* see Martz, "Electoral Trends , ' 1 69-79. Burt. H.
English, Liberaci-Sn Nacional in Costa Rica (Gainesville 1
University of Florida ^ress), 92-117; Henry Wells, Costa
Ricat Election Factbook Number 2, Sutyplement. February 1.
1970 (Washington; institute for Comparative Study of
Political Systems, 1970), Charles F, Denton, Patterns of
Costa Rican Politics. Allyn and Bacon Series in Latin
American Politics (Boston, 1971), 6 9 -7 9 .
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continued to be a source of support for PRN long after the
revolution.
While PIN tended to win its support from poorer,
less well-educated voters, the rural-urban split was
probably a more definite pattern than the class division,
as demonstrated by the relatively high percentage or
urban poor who voted against FLN.^1

PLN's rural strength

is explained by the fact that Costa Rica's traditional
political system had largely ignored the countryside at
election time and PLN, the "new" party, had capitalized,
on this fact by bidding for and receiving the rural
vote.

In 1958 PLN, which conducted a generally more

active campaign than did any other party, was the only
party to devote a significant amount of attention to the
countryside.

PUN tended to confine its campaign efforts

to the cities of the Meseta Central.

This campaign

pattern changed somewhat in later years as the lessons
of the new political era sank: in on traditional political
figures, forcing them to adopt some of PLN's highprofile campaign techniques in order to compete,
11 Denton believes that, due to the preponderant
role of PLN in Costa Rican politics since 1953» PLN is
identified as "the system." Urban poor, who have higher
expectations than rural poor, tend to react to the system's
failure to meet their demands by voting against PLN.
Denton, Patterns. 79.

200
Ulate, however, was not fully aware of the extent
to which the political scene had altered since the 194-0*s.
He was held in high esteem "because of his honest,
democratic government and he mistook this high personal
regard for continued widespread political influence.

Thus

in 1962 as soon as he was eligible to stand for re-election,
Ulate entered a three-way race for the presidency.

His

opponents were Orlich, who again received the PLN nod,
and Calderon, who had returned to Costa Rica and was
nominated by PRN.

Ulate, whose political style had

changed little over the years, offered no detailed program
and made few campaign promises.

He campaigned largely

on his record as president, emphasizing the economic
recovery of the period.

Because of the antagonism between

Calderfin forces and.those of Figueres' close friend,
Francisco Orlich, Ulate also tried to present himself as
an alternative to the strife between the two groups which
he said would be renewed if either Calder-Sn or Orlich
were elected.

12

Ulate's lackluster campaign was a j&ilure, as shown
by the vote.

With the Ulate and Calder-Cn forces working

against each other this time, Orlich won easily with
50.3# of the vote, while CalderCn received 35»3f° and

12

New York Times. Feb, 4-, 1 9 6 2 .
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Ulate trailed with a dismal 13.5%
Ulate was very disturbed by the size of his
defeat.

Criticism of his control was voiced within PUN

after the election, and one group which tried to wrest
power from Ulate was expelled from the party.

A more

important defection was that of Echandi who left the
party to form his own Authentic Union Republican Party
(PURA).1^

PURA generally shared PUN's position and

sometimes operated in conjunction with PUN but at times
took a separate course.
The outcome of the 1962 race made it clear that
PUN— which in 1949 had won 33 of 45 congressional seats—
would never again be a majority party.

Ulate thus

weighed the alternatives and decided to try to effect
a more stable coalition with PRN.

Ulate's concept of

Costa Rican democracy as representative, rather than
direct, made such an alliance acceptable.

In Ulate's view,

the important objective was to elect a good man who would
then represent all Costa Ricans, regardless of party
label.

Party affiliations and structure were thus

relatively unimportant to Ulate and he was willing to
work out almost any sort of ad hoc arrangement needed.

13 Martz,"Electoral Trends," 891. A minor
candidate received the remaining 1% of the vote.
14

Wells, "1970 Election," 23.
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Observers generally agree that Ulate was the
major force behind the creation of UnificaciSn Nacional
in 1 9 6 5 Unificaci5n was not originally designed to be
a new political party but only an agreement between PUN
and PRN to field common candidates for the 1966 election.
The initial statement announcing the formation of
Unificaci5n explained that "the coalition is temporary
with the object of winning the current political campaign.
In it each party will retain its own personnel and
16
organization."
A statement of principles was drawn up
which emphasized economic development and Costa Rica's
determination to avoid interference in other nations'
affairs and said that the organization's social policies
would be guided, to a certain extent, by papal encyclicals.
While thus endorsing CalderSn's views on social questions-and Ulate's on other matters— the declaration said little
about specific plans for further social reform, although

15 This was the opinion expressed by historian
Carlos MelSndez, as well as PUN leader Jorge Yega and
Ulate's sometime political associate Mario Echandi, in
interviews in San Josl in June, 197^ •
Dr. Yega acted as Ulate's representative in meeting
with Rafael Galder5n’s brother Francisco during the forma
tion of Unificaci5n Nacional. For an interesting account
of those events, see Dr. Vega's A la sombra del caduceo
(San JosSj Imprenta Lehmann, 1972), 95-110.
16

Vega, A la sombra, 9 8 .
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the statement did endorse "better paid and more productive
work.

17

The social reform measures of the Calderfin years

were, in any event, no longer a source of disagreement.
PLN had moved the center of controversy further to the
left and Calderon's reforms began to seem moderate.

They

had become a Costa Rican tradition and one in which Ulate
had esqpressed pride, although seldom discussing their
. . 18
origin.
PRN held the upper hand in the negotiations to
form the coalition because of its greater numerical
strength.

PUN's permanent followers were few in number.

At the time of its founding in_the early 19^0's, the
party was known as a "partido del sof&»"'a jest to the
effect that its members could sit on one sofa. 19 in later
years, of course, the party's numbers grew but, perhaps
due to the highly personalistic nature of PUN, it never
had a large permanent dependable folowing.

In each

election, PUN's vote came from widely varying elements

20

17 Statement of principles of UnificacitSn Nacional
in Otilio Ulate Papers.
18 See, for example, Otilio Ulate, "Nuevo Plan
Marshall y nueva politica intemacional americana,"
AmSrica, LVI (Jan.-June, 1958), 9-10.
19

Interview with Carlos Mel-Sndez, June 5»

20

English, LiberaciSn Nacional, 11^.

20*1-

whose loyalty and support could not he guaranteed for
the next election.

Such a party was ■cypical of the

Costa Rican political scene in the days before the
revolution, hut it was increasingly out of step with the
times in the post-revolutionary period.

PLN, which

more clearly represented the interests of certain groups
in society, had a more stable support base.

Even PRN

could count on a large working class vote because of
Calderon's association with social reform and the
continuing loyalty of this group for him.
In choosing candidates for the 1966 election, PUN
thus recognized PRN's greater strength in the coalition.
Putting the best face on the situation, one PUN leader
referred to UnificaciOn as a union of "cabeza y cuerpo—
head and body."

PUN was said to bring to the coalition

the elite of Costa Rica and PRN, the masses.

pi

Because

cuerpo carried more weight than cabeza at the polls, it
was agreed that the presidential candidate for the
coalition would be a calderonista. the first vice
president an ulatista and the second vice president a man
-

chosen by general agreement.

22

The man eventually selected as presidential
candidate— perhaps the only sort of person who could have

21

Vega interview.

22 Statement on the formation of UnificaciSn
Nacional, May 2 0 , 19&5* Otilio Ulate Papers,

205
been chosen for such a union— was Jos€ Joaquin Trejos
FernSndez, an unknown mathematics professor whose
previous association with politics had gone no further
than his personal support for CalderCn.^

UnificaciSn,

however, managed to neutralize the disadvantage of
Trejos* total lack of experience by emphasizing a "clean
hands" theme during the campaign.
The PLN candidate, chosen only after Figueres
strongly indicated his personal preference, was Daniel
oh.
Oduber, from the PLN moderate left wing.
At first,

23 The process by which Trejos was selected
indicates the highly personalistic nature of UnificaciSn,
Jorge Vega says that his wife suggested the name of
Trejos one night after Ulate had rejected all of the
calderonista candidates put forth by Francisco CalderCn.
Vega acknowledges that Trejos was a political unknown
and that he had some difficulty in persuading Ulate and
Calderon to go along. Vega says that "the task of
convincing don Otilio Ulate was not easy" but that
Ulate finally agreed, sv/ayed in part by the fact that
Trejos FernSndez was "the son of a great and loyal
ulatista, don Juan Trejos, the guarantee of good
quality."
Vega then went to confer with Francisco Calder6n
and found .that "the surprise of Paco [Francisco CalderSn]
was great. No one had thought of [Trejos] in any of the
discussions," but CalderSn eventually agreed to accept
Trejos. Vega, A la sombra. 102. Dr, Vega himself was
chosen as UnificaciSn's candidate for first vice
president.
Zhf Theodore Creedman, "The Crisis in Costa
Rican Politics," South Eastern Latin Americanist. XI, No,
h> (March 19&7) » 2.
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Oduber seemed to be a heavy favorite, but a number of
factors— the most telling was possibly FLN's clumsy
handling of UnificacLCn*s charge that Oduber had communist
leanings— turned the tide in favor of Trejos.2^

The

UnificaciSn candidate eked out a victory based on a
margin of less than one percent between himself and
Oduber.
The 1966 election was the last in which either
Ulate or PUN played an active role.

The "temporary"

■UnificaciSn continued to exist and some new small parties
were brought into the coalition,,

After much maneuvering,

Mario Echandi emerged as Unificaci<6n*s presidential
candidate in 1970, but Ulate refused to back Echandi,
25 PLN had been slow to respond to UnificaciCn
charges against Oduber and also slow to repudiate the
public support which communist leader Manuel Mora offered
to Oduber late in the campaign, Jos£ Figueres later noted
that "three kiss of death speeches" by Mora were a factor
in the defeat of Oduber, Figueres, "Memorandum Provisional
antes de que el Partido LiberaciCn Nacional haya tenido
tiempo de analizar el proceso electoral que culminC el 6
de febrero de 1 9 6 6 ," Partido LiberaciCn Nacional Papers.
26 From all accounts, Ulate bore Echandi no ill
will because of the separation of PURA from PUN but he
resented Echandifs efforts to go over his head in gaining
support of PUN leaders for the 1970 campaign, A sort of
PUN "rump assembly" had endorsed Echandi in 1 969 but Ulate,
according to a San JosS Radio Reloj broadcast on April 17,
1 9 6 9 , dismissed the idea of PUNfs endorsing Echandi as
"another of Mario Echandi*s pranks." The broadcast is
published in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Latin
American Daily Report, April 18, 1 9 6 9 ,

After failing at various attempts to find a compromise
candidate, Ulate withdrew PUN from the coalition and
even indicated that he would consider accepting a PUN
nomination himself, although he was then quite elderly. ^
Many individual PUN members, however, wanted to support
Echandi who held political beliefs similar to theirs
and who seemed to have a chance of winning.

Thus it

was decided that the party simply would not nominate
anyone for president, leaving each member free to
support whom he chose.

With Ulate offering no support

and with CalderCn ill and unable to campaign extensively,
Echandi lost the election to JosS Figueres, who began
serving his third presidential term in 1 9 7 0 .
Ulate continued to serve as president of PUN
and in 1973 he made another attempt to unite the
opposition in time for the 197^ elections.

However,

Calderdn Guardia had died soon after the 1970 election
and a unified opposition could not be brought

27 La Prensa Libre. Aug. 20, 19^1, as published
in FBIS, Latin American Daily Report. Sept. 12, 19^9.
28

Henry Wells, Election Factbook. 12.
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together.
While his political influence was declining,
Ulate continued to take his watchdog role seriously.
During his last year he was particularly concerned about
the fugitive American financier Robert .Vesco, who came
to Costa Rica during Jos£ Figueres' 1970-197^ term.
Ulate was deeply offended by Figueres' making Vesco
welcome in Costa Rica while an SEC investigation of
Vesco*s alleged fraudulent manipulations of mutual funds
was underway in the United States.

Vesco, who also

had been indicted in the United States in connection with
an illegal $200,000 cash contribution to Fresident Nixon’s
campaign fund, soon invested heavily in Costa Rican
enterprises, including several in which Figueres had an

29 Papers in his files indicate Ulate's attempts
to reunite the opposition. See also a dispatch of the"
Mexican news service INF0RMEX, July 25» 1973. reported in
FBIS, Latin American^Dpilv Report. July 2 6 , 1973^
In February 1974, a few months after Ulate's
death, Daniel Oduber, who had again been nominated by
PLN, was elected president. His election marked the first
time since 1 9 ^ that an incumbent party had not been
turned out of office by the Costa Rican electorate. The
reversal of Costa Rica's thirty year pattern of
alternation in office suggests that PLN had greatly
consolidated its power. With the longtime leaders of
PUN and PRN, Ulate and CalderSn, no longer living, the
future of the opposition movement seems in question.
30

See Christian Science Monitor. May 2k, 1973*
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interest,

Figueres admitted to having financial

transactions with Vesco and even to allowing Vesco money
to pass through his personal New York bank accounts, but
he denied that he had done anything illegal.-^2

A

number of Figueres' closest associates put distance
between themselves and the president on this matter.
Costa Rica's First Vice President Aguilar Bonilla, for
example, released a statement expressing his "complete
disagreement" with The president's relationship with
Vesco,33
Ulate did not believe Figueres' protestations
of innocence, but even if he had, Ulate would have
disapproved of the association with Vesco because of his
belief that the president should avoid even the appearance
of questionable activities.

During the spring and

summer of 1973 Ulate's criticism mounted. In May he told

31 In 1972 Vesco invested two million dollars in
a Costa Rican company controlled by Figueres, He later
was reported by the New York Times. May 30, 1973* to
have invested some millions in a company headed by
Figueres' son, Newsweek reported on Dec. 30, 197^ that
Vesco*s Costa Rican investments had grown to $^8 million.
See also the Wall Street Journal, Nov. 12, 197^.
32

Christian Science Monitor. May Zk, 1973.

33 Augilar Bonilla's statement was reported by
the Spanish news service EFE on July 28, 1973 and
published in FBIS, Latin American Daily Report. Aug. 2,
1973.
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a press conference that Vesco had left "our
sovereignty in tatters," and said that if he were
president, "Vesco would be deported immediately."

At

the same time, he wrote President Nixon a letter asking
for all available U.S, documentation that might involve
Costa Rica in the Watergate scandal as a result of
Vesco's dealings.

Then, m

July, denouncing the

Figueres-Vesco relationship in a radio speech, he
announced that he was "launching his last battle" against
Vesco's influence in Costa Rica,
Ulate was especially disturbed about Vesco's
influence in the Costa Rican m e d i a . F i g u e r e s was
planning to found a newspaper, Excelsior■ and it was
widely believed that the paper would be funded by Vesco,
37
although Figueres denied the rumor. Ulate thought that
Excelsior would be accorded special privileges and,
because of its strong financial position, might be able

3^

New York Times, May 2 6 , 1973*

35 Text of Ulate radio speech, dated July S,
1973* Otilio Ulate Papers.
36 Ibid. Newsweek reported on Dec. 30, 197^
that Vesco owned or controlled at least one Costa Rican
television station and a number of radio stations.
37 La NaciCn. June 15» 19731 as published in
FBIS, Latin American Daily Report, June 21, 1973*
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to drive other newspapers out of* business.

He thus

viewed the planned opening of Excelsior as tantamount to
an attempt to create an official press.

In his radio

address Ulate cited evidence of Yesco's connection with
the newspaper and reminded Costa Ricans of the importance
of preserving an independent press.
During the last few months of his life, Ulate
tried to gain an audience both in Costa Rica and in the
United States to protest Vesco.*s presence,

A considerable

amount of criticism did eventually surface in Costa Rica,
but the protests were largely unheeded while Figueres
remained in office.

The Costa Rican courts turned down
"30

a U,S, request for Vesco*s extradition in June 1973*
At the time of Ulate's death, on October 27» 1973,

38 In his radio speech Ulate made much of the
fact that the director of the planned Figueres paper,
Luis Burstln, had recently produced ten million colones
for the enterprise, whereas shortly before that time
Burstln had had to apply for a bank loan when he needed
some three million colones to open a tortilla factory,
Otilio Ulate Papers.
39 AFP, June 1 6 , 1973» published in FBIS, Latin
American Daily Report. June 18, 1973*
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Vesco's position in Costa Rica seemed secure. ^ 0
Ulate's last years, after the disillusioning
electoral defeat of 1 9 6 2 , must have been rather sad ones.
Just as his personal influence was ebbing, so the political
system to which he was accustomed, and for which he was
best suited, was also fading away.

40 Vesco is still in Costa Rica, but his tenure
appears less secure since Figueres' term ended in 1974,
The so-called "Vesco Law"— a law passed during Figueres'
administration which stipulated requirements making
extradition more difficult- bas been repealed. Further
more , a number of Figueres’ own party members have
criticized Vesco's continued presence. These complaints
within PLN became particularly pronounced in May, 1977
after the publication in. the New'R'enubllc~"of ■an interview
with Jos£ Figueres in which he said that Vesco had
contributed heavily to HLN presidential and congressional
campaign chests diring the 1973-1974 campaign. Some
embarrassed liberacionistas thought Figueres was trying
to retaliate against members of his party who blocked his
1975 bid for a fourth presidential term. President Oduber,
under obvious pressure, later announced that Vesco had
agreed to leave the country, but Vesco himself was reported
to have denied making such an agreement. For extensive
coverage of these developments— from a source generally
critical of Figueres' actions— see La, Republica, May 5»
1 977 and subsequent issues.

CHAPTER VIII
PERSPECTIVES
In his last annual address to congress, Ulate
summarized his administration's goals as having been
those of the Chinese proverbs

”to leave the saber rusty,

the plow well-cared for, the jail empty and the granary
1
full.”
The pragmatic nature of the proverb was
completely consonant with Ulate's approach to government,
and there can be little doubt about his success in
achieving these goals. He took office in a country with
a faltering economy in which there was, according to
historian Carlos MelSndez, considerable concern about the
government's orientation on economic q u e s t i o n s A t the
end of his term, long-neglected debts, both foreign and
domestic, had been attended to and the country's credit
rating restored, thus making possible future borrowing
for development projects.

In addition, a serious foreign

exchange shortage was eliminated and foreign exchange
reserves accumulated.

A decade-long tradition of

1 Otilio Ulate, Mensa.ie del senor presidente
constitucional de'la republics don Otilio Ulate presentado.
a la asamblea legislativa el 1 de mayode 1953 (San Jos§»
iraprenta Nacional, 1953)» 31«
2

Interview with Carles Melendez, June 1, 197^.
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imbalanced budgets was reversed and budget surpluses
which accumulated were applied toward a large-scale plan
of public works aimed at laying the basis for a prosperous
society.

Due both to good weather and government

encouragement, Costa Rica's granaries were literally
full.

An. old custom of importing food crops at a high

cost to consumers was ended and Costa Rica began exporting
food crops, after satisfying all local demand.

Ulate

could not claim credit for the good harvests of coffee
and bananas which occurred toward the end of his adminis
tration, but he did put the increased revenue from the
record crops to good use in the development program.
Acting largely on constitutional mandates, the
administration also drafted laws which gave permanence
to some of Ulate's programs, such as his reform of the
national banking system, and which gave substance to the
institutional reform begun under the Junta.

The single

large shortcoming of the Ulate administration may have
been its failure to see that workers shared fully in the
new prosperity.

However, the social reform programs of

the 1940's were maintained, and in many cases, were for
the first time since their founding given sufficient funds
to make them meaningful operations. More in line with
Ulate's thinking, self-help programs of technical assist
ance and small-scale construction projects were begun
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in order to assist rural communities and individual
farmers.
Statistics on economic progress do not tell the
whole story of Ulate’s administration because his greatest
contribution was one of restoring Costa Ricans' faith
in their government.

More than any other president in

the past decade * and probably more than any other in the
country's history, Ulate abided by constitutional norms
guaranteeing civil liberties, effective suffrage and
freedom from executive abuse.

In this way, he did a great

deal to heal the wounds and calm the fears of the 1940*s.
Applying the same principles toward foreign policy, he
improved relations with Costa Rica's closest Central
American neighbor and left the country in peace at the
end of his term.
Most historians, like contemporary journalists,
have been more attracted to the drama of the revolutionary
period than to the quiet progress of the Ulate adminis
tration.

Consequently little attention has been devoted

to the Ulate years.

John Martz, who believes that

’probably no Costa Rican president in recent years has made
such a valuable contribution,” is one of the few who has
given Ulate his due.-*

Costa Ricans in Ulate's day seemed

3 John Marts,. Central America; The Crisis and the
Challenge (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1959), 235.
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to agree with this assessment, if one judges by the heavy
endorsement given him in the plebiscite of 1953» which was
generally regarded at the time as a vote of confidence
in the Ulate administration.

It should be noted in

this context that such a vote of approval at the end of
a Costa Rican administration is rare.

The Costa Rican

electorate has shown a strong tendency to turn against
incumbent administrations at some point in their tenure.
Despite these facts, Ulate had continually
declining political influence after 1953 and his party
also fared poorly.

By 1953 the political momentum of

the country had passed from traditional forces to JoffS
Figueres and his National Liberation Party.

The

plebiscite of that year seems, in retrospect, to have
been a farewell tribute to an honorable man rather than
a mandate for a continuation of his policies.

In examining

the reasons that the tide turned away from Ulate, it may
be useful to consider his approach toward government
and the reasons that this political philosophy faced
difficulties after the 19^0's.
Most of Ulate’s political attitudes were those of
a conservative: his distaste for abstract ideas and his
reliance on historical experience; his ’’organic" view of
society and abhorrence of the atomistic concept of
society as divided into hostile interest groups; his
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aristocratic preference for indirect democracy in which
the "best men" govern not to serve their own interests
but those of the public.
Ulate was deeply committed to free suffrage but he
felt it no threat to the established order,

because

he shared Jefferson's belief that a "natural aristocracy"
of talent existed and that the electorate would freely
turn to such leaders to govern the country.

Ulate thus

saw a fundamental harmony between different classes and
interests in Costa Rica and believed that government should
be a process of conciliation and of moving toward goals on
which there was a general consensus rather than a process
of struggle of one group against another.

Seeing no

natural conflict between social groups, he rejected
ideological parties representing the interests of different
groups as unnecessary and harmfulj Costa Rica needed only
to choose a good man who would accept the responsibility
of governing in the name of all the people.
Ulate thought Costa Rican history bore out his view
of Costa Rican society.

At least since 1889 the country

had been governed along the lines he favored and, in his
opinion, had developed into "a rural democracy which would
h.
have warmed the heart of Thomas Jefferson."
He thought
if- Ulate was fond of quoting this description of
Costa Rica given by two American writers.
See Ulate,
19 52 Mensa.ie
and Lawrence and Sylvia Martin, "Four
Strong Men and a President,” Harper's, CLXXV, (Sent. 19^2),
425.
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Costa Rica sc far superior to its neighbors, for example,
that he publicly stated in 1951 that his nation could not
consider joining -a Central American federation until the
other countries in the region had come somewhat closer to
Costa Rica's level of achievement.^
In his belief in Costa Rica's democracy,
tranquility and superiority, Ulate subscribed to a
popular myth which was— and to a certain extent still is—
widely held by Costa Ricans of all classes.0

Since a

people's history is shaped not just by what has actually
happened to them, but also by what they perceive themselves
as having experienced, this myth has been a powerful
motivating force in Costa Rica.

It inspired a national

pride in the country’s political system and institutions
which protected these institutions and allowed the country
to turn its attention from internal security and toward
development.

As Costa Rica, which had already begun the

national period with certain advantages over its neighbors,
developed a larger middle class, a higher literacy rate
and level of education and a more stable and democratic

5 Thomas L.. Karnes, The Failure of Union; Central
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1961), 2^9.
6

"Myth” is used here in George Sorel's sense,
as a set of ideas which may or may not be true but which
forms the basis for belief and action. Joseph H. Hallowell,
Main Currents in Modern Political Thought (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, I960), *!<60.
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form of government, the myth was reinforced.

While this

view was thus beneficial for a time, it later appears
to have served as an excuse for inaction and a lessening
of progress.

Some Costa Rican leaders recognized the

problem, at least to a certain extent.

Ricardo JimSnez

said late in life:
I was under the impression that we conceived
the civil ideal differently {'from the rest
of Central America] and had a truer republic
and a purer democracy. As time went on I
have come to see that we have become more
"Central Americanized »” putting ourselves
in tune.7
Ulate, however, never entirely lost his idealistic
view of Costa Rica.

In a diary kept In his later years,

he noted that Figueres and Vesco probably had guilty
consciences because of what they were doing to "a
g

beautiful little rural democracy."
These political views held by Ulate were basically
similar to those of the Generation of 1889 which provided
such a rich vein of leadership for the country for half
a century.

The success of this generation had in turn

rested on earlier experiences, particularly the isolation,
generalized poverty and close racial and family ties
which bound together the small Costa Rican population.

7 Jimenez cited in John and Mavis Biesans, Costa
Rican Life (New York; Columbia University Press, 1 9 /4.3+)
225

.

8
Papers.

Otilio Ulate, Unpublished diary, Otilio Ulate
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Given such a cohesive society, Costa Rica's traditional
political system, as evolved by the Generation of 1889t
could count on a fairly high level of agreement on basic
questions; political disputes thus tended to deal with
peripheral matters and did not challenge the core of the
social order.

Costa Rica's was a conservative society,

and most political leaders had the same faith in
personalistic parties and politics which Ulate later
expressed.

Indeed, these tendencies may be innate.

Although the word "conservative" is not popular in
modern Costa Rica, many of the country's leading thinkers
describe their society in terms of individualism, strong
loyalty to persons rather than institutions, and skepticism
toward bold action and Big Government— terms which imply
conservatism.

For example, Rodrigo Facio, himself a

leader of the very liberal Partido Social Democrats, says
flatly: "The tico is personalistic.

□

Professor Abelardo

Bonilla, more traditional in his thinking, draws similar
conclusions:
Does the Costa Rican...have a clear concept
of the State? We think not...He doesn't
think about the State which is an abstraction
for him. He thinks about the Government and
the people that are in it...but the concept

9 Rodrigo Facio, ”La constitucion politics de 19^9
y la tendencia institucional,” Revista de la Universidad de
Costa Rica, XIII (July 1956), 99.
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and -the doctrine about the State are
limited to students and professional
jurists and not to all the people, because
a good part— reflecting the spirit of the
people— flees as from.'the plague any
doctrinaire speculation’and concerns himself
only with the letter of the law, just as the
voter concerns himself with the candidate and
not his program.10
Perhaps the most vivid description of this
conservative mentality is given by sociologist Eugenio
Rodriguez Vega:
The Costa Rican is not audacious in his ideas,
nor in his plans nor in his activities; he
always thinks on a small scale and on a short
term basis... the psychology of the pulperla
characterises us.1^Jas§ Figueres, himself thoroughly committed to
a modern political system, believes that Costa Rica's
lack of ideological parties during the early part of the
century was a sign of political immaturity and he has
cited, almost with embarrassment, the fact that more
’’backward" countries in Central America had Liberal
and Conservative parties.

12

Apologists for the personal

istic system, by contrast, considered it one of Costa

10 Abelardo Bonilla, El costarricense y su
actitud polltica,” Revista de la Universidad de Costa Rica.
X (Nov. 195^),
11 The pulperla is a general store-soda fountain
arrangement important in the social life of some communities.
Eugenio Rodriguez Vega,. Apuntes para una ^ociologla
c ostarricense (San Jos§: Editorial Universitaria, 1953)» 61.
12

Interview with Jos§'Figueres, July 17, 1967*
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Rica's strengths.

Professor Bonilla, for example,

reflecting on someone's comment that Costa Rica’s esteemed
Cleto Gonzalez Viquez would have been great if he had
only had a political philosophy, noted that "the people
would have thought it was precisely the lack of it that
made him a model Costa Rican governor.
This traditional system operated on the premise
that the political goals of most groups did not differ
radically and that they could be met through the system.
In the 1930's this consensus began to break down for
several reasons.

The chief reason may have been that the

Generation of 1889 seemed to have slacked its efforts
toward continued social and economic progress, possibly
because the leaders of this generation had become too
complacent about Costa Rica, too convinced of the reality
of the myth.

Since Costa Rica's system of indirect demo

cracy implied both deference on the part of the lower
classes and duty on the part of the privileged elite, the
failure of the elite to fulfill its end of the- bargain
helped undercut faith in the system.

Groups with a more

skeptical view of society and of government, such as
the Reform Party and the Communist Party, began to
gain an audience. Unlike most earlier political parties
and movements, these movements— particularly that

13

Bonilla, "Actitud politica," ^7 .
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of -the Communist Party— implied a lack of faith in the
very nature of the system.
The most serious challenges— the ones the system
finally could not accommodate, defeat or absorb— came
in the 194-0' s . Even allowing for the fact that CalderSn
Guardia's social reform program was less radical than it
was perceived to be, he nevertheless represented the
greatest threat to the political system of I889 since
it had evolved.

In the first place, Calder6n was not a

voice crying in the wilderness, but the President of the
Republic, and hence he had a much greater chance of
actually putting his program into effect.

Iin addition,

Calderon's alliance with the Communist Party and his
more-than-usually arbitrary means of dealing with
political opponents alarmed many leaders of the traditional
school, particularly those such as Ulate who were strong
democrats. It is doubtful that Ulate and others would
ever have launched a revolution against Calder&n but
they acquiesced in JosS Figueres' ouster of him and, in
so doing, they acknowledged the inability of their
system to deal with CalderSn in less drastic ways and thus
helped to undermine the system they believed in..

By

permitting Jos§ Figueres to seize control of the govern
ment, they cu-t short the first challenge but were then
powerless to stop what proved to be an even more
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threatening— "because more successful— departure from
the traditional path.
Because he was accustomed to and "believed in a
political system in which basic values are taken for
granted, Ulate was not at home in a period of revolution;
Like most conservative leaders, Ulate was a actor, not
a theoretician, and his approach to government was the
pragmatic one of getting the job done.

This approach

is most effective in a stable social order where great
change is seldom undertaken and such change as occurs
is based on a natural extension of existing laws and
14
customs.
Ulate's relatively tolerant attitude toward
political opponents and his view of his duty as that of
restoration of social harmony were thus a part of his
effort

to reconstruct a social order based not so much

on the triumph of his policies over those.of some other
group as on reconciliation of different views in such a

14 Ulate's approach to change is, in this, sense,
reminiscent of that of Disraeli, who believed:
The great question is not whether you should resist
change, which is inevitable, but whether that
change whould be carried out in deference to the
manners, the customs, the laws, the traditions of
the people or in deference to abstract principle
and arbitrary and general doctrines■*
Quoted in Peter Viereck, Conservatism from John Adams to
Churchill (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1956), 43T

way that the most basic conflict never arose.

Once the

basis of the political system was challenged, however,
Ulate's position became difficult to maintain.

Henry

Kissinger has observed the dilemma of a conservative in
a period of great changei
It is the task of the conservative not to
defeat but to forestall revolutions...a society
which cannot •prevent a revolution, the
disintegration of whose values has been
demonstrated by the fact of revolution, will
not be able to defeat it by conservative
means.15
Nothing has been so indicative of the end of the
conservative era of consensus in Costa Rica as the
success of the National Liberation Party founded during
Ulate's administration.

The party and the political

beliefs of its leaders are the antithesis of the
traditional order.

The party leaders express faith in

government of institutions, not men; they are proud of
their party's ideological base; they sponsor controversial
programs which are known to divide the country in sharp
debate; and they emphasize a high profile role for the
government in many spheres.
PLN's success within Costa Rica's Conservative
milieu can be explained several ways.

In the first place-

15 Henry Kissinger, "The Conservative Dilemmaj
Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich,”
American Political Science Review (Dec. 195*01 156.
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and this is probably the most important factor——the .party
simply has a much more effective organization and a much
more thorough method of campaigning.

Compared with the

efforts of other parties, PLN is a juggernaut at campaign
time, and JosS Figueres, in particular, has shown a
willingness to begin campaigning years before an election,
as he did in 1953 and 1970.

Furthermore, the party

claims to have tapped new sources of political support, to
be offering Costa Rican peasants and workers a more
1^
direct participation in the democratic process.
PLN has also drawn support from another source—
members of the country’s elite who have gravitated to
PLN as it became clear that this new political force
would be the dominant one in Costa Rica.

The President

of the PUN-dominated legislature during Ulate’s adminis
tration, himself a PUN member who later joined PLN, noted
that, "at the beginning of Ulate's term, most of us were
ulatistas but many of us have since joined LiberaciSn.»^7

16 If any social group has gained a greater voice
in the m o d e m political system, however, it appears to be
not the working class, but certain members of the middle
class, particularly those associated with the expanding
bureaucracy. Charles Denton argues rather convincingly
that with the new higher-profile role of the government
the Costa Rican working class has been subjected to
greater regulation but has had fewer of its demands met.
See Denton, Patterns of Costa Rican Politics (New York:
Allyn and Bacon, 1 9 7 1 ), 82.
17 Interview with Marcial Rodriguez Conejo,
July 15, 1967.
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Such defections have "been costly to PUN and the traditional
order in terms of the leadership essential to the function
ing of its personalistic system.

Furthermore, there are

indications that the younger generation of Costa Ricans
are accepting PLN as the majority party in even greater
numbers than their parents.

Asked to list the political

party with which they most closely identified, upper class
schoolboys in San JosS, many of whose parents were sup
porters of PUN, listed PLN twice as often as any other
party.

18

While allowing for the fact that youth tends

to be more liberal than the older generation in most
societies, the survey still indicated the likelihood
of growing strength for PLN.
One observer has noted that Costa Rican society
has changed little and that PLN, like the other parties,
draws its leaders from the very small prestige class.^
Leaders of most political movements, whatever their
nature, are probably drawn from, elites, but this does not
negate the important differences between movements.

There

seems to be more substance to the observation that Costa
Rica has not undergone radical changes under PLN's

18 Daniel Goldrich, Sons of the^Establishment:
Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica (Chicagoi Rand
McNally,“1966), 51.
19

Denton, Patterns, 105■

228

direction.

This may be, as one writer indicates, because

PLN leaders have lost some of their seal, have become too
rich and out of touch with the country.

20

Another

explanation is that Costa Rica's usually conservative
society, even if it chooses to be led by a liberal party,
acts as an inhibiting influence on bold action.
Despite these facts, however, PLN is a new force
in Costa Rica, offering both a program and a concept of
government and society different from that of the
traditional system, which it has now largely supplanted.
Costa Rica in recent decades has shown a tendency toward
alternation in power, and it is quite possible that this
pattern may reassert itselfj but even so, a viable alterna
tive to PLN is more likely to develop from a PLN split or
from a strengthening of what remains.of the UnificaciSh
Nacional than from a revival of PUN or some other
traditional party.

Sometime between 1 9 ^ and 1953* Costa

Rica turned away from its traditional system and Otilio
Ulate, one of the last and best representatives of that
system, was unable to restore it to the position of
unquestioned supremacy it held during the Generation of
1889.

20 Robert J . Alexander, Latin American Political
Parties (New Yorki Praeger, 1973)» 2 3 2 .
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